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Following the Haitian Revolution, the island of Cuba emerged as the most productive sugar 
colony in the world. With the wars of independence on the American mainland threatening to 
spread to Cuba, and with the island’s growing population of enslaved Africans raising concerns 
that isolated acts of slave resistance might develop into more coordinated rebellions of larger 
scale, metropolitan officials sought to shield the colony from the transformations of the Age of 
Revolution by consolidating Spanish sovereignty over the island. As part of a broad effort to 
develop a mode of counter-revolutionary governance, metropolitan officials ordered the 
establishment in Havana of a permanent military tribunal known as the Military Commission, 
aiming to bolster the legal powers of the colony’s captain general to contend with threats to 
Cuban slavery and Spanish empire. 
 Through a study of Cuba’s Military Commission during the three decades it was in 
operation from 1825 to 1856, this dissertation demonstrates how colonial officials learned to 
channel fears of racial violence into an exceptional mode of repressive justice that afforded them 
the latitude and discretion to pursue the consolidation of sovereign authority within the executive 
branch of the colonial state. Though metropolitan officials envisioned the tribunal as a bulwark 
against political dissent, colonial officials regularly used the tribunal to contend with the actual 
and perceived threats posed by the island’s population of free and enslaved people of color. The 
Military Commission’s efforts to extend the legal powers of the captaincy general throughout 




that juridical exclusion and states of exception played in the development of legal and political 
regimes capable of abrogating the very norms, laws, and practices they claimed to sustain. By 
focusing on the way legal practices that evolved in the repression of free and enslaved people of 
color were institutionalized, becoming fundamental components of the normative administration 
of justice, this dissertation argues that the legal dimensions of slavery did not disappear with 
slavery’s demise, but contributed to the emergence of administrative structures and the 
reconfiguration of inter-institutional relations of power that characterized the development of 











There was a time when prevailing winds and ocean currents sustained Cuba’s place in the 
Spanish Empire. Overshadowed by Spain’s possessions on the American mainland, Cuba’s 
relevancy hinged on Havana’s role as the final port of call for ships preparing to move America’s 
wealth across the Atlantic and into Spanish coffers. For hundreds of years, Cuba served as a 
point of transit.1 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, a different set of forces emerged that would 
help make Cuba more than a pivot in the imperial system of trade. In 1791, enslaved men and 
women on the northern plain of the French colony of Saint-Domingue rose up against their 
masters. Over the next thirteen years, they and their allies fought for and erected the independent 
nation of Haiti on the remains of what had been the most productive sugar colony in the world.2 
Having long aspired to replicate the fortunes of Saint-Domingue, Cuban planters were well 
prepared to step into the opening in the global market for sugar left by the Haitian Revolution. 
Aware that their capacity to do so was contingent on their ability to import increasing numbers of 
enslaved Africans to work the fields, they had already successfully lobbied Spain to begin 
                                                 
1 Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the 
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liberalizing the slave trade to Cuba in 1789.3 Over the next three decades, during the years of the 
liberalized slave trade to Cuba, an estimated 300,000 Africans were brought to Cuban shores 
through legal and illegal means.4 During the 1820s and 1830s, even as the British exerted 
increasing pressure on Spain to comply with its treaty obligations to abolish its slave trade, the 
contraband slave trade introduced an additional 322,560 slaves to Cuba.5 
Just as Cuba’s plantation economy was in ascendancy, the Napoleonic invasion of the 
Iberian Peninsula and the abdications of Carlos IV and his son Fernando VII threw the Spanish 
Empire into turmoil. Throughout Spanish domains, anti-French resistance organized around 
regional experiments in self-governance. In the Americas, independence movements emerged 
from the ensuing disruption, steadily eroding Spain’s once formidable Atlantic empire. By 1823, 
only Cuba and Puerto Rico were fully under metropolitan control. Whereas Cuba was long a 
place most people passed through, it now became the hub of what Josep Fradera has called the 
“colonies after empire.”6 
Spain too proved susceptible to these disruptions. During the French occupation, political 
resistance eventually coalesced around the Cortes de Cádiz, which in 1812 proclaimed a liberal 
constitution premised on the idea that national sovereignty reverted to the people in the king’s 
                                                 
3 Ada Ferrer, Freedom’s Mirror: Cuba and Haiti in the Age of Revolution (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), chap. 1. 
4 David R. Murray, Odious Commerce: Britain, Spain and the Abolition of the Cuban Slave 
Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 19. 
5 David Eltis and David Richardson, “A New Assessment of the Transatlantic Slave Trade,” in 
Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New Transatlantic Slave Trade Database, eds. David 
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absence. With the defeat of French forces in 1813, Fernando VII reclaimed the throne as 
sovereign, abolished the Constitution of 1812, and nullified most of the liberal reforms enacted 
by the Cortes. Resentment over his absolutism lingered, however, until elements in the military 
compelled the king to reinstate the Constitution of Cádiz in 1820. For three years known as the 
trienio liberal, constitutional monarchy prevailed throughout Spanish domains, until a coalition 
of European forces led by the French invaded Spain and restored Fernando VII, who reigned as 
absolute monarch until his death a decade later.7  
By 1823, then, Cuba found itself caught up in winds and currents of a different sort. In a 
world where the struggle against slavery had engendered the nation of Haiti and propelled the 
project of British abolitionism, Cuban slavery was stronger and more important than ever. In a 
time when a hemisphere once the site of colonies was now the home of nations, Cuba maintained 
its imperial relationship with Spain. And at a moment when emerging liberal ideologies were 
transforming notions of citizenship and sovereignty, residents of the “ever-faithful isle” remained 
subjects of an absolutist monarch. In the waning days of the Age of Revolution, Cuba’s political 
and economic elites plotted a counter-revolutionary course.8 
For those directing Cuban economic policy, negotiating the cross-currents of slavery and 
empire promised great rewards. By the late-1820s, planters in Cuba had succeeded in mobilizing 
the labor of enslaved Africans to transform the island into the largest producer of sugar in the 
world.9 In the capital city of Havana, the resultant wealth was on full display as what Manuel 
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Moreno Fraginals has coined the “sugarocracy” acquired noble titles, built palaces, and 
bejeweled themselves in the finest imports from the east.10 Furthermore, the wealth wrought 
from Cuban slavery transformed the island into the most important colonial possession in 
Spain’s greatly diminished empire. Whereas the empire had once financed the costs of colonial 
governance in Cuba through a subsidy from New Spain known as the situado, by the 1820s it 
was the colony that was subsidizing metropolitan governance in Spain.11 
Far from assured, Cuba’s fortunes were premised on a risky proposition. Planters seeking 
to move into the openings afforded to them by the Haitian Revolution could only do so by 
harnessing the lives and labor of increasing numbers of African captives. With the nation of Haiti 
an ever-present reminder of the revolutionary potential of this enslaved labor force, they pursued 
a bold and delicate course, seeking to, in the words of Ada Ferrer, “emulate Saint-Domingue, but 
to contain Haiti.”12 
The risks of this endeavor became manifest in 1812 when a conspiracy of free men of 
color led by José Antonio Aponte, an artist, carpenter, and veteran of Havana’s free black militia, 
persuaded slaves on a number of sugar plantations on the outskirts of the city to rise up in 
rebellion. The uprising was quickly suppressed, and soon after the conspiracy dismantled. After a 
judicial proceeding commissioned by the captain general, the island’s highest ranking colonial 
official, Aponte and his co-conspirators were publicly executed, their bodies decapitated, and 
their severed heads displayed in the black neighborhoods of Havana as a warning to free and 
                                                 
10 Manuel Moreno Fraginals, El ingenio: Complejo económico social cubano del azúcar, vol. 1 
(Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1978). 
11 Fradera, Colonias para después de un imperio, 56. 




enslaved people of color. Slaves who had denounced the rebellions and cooperated with 
investigating officials, by contrast, were rewarded with their freedom.13 As Matt Childs has 
pointed out, however, “the most attentive pupils to the lessons of death for rebellion and rewards 
for loyalty to the Spanish Crown were the white Creoles,” as the rebellion “served to dilute 
whatever aspirations white Cubans had of creating an independent country.”14 
If aspirations to independence had been diluted, they had not been rendered fully inert. 
By 1823, the emergence of Simón Bolívar and the final Wars of Independence on the American 
mainland had lent credence to the possibility of national independence, while the dissolution of 
the trienio liberal in Spain seemed to portend the foreclosure of even moderate reforms in Cuba. 
Inspired and frustrated, a conspiratorial movement eventually emerged from a network of secret 
societies throughout the island, drawing some support from free people of color and with links 
abroad, apparently aiming to abolish slavery and secure Cuban independence from Spain. Upon 
learning of the conspiracy, Cuba’s captain general relied on district and municipal courts to 
conduct preliminary investigations before convening a special commission of jurists from the 
Real Audiencia, the island’s final court of appeals, to prosecute what was by then known as the 
Conspiracy of the Soles y Rayos de Bolívar.15 
By 1824, colonial administrators in Cuba and metropolitan officials in Spain were well 
                                                 
13 Matt D. Childs, The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle against Atlantic Slavery 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Ferrer, Freedom’s Mirror, chap. 7. 
14 Childs, The 1812 Aponte Rebellion, 177. 
15 Vidal Morales y Morales, Iniciadores y primeros mártires de la revolución cubana (Havana: 
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aware that in an Atlantic world replete with black citizens, new nations, and growing momentum 
behind the abolitionist project, anti-slavery and anti-colonial struggles were not aberrations in the 
normative functioning of Cuban slavery and Spanish empire, but were now among their 
permanent features. To maintain Spanish sovereignty over Cuba in opposition to the forces of 
revolution and the threats they posed while also attending to the economic interests of Cuban 
elites and the exigencies of imperial finance, then, would require a sustained response to 
persistent crises. It would require, in other words, a counter-revolution through governance. 
Isle of Exceptions considers colonial governance in Cuba in the aftermath of the near total 
collapse of Spain’s empire in the Americas, and in particular the development of some of the 
legal mechanisms colonial officials turned to when confronting threats to Cuban slavery and 
Spanish empire. Though the colonial state relied on a constellation of forces to defend the island 
from physical attack, including a sizeable garrison of soldiers in the regular army, local militias, 
regional magistrates with policing powers, and the auxiliary support of area residents, it 
promoted the long-term cause of insular security through practices that were decidedly legal in 
form. Following the slave rebellions of 1812, after all, it had been interrogations conducted 
during the investigatory phase of a judicial process that had identified José Antonio Aponte as 
the leader of the conspiracy. Similarly, the dismantling of the Conspiracy of the Soles y Rayos de 
Bolívar had occurred at the hands of a distributed set of investigations that had then been 
combined into a unified prosecution of over 600 defendants.16 In these instances, determining 
culpability and passing sentences served a strategic purpose beyond merely meting out justice. 
They were also about gathering intelligence on present threats and diminishing the potential of 
future ruptures. 
                                                 




To help confront threats to Cuban slavery and Spanish empire, the metropolitan 
government ordered the establishment on the island of an Executive and Permanent Military 
Commission on March 4, 1825.17 An extension of a system of permanent military tribunals set 
up in Spain in 1824 following the restoration of Fernando VII’s absolutist regime, Cuba’s 
Military Commission institutionalized the captaincy general’s powers to commission judicial 
processes on an ad hoc basis, as had been done with the prosecutions of the conspiracies of 
Aponte and the Soles y Rayos de Bolívar. Furthermore, the new tribunal, as a military court that 
operated within a military hierarchy, afforded captains general a juridical apparatus that served at 
their discretion.18 
The captaincy general’s ability to defend Cuba through legal means, however, was not a 
competency that could be amplified with the stroke of a pen. As Malick Ghachem has observed 
about the Code Noir in colonial Saint-Domingue, “few laws are so immaculately designed, few 
decisional principles so clearly drawn, as to leave no room at all for creative tinkering with their 
margins” or for “unintended applications.”19 Indeed, the captaincy general’s ability to prosecute 
threats to Cuban slavery and Spanish empire meant contending with the gaps and fissures 
between imperial designs and their colonial articulations. 
The originating system of permanent military tribunals in Spain had been explicitly 
                                                 
17 Decreto, Havana, 4 March 1825, exp. 1, leg. 1, Comisión Militar Ejecutiva y Permanente 
(hereafter CM), Archivo Nacional de Cuba (hereafter ANC). 
18 For the only dedicated study of the Military Commission, see Joaquín Llaverías, La comisión 
militar ejecutiva y permanente de la isla de Cuba (Havana: Academia de la Historia de Cuba, 
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19 Malick Ghachem, The Old Regime and the Haitian Revolution (New York: Cambridge 




established following the trienio liberal to purge liberals from all levels of government.20 If 
metropolitan officials had envisioned Cuba’s Military Commission as a bulwark against the 
threats posed by liberal constitutionalists following the island’s own experience during the 
trienio liberal, Captain General Francisco Dionisio Vives acknowledged the differing challenges 
facing his administration when he introduced the tribunal to Cubans as an expression of the 
King’s desire to “protect them from the horrors and ruin brought on by the unrest that has been 
experienced in his American domains.”21 However threatening Captain General Vives may have 
found subversive political ideologies from the mainland to be, threats like those posed by the 
Cuban conspiracies of Aponte and of the Soles y Rayos de Bolívar, which relied on free people 
of color to channel the potential of the island’s enslaved population towards a separation from 
Spain, were surely of more immediate concern. Whereas the targets of Spain’s system of 
permanent military tribunals were envisioned as governing officials, Cuba’s tribunal would thus 
expend much time and effort prosecuting free and enslaved people of color. 
This difference in the social standing of the defendants prosecuted by Cuba’s Military 
Commission had immediate and long-lasting consequences. The tribunal functioned at a time 
when most expenses incurred during judicial proceedings, from the cost of paper to the 
consultative services of legal advisers, were paid for through fees, fines, and the confiscation of 
                                                 
20 For Spain’s system of Military Commissions, see Pedro Pegenaute, Represión política en el 
reinado de Fernando VII: Las comisiones militares (1824-1825) (Pamplona: Universidad de 
Navarra, 1974). 
21 Decreto, Havana, 4 March 1825, exp. 1, leg. 1, CM, ANC. “para preservarlos de los horrores y 





property.22 The tribunal thus faced the unique challenge of having to finance its operations when 
some of its most costly prosecutions involved slave rebellions, where most defendants not only 
lacked property to embargo, but were themselves held as property by others. In order to function, 
the tribunal thus required a host of financial accommodations that had not been mandated in the 
royal order of March 4, 1825, forcing successive captains general to attend to the tribunal’s 
administrative needs even as they wielded the tribunal as a court of law. 
Through a study of Cuba’s Military Commission during its three decades in operation, 
Isle of Exceptions demonstrates how threats to Cuban slavery and Spanish empire served as 
motive forces behind a set of legal and administrative innovations that disrupted established 
governing practices and relations of institutional power constituting the colonial government. 
Over time, successive captains general took advantage of the openings caused by the tribunal’s 
work to assist in a broader program of administrative reforms aimed at consolidating governing 
authority within the office of the captaincy general. In his study of slavery and governance in 
sixteenth-century Quito, Sherwin Bryant argues that “by governing the importation, distribution, 
sale, management, and use of enslaved Africans, the crown and its officials conducted the 
development of colonial authority and over time colonial state formation.”23 By extending 
Bryant’s insights into the waning days of the Age of Revolution, and focusing on the application 
of law in the service of insular security, Isle of Exceptions argues that it was in part through the 
Military Commission’s experience applying law in the repression of free and enslaved people of 
color that the colonial state developed the mechanisms and ability to practice counter-
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In his study of the lead-up to Spanish American independence, Jeremy Adelman observes 
that “social revolutions were not the cause of imperial breakups, but their consequence.”24 With 
the Spanish Empire having already all but collapsed, metropolitan and colonial officials resisted 
further imperial deterioration by adjusting governance to prevent social revolution. Effectively 
governing the island in the face of persistent threats to insular security, however, was not merely 
an exercise in more effectively defending Spanish sovereignty. It was also about contending with 
the ways sovereign authority was expressed throughout the island. As Isle of Exceptions 
demonstrates, slaveholders, white residents, and governing officials could all influence the 
state’s response to the actual and perceived threats posed by free and enslaved people of color, 
just as functionaries of different governing institutions could then claim authority over different 
aspects of that response. As a disparate cast of characters with varying degrees of formal and 
informal power attended to challenges to Cuban slavery and Spanish empire, they also often 
found themselves contesting the configuration of Spanish sovereignty itself. Through these 
struggles over who had claims to sovereign authority, and who had the power to determine how 
that authority might itself be transformed, a new form a colonial governance emerged constituted 
through and of the practices of repression and domination. 
Evoking Lauren Benton’s observation that “the administration of empire depended … on 
the exercise of delegated legal authority,” Spanish sovereignty in Cuba was expressed by 
officials from the captain general in Havana and governors in regional capitals like the city of 
Matanzas to the neighborhood commissars and district captains extending governing authority 
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throughout urban centers and the countryside.25 While they ostensibly worked towards similar 
goals, their distribution across the geography of Cuban slavery served to differentiate their 
particular strategies for enacting sovereign authority. The focus of chapter 1, this strategic 
divergence was on full display in the Military Commission’s first major prosecution, which dealt 
with a slave rebellion that broke out across multiple plantations in the Guamacaro district of 
Matanzas on June 15, 1825.  
According to Manuel Barcia, the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825 was “the first large 
African-led slave revolt in nineteenth-century Cuba,” signaling a new phase in the 
“Africanization of the manifestations of slave resistance.”26 For the officials coordinating its 
suppression, investigation, and prosecution, however, the rebellion was a more enigmatic event, 
posing different challenges and eliciting different responses. The governor of Matanzas, for 
instance, saw the rebellion as an expression of the inherent risks of plantation slavery. 
Investigating the rebellion thus served the purpose of identifying its leaders so that their public 
executions would act as warnings to other slaves considering similar actions. For Captain 
General Vives in Havana, on the other hand, the size of the rebellion and the number of 
plantations affected were indications that the slaves themselves could not have planned and 
coordinated the uprising on their own. By ordering the Military Commission to investigate the 
rebellion and prosecute its leaders, Vives hoped to verify his suspicion that political dissidents 
with ties to independence movements on the American mainland had been behind the uprising. 
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Because the rebellion posed different types of threats, it also afforded the officials who 
did the actual work of suppression, investigation, and prosecution with different types of 
opportunities. Local authorities participating in the military and legal responses to the rebellion 
hoped to curry favor with the government in order to pave the way for future commissions and 
possible rewards. While Military Commission officials similarly hoped to merit personal 
distinction, they also sought to demonstrate the new tribunal’s ability to advance the interests of 
the captaincy general and insular security more broadly. 
 As tribunal officials prosecuted the rebellion, then, they engaged in a series of disputes 
with other agents of colonial governance regarding the ends to which their efforts would serve. 
Hoping that the prosecution would itself work against future outbreaks of violence, Matanzas-
based officials pursued a repressive mode of justice aimed a terrifying the region’s enslaved 
population. Military Commission officials, on the other hand, sought an interrogatory mode of 
justice, hoping to uncover what they believed to be the true origins of the rebellion. These 
contestations unfolded through interpretative disagreements over laws mandating the abrogation 
of normal legal practices when prosecuting slave rebellions and on the legitimacy of the use of 
torture when interrogating slaves. 
Sovereign authority was not the purview of governing officials alone. Indeed, as Benton 
points out, the “outsourcing of violence [was] also integral to layered systems of sovereignty in 
which the sovereign’s claim to a monopoly on coercive power was consistent with the 
authorization of weakly regulated violence in the sovereign’s name.”27 In Cuba, as in other slave 
societies, a prevailing example of this sovereign outsourcing was found in the sanctioned use of 
                                                 




violence by slaveholders against their slaves.28 A related form of sovereign outsourcing was also 
found in the spaces of urban life, where white residents, though not formally authorized to use 
violence against populations of color, were nonetheless called on to participate in the work of 
policing.29 
Chapter 2 considers the Military Commission’s first seven years in operation and focuses 
on cases where the tribunal’s role in promoting insular security brought it into contact with free 
and enslaved people of color in the urban centers of Havana and Matanzas. Since the tribunal 
was not itself a police force, Captain General Vives frequently assigned it cases to prosecute that 
had already been initiated by regional officials and local authorities. In cases dealing with people 
of color accused of engaging in subversive activities, it was often the denunciations and 
testimonies of area residents that initiated these preliminary investigations. The tribunal thus 
often encountered defendants of color whose apprehensions reflected the suspicions and 
prejudices of white residents and neighbors engaging in an informal, yet legally sanctioned 
practice of insular security. 
It is difficult to discern with any precision to what extent these denunciations stemmed 
from suspicions regarding the threatening activities of people of color, and to what extent they 
reflected petty bigotries and personal grievances. In the aggregate, however, they fueled an 
informal mode of repressive justice that placed restrictive pressure on the social lives of urban 
people of color. Following the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825, Matanzas-based officials living and 
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working within the heart of Cuban slavery viewed the law as a means to terrify the enslaved into 
submission. In the urban centers of western Cuba, area residents and local authorities living 
proximate lives with a diverse urban population of color also turned to the law in a similar 
project of social domination. 
For Military Commission officials who did the actual work of prosecuting these cases, 
however, fear, suspicion, and animosity did not constitute evidence of actual wrong-doing. In 
their efforts to uncover threats to Cuban slavery and Spanish empire, tribunal officials grew 
frustrated with the frequency with which they expended time and energy pursuing prosecutions 
against free people of color that resulted in acquittals. These frustrations engendered intra-
institutional ruminations about the inconveniences that resulted from following the letter of the 
law in such prosecutions. Over time, tribunal officials began contemplating ways of bypassing 
the law when prosecuting free people of color. 
Even as these prosecutions were inconvenient and engendered frustrations, they were 
nonetheless consequential, as they placed the Military Commission and the captaincy general it 
served in contact with white Cubans who may have been readily inclined to collapse any 
distinctions between the revolutionary potential of free people of color and the actual threats they 
posed. Though the outcomes of these prosecutions seldom confirmed their originating biases, the 
accusations they acted upon placed the impulse of tribunal officials to hold free people of color 
to a less rigorous practice of law in dialog with their growing preoccupation regarding possible 
alliances between free and enslaved people of color. 
While the Military Commission’s work placed it in contact with agents of imperial 
sovereignty layered vertically along the political, military, and social hierarchies ordering Cuban 




institutions possessing distinct legal competencies and particular political interests. During the 
crafting of the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz as well as the years of liberal governance of the trienio 
liberal, political contestations between Cuban elites and Spain may have seemed to pivot around 
questions of citizenship and representation within the fledgling liberal order. As Josep Fradera 
has also demonstrated, “the struggles for control of the institutions of government were just as 
fierce.”30 By shifting focus from the tribunal’s prosecutorial work to its institutional presence, 
chapter 3 demonstrates how Spanish sovereignty in Cuba was also articulated through a set of 
inter-institutional relationships that held colonial governance suspended within the push and pull 
of competing political objectives. Within this web, the tribunal’s mandate to contend with actual 
and perceived threats to Spain’s continued dominion over Cuba earned it room to operate, while 
its role in amplifying the executive authority of the captaincy general attracted the ire of self-
interested institutions. 
Captain General Vives introduced Cuba’s Military Commission into a governing context 
characterized by a negotiated division of administrative authority that afforded large measures of 
autonomy and local control to some of the government’s most important institutions.31 The Real 
Audiencia, located in the city of Puerto Príncipe in central Cuba, served as the institutional 
center of the island’s legal system, enjoyed broad consultative powers, could draft certain types 
of legislation, and possessed the right to communicate directly with the metropolitan government 
in Spain.32 For the members of the island’s highest court, the new tribunal was seen as an 
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unnecessary infringement on its jurisdiction. 
For the Intendancy, the Military Commission’s disruptions were more subtle, though 
potentially more consequential. As the island’s chief financial institution, the Intendancy and its 
ancillary organizations played important roles in promoting the rise of Cuba’s sugar economy. 
While the Intendancy’s importance to imperial finance grew after the Wars of Independence on 
the American mainland, the institution also increasingly expressed the interests of Cuban elites 
aspiring to greater levels of control over sectors of the Cuban economy responsible for their 
growing wealth. Its role as an instrument of local interests became further entrenched in 1825 
with the appointment of the Cuban-born Claudio Martínez de Pinillos as superintendent.33 Even 
as the Intendancy welcomed the Military Commission’s efforts to promote political and social 
stability on the island, then, it did not look favorably on the financial burdens the tribunal might 
impose. And like the Real Audiencia, it was wary of the tribunal’s potential to diminish their 
claims to sovereign authority by amplifying the executive powers of the captaincy general. 
Though the threats posed to Cuban slavery and Spanish empire brought some of these 
divergent interests and objectives into line, they were not enough to obliterate them altogether. In 
attending to the Military Commission’s finances, for instance, Superintendent Martínez de 
Pinillos insisted that all directives be mandated by the responsible ministries in Spain, rather than 
by order of the captain general. And when the Real Audiencia received orders to disband the 
Military Commission, its members jumped at the opportunity to instruct then Captain General 
Miguel Tacón to disband a judicial rival.  
During the tenure of Captain General Miguel Tacón from 1834 to 1838, these tensions 
developed into discord. With the death of Fernando VII in 1833, contestations over the future of 
                                                 




Spanish sovereignty provoked the first Carlist war on the Peninsula. Cuba too faced its share of 
disruptions, as former subjects of an absolutist monarch contemplated futures with a greater 
political voice as Spanish citizens. For metropolitan officials and Captain General Tacón alike, 
the opening of political possibilities in Cuba evoked the specter of Latin American 
independence, prompting the captain general to assume a more assertive disposition regarding 
the authority of his office. One way he articulated this disposition was through increased use of 
the Military Commission to not only prosecute threats to insular security, but to promote a more 
diffuse sense of social order throughout the island. When Tacón then attempted to create a new 
court to oversee the prosecution of vagrants and the suppression of unsanctioned jurists known as 
picapleitos, he faced open opposition from the Real Audiencia. A developing rivalry with 
Superintendent Martínez de Pinillos of the Intendancy further distressed Tacón’s administration. 
The limits of executive power within a governing context of distributed sovereign authority were 
revealed in 1838, when leading figures in Cuban society and government successfully 
orchestrated Tacón’s recall to Spain.34 
Indeed, for the first decade and a half of the Military Commission’s existence, it proved 
ineffectual as a centralizing force precisely because institutions like the Intendancy and Real 
Audiencia were such powerful agents of Spanish sovereignty that they could determine how, if at 
all, they would facilitate the tribunal’s work. Even as successive captains general tried to use the 
tribunal to bolster the legal competencies of their office, there was always the risk of 
destabilizing the foundations of Spain’s dominion over the island and producing precisely the 
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type of revolutionary upheaval the court was designed to combat. From its inception, then, the 
Military Commission engendered disruption and discord, limiting its ability to provoke any 
fundamental transformations in the configuration of sovereign authority constituting colonial 
governance. 
The growth in Cuban slavery, however, engendered the conditions for that to change. By 
the 1840s, Cuba’s continued reliance on the contraband slave trade to sustain and increase its 
enslaved labor force had provoked the ire of the British government and abolitionists alike. Their 
particular agendas converged in 1840 with the appointment of David Turnbull as British consul 
to Cuba. While Turnbull’s abolitionist activities created such a stir that his superiors eventually 
transferred him off the island, he remained a potent symbol of foreign meddling with the future 
of Cuban slavery.35 
Through its very success, the contraband slave trade to Cuba also invigorated concerns 
regarding threats to Cuban slavery from within. When an 1841 census revealed that Cuba’s free 
and enslaved population of color exceeded its white population, it undercut the argument that 
Cuba would not succumb to a general slave uprising because of the demographic superiority of 
the island’s white population.36 When a succession of slave rebellions rocked the region of 
Matanzas in 1843, then, colonial officials were primed to believe that Captain General Vives’s 
original fears were coming true and that outside forces were relying on free people of color as 
intermediaries in efforts to incite the enslaved to rise up en masse to abolish slavery and 
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overthrow the colonial regime. And indeed, a version of that formulation seems to have been 
taking place. 
In early January 1844, Captain General Leopoldo O’Donnell authorized a group of local 
authorities and area planters to conduct an explicitly extrajudicial investigation into revelations 
that some of the slave rebellions of 1843 might have been premature actions of a vast plot. This 
investigatory process was organized around the premise that slaves under interrogation would 
only reveal the truth of the conspiracy if compelled to do so by employing the corrective 
measures slaveholders used to maintain plantation discipline, measures that were considered 
torture and thus prohibited during lawful interrogations. Even though officials thus described this 
investigation as extrajudicial, the violence undergirding the master/slave relationship itself 
possessed legal sanction and was only steps removed from the mode of repressive justice 
Matanzas-based officials had advocated for in the wake of the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825.  
Eventually, O’Donnell extended his authorization to use torture against slaves to include 
free people of color as well. As the extrajudicial investigation grew, so too did the scale and 
scope of the conspiracy it claimed to have discovered. Elevating repressive modes of 
interrogation to their most egregious levels, the investigatory process became notorious for the 
overt violence employed by interrogators, who were known to whip slaves while they were tied 
to ladders. This practice was so prevalent that the conspiracy came to be known as La Escalera 
(the ladder) and 1844 as the Year of the Lash. 
Generations of scholars have debated whether the plot investigators claimed to have 
discovered was a convenient fabrication or accurately reflected the efforts by a coalition 
attempting to foment revolution.37 Robert Paquette provides the most useful framework for 
                                                 




understanding what the investigators were contending with when he wrote that “the Conspiracy 
of La Escalera existed not as one conspiracy but as several distinct yet overlapping conspiracies, 
central elements of which were revolutionary in their aspirations.”38 In her recent study on La 
Escalera, Aisha Finch highlights the roles that slaves of African descent, especially enslaved 
women, played in sustaining what she refers to as “a black political culture in the rural plantation 
world that produced an insurgent struggle, and transcended its limitations.”39 Taking the 
existence of the conspiracy as a settled matter whose precise details nonetheless remain elusive, 
then, chapter 4 considers the Military Commission’s role in the investigatory process that 
uncovered the conspiracy and its implications for the reconfiguration of sovereign authority on 
the island. 
Captain General O’Donnell assigned the Military Commission to assume jurisdiction 
over the “Escalera process” only after investigators claimed to have uncovered links between 
rural slaves and urban free people of color in a conspiratorial network.40 It was not this 
“evidence” of a conspiracy that compelled him to do so, however, so much as it was the toll the 
Escalera process was taking on the colonial government’s ability to sustain a judicial process that 
had quickly grown out of control. With the number of investigators growing and with hundreds 
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of detainees filling the prisons and hospitals of Matanzas, there was no clear indication of who 
was going to foot the bill. As a court operating at the captain general’s discretion and with a long 
history of financing the prosecution of free and enslaved people of color, the Military 
Commission was the obvious instrument to start moving from investigations into prosecutions 
and to bring the Escalera process to a conclusion. In doing so, however, the tribunal did not 
displace the functionaries and ethos of the extrajudicial phase of the Escalera process, but rather 
incorporated the men and the mentality into the institutional expression of Captain General 
O’Donnell’s legal powers. The Escalera process was thus more than a series of investigations 
and prosecutions. It was also a transformative event during which the exigencies of insular 
security in the face of massively organized black resistance compelled the convergence of the 
instruments of governance with the forces of social domination. 
Through imprisonment, torture, execution, exile, and expropriation, free and enslaved 
people of color experienced the worst of the Escalera process.41 The entire episode also had an 
important influence on the colonial government and Cuban society more broadly. Though 
legislative reforms augmenting the powers of the captaincy general were still on the horizon, 
Captain General O’Donnell emerged from 1844 empowered with a greater de facto concentration 
of sovereign authority than any of his predecessors, and that his successors would carry into the 
1850s.  
If the Conspiracy of La Escalera represented the culmination of struggles against Cuban 
slavery stretching back to the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825 and the Aponte Rebellion of 1812 
before that, Narciso López’s efforts to effect Cuba’s annexation to the United States from 1848 
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to 1851 marked a new phase in a history of Cuban anti-imperialism stretching back to the 
Conspiracy of the Soles y Rayos de Bolívar of 1823. The initial focus of chapter 5, López’s 
actions against Spanish empire were particularly alarming because of his storied career serving 
the empire he eventually turned against. A general in the Spanish army who had commanded 
soldiers in the Americas and Spain, and had even served as the Military Commission’s president 
from 1842 to 1843, López had retreated from government service thereafter only to emerge five 
years later as a proponent of Cuba’s separation from Spain and annexation by the United States. 
The Military Commission prosecuted López in absentia when the general fled the island after an 
aborted insurrection in 1848. Following López’s first expedition to Cuba in 1850, Captain 
General José de la Concha directed the tribunal to prosecute suspected supporters of Cuba’s 
annexation to the United States. And when Spanish troops in Cuba captured López and fifty of 
his soldiers during a second expedition in 1851, De la Concha directed tribunal officials in 
enacting the kind of severe and exemplary justice against the prisoners that Matanzas-based 
officials had called for in response to the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825 and that Leopoldo 
O’Donnell had achieved during the Escalera process of 1844. Rather than publicly executing free 
and enslaved people of color as a warning to those who might seek to end Cuban slavery, 
however, De la Concha executed a former Spanish general in order to dissuade future action 
against the empire itself.42 
De la Concha’s execution of Narciso López was the most dramatic example of a captain 
general directing the legal powers and practices the colonial government had developed in the 
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repression of free and enslaved people of color towards securing the island from the evolving 
threats to Cuban slavery and Spanish empire. Another focus of chapter 5, the concentration of 
sovereign authority within the captaincy general accompanying this transformation also took 
place at an institutional level. In 1853, the captaincy general assumed all the powers once held by 
the superintendent of the Intendancy. And in 1855, De la Concha enacted a series of legal 
reforms that centralized the administration of the island’s system of lower courts by 
professionalizing its workforce and affording the captaincy general broad authority over judicial 
appointments. Through these reforms, the metropolitan government codified into law the 
centralization of colonial governance under the sovereign authority of the captaincy general. 
Their ability to do so without inciting the type of disruption that had contributed to Latin 
American independence, however, reflected how this process of centralization had already taken 
place. In this final regard, the Military Commission had played an important role as one of the 
main tools successive captains general used to wrest sovereign authority from leading institutions 
of colonial governance such as the Real Audiencia and the Intendancy. As if to highlight this 
point, De la Concha followed the implementation of the legal reforms of 1855 with the Military 
Commission’s dissolution, claiming that the tribunal’s role in amplifying the legal dimensions of 
executive power had now been replicated throughout the island’s system of lower courts.  
Isle of Exceptions thus opens up the conceptual terrain established by Frank 
Tannenbaum, when he argued that “nothing was beyond or above or outside the slave institution; 
the institution was the society in all of its manifestations.”43 Taking Sherwin Bryant’s call to 
recognize “the centrality of slavery to colonial development and the emergence of race as a 
modality of early modern colonial governance” into the contentious world of Cuban slavery and 
                                                 




Spanish empire in the waning days of the Age of Revolution, Isle of Exception argues that 
administering justice in the service of counter-revolutionary governance would itself involve a 
revolution in how justice was administered.44 
                                                 










A Precarious Balance: Repression and Authority in Matanzas, 1825 
 
On July 21, 1825, in a military fortress in the city of Matanzas, the enslaved Pablo Gangá faced 
Captain Francisco Lamadriz as a different sort of captive.1 Pablo had been detained in the late-
afternoon of June 15, following a slave rebellion that had broken out across multiple plantations 
in the Guamacaro district of the jurisdiction of Matanzas.2 He now stood before Lamadriz 
accused of being among the principal leaders of the rebellion. A fiscal (prosecutor) with Cuba’s 
Military Commission, Lamadriz had been charged with determining the origins of the rebellion. 
At that moment, his primary concern was to take Pablo’s confession. His efforts that day, 
however, were only the most immediate step in a broader legal intervention into colonial 
governance upon which metropolitan and colonial officials staked the future of Cuban slavery 
and, indeed, the Spanish Empire itself. 
Less than two years earlier, Captain General Vives had reported to his superiors in Spain 
that Cuba’s poorly administered system of justice hindered his prosecution of the Soles y Rayos 
de Bolívar, the name given to a separatist conspiracy aiming to achieve Cuban independence 
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from Spain. He had thus requested a set of extraordinary powers, normally reserved for 
governors of cities under siege, to authorize him to dismiss judges whom he believed were 
imperiling the prosecutions. He had also sought approval to establish a special court in Havana in 
order to unify into a single prosecution the myriad investigations into the conspiracy being 
conducted by district and municipal judges and officials.3 Ultimately, the fiscal responsible for 
the unified prosecution recommended that twenty-five of the leading conspirators be exiled to 
Spain and that charges be dropped against more than 600 remaining conspirators, owing to the 
massive disruption that would be caused by punishing them according to the law.4 
As Vives contended with the limitations of Cuba’s legal system in his efforts to maintain 
the colony within the Spanish Empire, Fernando VII also turned to the law to defend his claims 
to absolute sovereignty. In 1823, a coalition of European powers led by the French invaded 
Spain and restored Fernando VII as absolute monarch, bringing an end to the three years of 
constitutional rule known as the trienio liberal.5 In an effort to consolidate his claim to absolute 
sovereignty and purge liberal partisans from municipal and provincial governments, the king 
approved the establishment of a system of military tribunals throughout the provincial capitals of 
Spain known as the Executive and Permanent Military Commissions, which would empower 
provincial executives with a judicial apparatus to bypass municipal and regional courts when 
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prosecuting enemies of the state.6 
In 1825, the metropolitan government granted Vives the extraordinary powers he had 
initially requested during the prosecution of the Soles y Rayos de Bolívar.7 Because Spain’s 
system of Military Commissions was already in place and because Vives had already raised 
concerns about the capacity of Cuba’s legal system to contend with political threats, the 
metropolitan government had also authorized Vives to establish the island’s own Executive and 
Permanent Military Commission.8 In the colony as in the metropole, then, the solution to a 
potential crisis of sovereignty was to amplify the powers of governing executives to contend with 
political threats through legal means. 
As fiscal Francisco Lamadriz’s interrogation of Pablo Gangá made apparent, however, 
Cuba was not Spain. If Captain General Vives considered the Soles y Rayos de Bolívar as New 
World analogs to the Spanish liberals the Military Commissions in Spain had been set up to 
prosecute, he was also aware that Cuba’s growing enslaved population posed an equal if not 
greater threat to the plantation economy that had elevated Cuba’s importance within Spain’s 
greatly diminished empire.9 
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While the growing demands of local production for global markets had served to pull 
Africans like Pablo Gangá toward the regional center of Cuba’s booming agricultural economy, 
he had also been pushed into this world as a consequence of war. Though it is impossible to 
discern anything precise about their origins from the ethnonym gangá attached to their assigned 
Christian names, Africans designated as gangá had often arrived in Cuba on vessels that had 
embarked from the Sierra Leonean coast.10 This was a region affected by decades of war 
resulting from the rise of the Sokoto Caliphate at the expense of the Oyo Empire; a conflict that 
provided the trans-Atlantic slave trade with much of its human cargo during the first half of the 
nineteenth century.11 Even if Pablo had never fought in the service of conquest or defense, he 
came from a place where the violence of war prevailed. Finding himself at the heart of Cuban 
slavery, he now found that the violence of war held the possibility for an end to his 
enslavement.12 
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When Pablo Gangá led slaves in rebellion in the Guamacaro district of Matanzas on June 
15, 1825, Captain General Vives was thus inclined to consider the event as the type of threat that 
could potentially disrupt Spanish dominion over Cuba. After Matanzas-based forces suppressed 
the rebellion and initiated a preliminary investigation to identify its leaders, Vives ordered the 
newly established Military Commission to take over the investigation, setting into motion a legal 
process that would repeatedly place slaves like Pablo Gangá in the presence of officials like 
Francisco Lamadriz. To protect Spanish sovereignty over Cuba, then, meant extending the 
captain general’s legal powers to contend with threats to Spanish empire into the heart of Cuban 
slavery. 
When it came to employing the law to contend with slave resistance, however, officials 
with the Military Commission and Captain General Vives himself would discover that defending 
Spanish sovereignty was a matter subject to interpretation. For officials with the Matanzas 
government, slave resistance was not a potential concern that had to be discovered and 
understood through a legal process rooted in interrogation and deliberation, but an intrinsic 
aspect of plantation slavery that had to be managed through repression. For local authorities, 
many of whom were slaveholders themselves, managing slave resistance was also an exercise in 
ownership, in which they possessed a form of “domestic” sovereignty over their human chattel.13 
If Vives’s deployment of the Military Commission to address the ruptures of Cuban slavery 
represented a concentration of sovereign authority in legal matters within the executive powers 
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of the captaincy general, he would find that the institution of slavery itself served as a 
countervailing force, diverging the interests of central and regional governments, and confusing 
the motivations of local actors pursuing their interests as subjects of an absolutist monarch, 
residents of an ascendant slave society, and themselves masters of slaves. 
 
The Guamacaro Rebellion of 1825 
On June 15, 1825, around one in the morning, Joshua Armitage awoke to the sound of someone 
knocking at the front door. A voice rang out through the darkness, informing Armitage that a 
maroon was hiding among the slave quarters. Armitage made for the front door and was greeted 
by Federico Carabalí, his contramayoral (slave driver). Such a commotion was certainly cause 
for concern, though perhaps not for alarm.14 After beckoning his eldest son to join them, 
Armitage followed Federico, armed only with a whip, into the dead of night.15 
Originally from England, Armitage had immigrated to Cuba in 1819 after making a life 
for himself in the United States as a steamboat owner and captain. He had responded to a 
package of incentives offered by the Cuban government to promote white immigration to centers 
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of agricultural production. While these incentives were intended to foster economic growth, they 
were also meant to address concerns that the island’s growing enslaved population was 
engendering a dangerous demographic imbalance.16 Accompanying Armitage were his wife, two 
sons from a previous marriage, a free woman of color who worked as the family’s governess, 
and three domestic slaves. After arriving in Cuba, his wife gave birth to their third son. In 1822, 
he purchased a coffee plantation in the Guamacaro district of the jurisdiction of Matanzas. By 
1825, he owned nineteen slaves who farmed 60,000 coffee plants on eighteen caballerías of 
land. As he accompanied Federico Carabalí to the slave quarters, Armitage sat atop his own little 
fiefdom as patriarch and master.17 
Ana, the family’s governess, had also been awakened by the commotion. She followed 
the men toward the slave quarters out of curiosity and was startled when a group led by Lorenzo 
Lucumí, whom she recognized as a slave from a neighboring plantation, attacked Armitage and 
his son, hacking them to death with machetes. Ana rushed back to the house to warn the others, 
after which Armitage’s wife, Margaret Littlewood, ran towards the slave quarters to see for 
herself. At the sight of her dead husband and stepson she began to scream. Ana then witnessed 
another slave named José de la Luz, also from a neighboring plantation, struggle with Littlewood 
before striking her over the head with a club, killing her. Armitage’s second son then attempted 
to escape towards the coffee fields, to no avail. José de la Luz quickly caught up with the boy 
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and struck him dead with his club.18 
By then slaves had begun sacking the house in search of provisions and weapons. One of 
them grabbed Armitage’s youngest son and prepared to kill him before being stopped by 
Lorenzo Lucumí. The boy then passed through a number of hands before being entrusted to Ana, 
who had sought refuge in the kitchen with a group of Armitage’s slaves. Led by Ana, the group 
then set off towards the back country to get away from what was clearly an open rebellion.19 
As the rebels continued sacking the house, someone shouted that a figure on horseback 
was approaching. They soon recognized the figure to be Pablo Gangá. Pablo dismounted his 
horse and surveyed the scene, asking to be shown the bodies of Armitage and his family 
members. When the rebels finished sacking the house, Pablo gathered them together before 
mounting his horse and riding off into the night. The rebel force then proceeded to carry their 
rebellion to neighboring plantations.20 
Under the cover of night, the rebels traversed the countryside, their numbers growing as 
area slaves joined the uprising. Upon arriving at a coffee plantation named La Java, they were 
greeted by the plantation’s slaves. The force now numbered approximately one hundred.21 
La Java’s owner, Jean Fouquier, was a Dutchman who resided on the plantation with his 
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American-born wife, Marie Louise Beauvais, and their two children.22 Around 3:30 AM, they 
were awakened by the sound of a commotion. Upon stepping outside to check on the 
commotion, Fouquier realized that he was in immediate danger. He made a run for it, but was 
attacked and left for dead. When Beauvais attempted to escape the house with her two children, 
she found her dying husband lying on the ground. While holding Fouquier in her arms, Beauvais 
saw one of the plantation’s slaves end her husband’s life with a blow from a machete. Beauvais 
and her children managed to survive, however, finding refuge in the hut of a trusted slave who 
had not joined the rebellion.23 
Around 6:30 AM, the rebels approached a coffee plantation named Nuestra Señora de la 
Luz. The plantation’s owner, a Spaniard named Juan Bautista Tosca, was busy fixing a fence 
when he heard his wife, María de la Luz, yelling at him from the house. When he looked up, he 
saw the approaching rebels. He then took off running, leaving his wife to fend for herself.24 After 
sacking Tosca’s house, which they found to be empty, the rebels took to the main road and were 
joined again by Pablo Gangá, riding a horse and wielding a trabuco (blunderbuss).25 
As they continued traversing plantations, the rebel force grew in size, as did the trail of 
death and destruction. By noon, approximately 180 rebels approached the crossroads at Coliseo. 
A group of fleeing area residents who had managed to stay ahead of the growing rebellion had 
already come together at a tavern next to the crossroads. After the rebels set fire to the tavern, the 
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area residents barricaded themselves in the second floor of a neighboring house. They 
successfully held off the rebels with firearms until a group of soldiers and armed civilians arrived 
and finally dispersed the insurgents.26 
In the rebellion’s aftermath, colonial officials would blame the widespread outbreak of 
violence on foreign plantation owners such as Joshua Armitage who were said not to have 
subjected their slaves to sufficiently severe levels of discipline.27 To acknowledge deeper causes 
would have provoked inconvenient conversations that might have drawn causal connections 
between the growth in the region’s plantation economy, the region’s growing enslaved labor 
force, and a future replete with more frequent and more dramatic outbreaks of resistance to 
slavery. A far easier lesson to learn would be that the answer to violence was more violence.  
 
Slave Resistance and Repressive Justice 
For the officials constituting the Matanzas government, from authorities at the district level to 
the jurisdiction’s governor in the city of Matanzas, slave resistance had never been an abstract 
concept, but was instead a persistent feature of plantation slavery. The rebellion of June 15, 
1825, thus elicited an immediate response from officials seeking to bring order to the countryside 
while they also tried to determine the origins of the uprising. In these endeavors, a sense of 
urgency served to blur the distinction between the military and legal responses to the rebellion. 
This proved to be a source of tension, however, as interrogating, judging, and sentencing 
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prisoners was a time-consuming process that stood in the way of their prompt execution. 
Matanzas officials thus pursued a repressive mode of justice as they confronted the problems of 
applying the law in a context where violence could break out at any moment.  
Immediately after the confrontation at the Coliseo crossroads, armed forces made up of 
soldiers and area residents began the process of securing the countryside by hunting down those 
they saw as active rebels who remained at large, and apprehending free and enslaved people of 
color whom they suspected of being connected to the rebellion. The next day, Lieutenant Carlos 
Ghersi, a member of the local militia and commander of one of these forces, reported that he and 
his men had spent the night near the affected areas in order to prevent rebels from 
communicating with slaves who had remained on their respective plantations. He also suggested 
that the uprising had originated on Jean Fouquier’s plantation, and that Fouquier’s mayoral 
(overseer), Cristóval Carabalí, and his contramayoral, Tomás Carabalí, both of whom were free, 
had been its leaders.28 Two days later, Guamacaro’s capitán de partido (district captain), Andrés 
Máximo Oliver, reported that he and his men had eleven rebels in custody, and that according to 
Marie Louise Beauvais, some of them had been involved in the murder of her husband. Among 
Oliver’s prisoners was Pablo Gangá, who, he noted, “is the one who (so they say) spread the 
word to the other plantations.”29 
 On June 16, interim governor of Matanzas Manuel de Castilla y Armenteros initiated a 
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formal investigation into the origins of the uprising.30 Accompanied by an asesor (legal advisor) 
and a secretary, Castilla y Armenteros began the investigation by personally interrogating a slave 
name Vicente Carabalí, who had been apprehended on the day of the rebellion and placed in a 
holding cell for captured maroons in the city of Matanzas.31 
 By June 18, Governor Cecilio Ayllón had returned to the city of Matanzas. A colonel in 
the regular army, Ayllón served as the jurisdiction’s political and military chief. As he took the 
reins of the military response to the rebellion, he also assumed control of the investigation 
initiated in his absence by Manuel de Castilla y Armenteros. With the aid of Félix de Acosta, his 
official asesor, Ayllón continued to personally interrogate prisoners. One such prisoner was José 
Felipe Navarro, a free man of color who had been apprehended following the uprising. Ayllón 
plied Navarro with questions aimed at gathering information, while a secretary kept pace with 
the proceedings by summarizing in his own words the questions posed and the answers 
proffered. When ordered to identify himself, Navarro replied that he was a thirty-five year old 
native of Maracaibo and that he was employed on a plantation owned by Luis Juan Maria 
Chatelain. Ayllón then asked about the role he had played in the rebellion. The secretary 
recorded an extended answer, the precise nature of which, including the tone of the interrogation 
and the extent to which Navarro felt his life to be in danger, was occluded by his quill.32 
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 Navarro claimed that he had learned of the rebellion only as it had unfolded. While he 
placed himself in the thick of things, he presented himself as a passive witness to the actions of 
others. He claimed, for instance, to have witnessed Pablo Gangá riding on a horse while wielding 
a trabuco. He also singled out Lorenzo Lucumí as a leader of the rebellion and claimed to have 
witnessed Lorenzo kill a white man. Towards the end of the interrogation, Navarro claimed that 
the uprising had been planned entirely by the slaves themselves and that he had heard that they 
had been in communication with slaves from the city of Matanzas and as far away as Havana. 
While Ayllón’s role in directing Navarro’s declaration through leading questions or physical 
coercion remains unclear, the contours of Navarro’s own intentions are less ambiguous. In an act 
of self-preservation, Navarro provided cooperative testimony that minimized his own role in the 
rebellion while directing attention towards others.33 
 A prisoner named José Antonio Gangá extended his own attempts at self-preservation to 
include other slaves owned by his master, Jean Fouquier. Prompted by Governor Ayllón, José 
Antonio described how he and his fellow slaves had actively resisted the rebels and had even 
attempted to save Fouquier’s life. When asked to identify the leaders of the rebellion, he readily 
gave up the names of Lorenzo Lucumí and Federico Carabalí, both of whom came from different 
plantations. But when asked whether three other slaves belonging to Fouquier had taken part in 
the violence, he reiterated his earlier claim that Fouquier’s slaves had refused to participate. 
Unbeknownst to José Antonio, Ayllón had just received another report from Lieutenant Carlos 
Ghersi stating that Fouquier’s widow had identified José Antonio and the other three as active 
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members of the rebellion.34 
Governor Ayllón then asked José Antonio about Pablo Gangá. Pablo’s name had already 
come up during José Felipe Navarro’s interrogation. That same day, Ayllón had received capitan 
de partido Andrés Máximo Oliver’s field report stating that Pablo was in his custody and was 
said to have participated in the rebellion. José Antonio claimed that he had not seen Pablo during 
the rebellion, but that Pablo lived on a nearby plantation and would regularly be seen on the 
outskirts of his own plantation. He added that on the day of the uprising he had heard that Pablo 
had acquired gun powder, but that he did not know from whom.35 
By June 19, soldiers had delivered Pablo Gangá to authorities in the city of Matanzas. 
Pablo soon found himself before Governor Ayllón. Having emerged as a person of interest, 
Pablo encountered a governor whose inquisitorial focus had narrowed considerably. The 
interrogation began with Pablo identifying himself as a twenty-six year old native of the “African 
coast.” He was married and worked as a carriage driver on Juan Bautista Tosca’s coffee 
plantation. When questioned about the rebellion itself, Pablo attempted to conceal the role he had 
played, claiming that he had no prior knowledge of the uprising and that he had been forced to 
join the rebels after they had attacked his master’s plantation. One of them had even handed him 
a trabuco. He claimed to have been present as the rebels moved through the countryside, burning 
houses and killing white residents, but to have played no active role in the violence. He had also 
been among the rebels who had been dispersed at the Coliseo crossroads, and had hidden out in 
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the backcountry before presenting himself at the house of an area planter later in the day.36 
As others before him had done, Pablo also provided detailed information (or 
disinformation) regarding some of the uprising’s more active participants. He identified Lorenzo 
Lucumí and two of Jean Fouquier’s slaves as the principle leaders of the rebellion. He even 
claimed that the two slaves owned by Fouquier had been responsible for their owner’s death. 
Through deceit and misdirection, Pablo Gangá attempted to diminish his culpability. With one 
revelation, however, he also sought to elevate his eligibility for whatever mercy might be 
available. Pablo claimed that prior to being swept up in the rebellion, he had tried to safeguard 
his mistress, María de la Luz, by ordering two of Juan Bautista Tosca’s slaves to protect her from 
the coming violence.37 When the rebels entered Tosca’s house, then, they found it to be empty. 
Following Pablo’s orders, the two slaves had hidden their mistress behind a door.38 
Following up on the testimonial evidence he had already amassed, Governor Ayllón then 
asked Pablo Gangá if he had acquired any gun powder prior to the rebellion. Pablo admitted that 
on the Sunday before the uprising, while running an errand for his master, he had run into 
Lorenzo Lucumí on the road and that Lorenzo had asked him to deliver a package on his behalf. 
Pablo insisted, however, that he had not been aware that the package contained gunpowder.39 
While interrogating another prisoner two days later, however, Ayllón learned that Pablo had 
been seen firing several shots during the uprising. It remained unclear, though, if Pablo had 
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actually killed anyone.40  
After three days of interrogating prisoners and reading reports from the field, Governor 
Ayllón was left with many questions about the events of June 15. He thus ordered his asesor 
Félix de Acosta to travel to the affected plantations to survey the damage and continue the 
investigation in the field.41 But he also took time to assess his current situation. While reports 
from officials and soldiers such as Andrés Máximo Oliver and Carlos Ghersi depicted a situation 
increasingly under control, many rebels, including Federico Carabalí and Lorenzo Lucumí, 
remained at large, raiding plantations as they avoided capture.42 The threat of further unrest was 
compounded as Ayllón determined that the rebellion had been proceeded by months of planning 
and that the conspiratorial network might have extended as far as the city of Matanzas and even 
Havana. Though an uprising had been suppressed on June 15, renewed violence was a real 
possibility. While an 1817 census had found the jurisdiction of Matanzas to be home to 9,511 
white residents and 9,447 slaves, Ayllón surely had a sense of what an updated census would 
reveal. Since 1817 the growth in Matanzas’s enslaved population had greatly outpaced that of 
whites. By 1827 Matanzas’s white population would be listed at 16,671 and its enslaved 
population at 26,522.43 If colonial officials in Havana had convinced themselves that the 
demographic superiority of white Cubans throughout the island shielded them from the violence 
that had afflicted the French colony of Saint-Domingue, Ayllón could take no such comfort.  
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 It was not sufficient, then, simply to suppress the rebellion and restore peace to the 
countryside. Nor could Governor Ayllón’s investigation be considered a success if it only served 
to identify the leaders of the uprising. He thus sent a preliminary report to Captain General 
Francisco Dionisio Vives, stating that “it is important to the security of the island that we 
expedite as much as possible the conclusion of this case, so that the punishments be as quick and 
exemplary as the nature of the crime demands.”44 In his view, “quick and exemplary” 
punishment could deter future rebellions. For the investigation to serve such a function, it would 
have to be concluded as quickly as possible and at the scene of the crime, so that rebels could be 
punished in the presence of the area’s slaves as a warning against further violence. Ayllón thus 
asked Captain General Vives to transfer control of the investigation to the recently established 
Military Commission. He believed that continuing the investigation under the auspices of a 
military court, allowing the entire judicial process to be conducted rapidly in the field, would 
enable authorities to mete out the type of swift and severe justice that these exceptional 
circumstances required.45 
 Governor Ayllón’s sense that the Military Commission needed to be called in was 
reinforced by reports indicating that the situation on the ground threatened to compromise the 
investigation itself. On June 21, Andrés Máximo Oliver captured Cristóbal Carabalí and Tomás 
Carabalí, Jean Fouquier’s mayoral and contramayoral, whom Carlos Ghersi had suggested were 
the masterminds behind the rebellion. Oliver placed the prisoners in the custody of soldiers 
responsible for transferring them to the city of Matanzas. The soldiers shot and killed Cristóval 
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and Tomás, however, supposedly during an attempt at escape.46 
Ayllón also became aware that his sense of urgency was not necessarily shared by 
officials in Havana. On June 22, Captain General Vives ordered Ayllón to return canons he had 
sent to Matanzas immediately following the rebellion, perhaps because his initial concerns about 
the severity of the threat posed by the rebellion had dissipated somewhat. Perhaps in a bid to 
demonstrate the colonial government’s control over the situation, Vives also ordered Ayllón to 
dismiss the area residents participating in the forces still patrolling the countryside.47 
By June 24, asesor Félix de Acosta had returned from the field, having questioned 
various individuals who had experienced the rebellion first hand. Among them had been Joshua 
Armitage’s governess, Ana, who had witnessed the uprising’s initial moments.48 He had also 
interviewed Juan Bautista Tosca and María de la Luz, both of whom had corroborated Pablo 
Gangá’s claim that he had saved his mistress’s life.49 
In his report to the governor, Acosta declared that soldiers had succeeded in either 
capturing or killing most of the rebellion’s principle leaders. Almost all of them had been 
contramayorales on their respective plantations and it appeared that they had been conspiring to 
rebel for several months. Though the depths of the conspiracy had yet to be determined, Acosta 
might have thought it advantageous to describe the rebellion in terms that evoked the Haitian 
Revolution when he stated that the conspiracy aspired “to take [the city of Matanzas] as well as 
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Havana and establish a free, black state on the island, after killing all the whites.”50 
As the governor’s official legal adviser, Félix de Acosta then presented Ayllón with a set 
of recommendations. In the long term, Acosta suggested that the government draft a set of 
ordinances regulating free and enslaved people of color within the jurisdiction of Matanzas. In 
the short term, however, he argued that the situation was sufficiently urgent that they could 
proceed with the investigation without attending to the formal requirements of legal processes. 
“With atrocious crimes such as this one,” he wrote, “privileged evidence is sufficient to condemn 
the guilty.”51 In this case, “privileged evidence” referred to testimony that would have been 
inadmissible in other contexts.52 In a civil suit, for instance, slaves could not give testimony. In 
building a legal case against the leaders of the rebellion, however, slave testimony would suffice. 
Still, Acosta believed that it was the execution of a judicial sentence, “not so much for its 
severity, but for the promptness with which it is applied, that is most effective for promoting the 
beneficial effects of exemplary punishments.” In order to dissuade further violence, and so that 
“the heads of the criminals fall before the knife of the Law,” he argued that it was necessary that 
the investigation “not be detained by the search for excessively detailed evidence.”53 
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Supporting this call for processual expediency, Acosta cited a provision in the vast body 
of laws governing Spain’s overseas possessions known as the Recopilación de las leyes de Indias 
mandating that, in his words, “ordinary judicial proceedings will not be brought in cases of riots, 
sedition, and rebellions that include the uprising of blacks; and that their leaders be promptly 
punished in an exemplary way.”54 In order to avoid the fate that had befallen the former French 
colony of Saint-Domingue so as to “conserve this precious part of His Majesty’s domains,” 
Acosta thus advised Governor Ayllón to ask Captain General Vives to direct the newly formed 
Military Commission to take up the case so that “in conformity with the Recopilación, the 
perpetrators be punished at the scene of the crime.”55 
Governor Ayllón and asesor Félix de Acosta’s successive calls to have the Military 
Commission assume control over the investigation reflected the conflicting priorities of the 
government of the jurisdiction of Matanzas, one that was at the same time a purveyor of law and 
a military force. As they investigated the origins of the rebellion in conformity with the 
processual requirements of law, they shared the sense that the winding down of military 
operations required a simultaneous escalation in state violence in order to dissuade further slave 
resistance. Standing in the way of the use of violence was a centuries-old legal tradition 
                                                 
culpado; y no ignora que las penas no tanto por su tamaño, cuanto por la prontitud con que se 
aplica son mas eficaces para [...] el saludable efecto del escarmiento. De consiguiente para que se 
logre la segundo y que las cabesas de los criminales caigan cuanto antes la cuchilla de la Ley, 
preciso la no detenerse en buscar pruebas demasiado minuciosas.” 
54 Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias, Libro VII, Título V, Ley XXVI. “no le formen procesos 
ordinarios en los casos de motines, sediciones, y rebeldias con actos de alzamientos de negros y 
que se castiguen ejemplarmente los cabezas, escusando tiempo.” 
55 Dictamen del asesor de Matanzas, Matanzas, 25 June 1825, f. 90-91, exp. 4, leg. 1, CM, ANC. 





prescribing everything from the questions to be asked during interrogations to the procedural 
steps required in preparing a legal process for judgement. Both officials were also aware that this 
legal tradition was not without its exceptions. Ten days after the outbreak of the rebellion, 
Ayllón forwarded a copy of Acosta’s report to Captain General Vives in Havana.56 If Ayllón and 
Acosta felt bound by law, the newly formed Military Commission promised to set their 
investigation free. 
 
Insular Security and Interrogatory Justice 
Captain General Vives had learned of the rebellion soon after it had broken out and dispatched 
soldiers and artillery to Matanzas to assist in its suppression.57 As the highest ranking military 
official in Cuba, however, he was also occupied with security threats beyond the island’s shores. 
Seven months prior, Spanish forces had suffered a decisive defeat in Perú at the Battle of 
Ayacucho. Vives was busy coordinating resources to assist the besieged fortress San Juan de 
Ulúa, just outside the city of Veracruz, the last stronghold of Spanish forces in Mexico.58 Spanish 
dominion was in retreat on the American mainland, while Haitian president Jean-Pierre Boyer 
was three years into his rule of a unified and independent Hispaniola.59 With the successors of 
the Haitian Revolution now occupying former Spanish territory, and the prosecution of the 
separatist Conspiracy of the Soles y Rayos de Bolívar only recently concluded, Vives was also 
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inclined to consider the rebellion as the latest conflict in an ongoing and developing period of 
regional instability and disruption with the potential of affecting the island. 
 As Captain General Vives and the Military Commission took control of the investigation 
from the Matanzas-based officials, then, the rebellion itself assumed a different meaning. 
Whereas Governor Ayllón had treated the rebellion as an immediate threat to life and property, 
Vives viewed the rebellion in the context of all the threats to Spanish sovereignty over Cuba. For 
Vives and the Military Commission, learning as much about the uprising as possible would be as 
important as suppressing the rebellion and preventing further violence had been for officials in 
Matanzas. The tribunal thus pursued an interrogatory mode of justice, where success was 
predicated on their command of the law. 
By June 22, Captain General Vives had read Governor Ayllón’s report from June 20, in 
which the governor had requested that control of the investigation be transferred to the Military 
Commission. Though Vives granted Ayllón’s request, complications related to the tribunal’s 
novelty conspired to delay any action. Upon receiving his orders, the tribunal’s first president, 
Brigadier General Luis de Michelena, resigned from his position, citing ill health. On June 25, 
Vives formally appointed Brigadier General José Cadaval to replace Michelena as the tribunal’s 
president.60 
As these administrative matters delayed the Military Commission’s assumption of 
responsibility, the situation in Matanzas continued developing. Since the showdown at the 
Coliseo crossroads, armed forces had been busy capturing and sometimes killing slaves who had 
been dispersed during the rebellion. On June 26, soldiers killed Lorenzo Lucumí, the slave who 
had initiated the rebellion by killing Joshua Armitage. The next day, his accomplice Federico 
                                                 




Carabalí suffered the same fate.61 
On July 2, President Cadaval arrived in the city of Matanzas to oversee the initial stages 
of the Military Commission’s first major case. He was accompanied by the tribunal’s asesor, 
José Ildefonso Suárez, and two fiscales, Captains Francisco Lamadriz and Anastasio 
Castellanos.62 After taking custody of the case file Governor Ayllón and Félix de Acosta had 
assembled thus far, Cadaval ordered Suárez to study the case file and draft a consulta (legal 
review) outlining future courses of action.63 
For two days Suárez poured over the 250 folios making up the case file. In what was his 
first major opinion as the Military Commission’s asesor, Suárez expressed a measured sense of 
urgency as he outlined his vision for the tribunal’s pursuit of the investigation, while also 
signaling his thoughts on the greater ends to which the tribunal served: 
Scenes such as the ones my imagination has considered, the traversal of which 
have filled me with anguish and pain as I have contemplated the innocent victims 
who perished at the hands of their own servants, have obliged me to meditate 
with circumspection regarding the path that the commission should follow in 
order to punish such barbarous and cruel men at the same time that the 
punishments not drive the tribunal to such extreme rigor that we confuse the 
naive with the wicked, and the loyal servant with the traitor. 64 
Suárez’s call for deliberation was rooted in the observation that while they were certainly dealing 
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with “ferocious and bloodthirsty men,” they had seen others “recognize humanity and practice 
virtue.”65 He pointed to the Armitage children’s governess, Ana, the unnamed slave who had 
hidden Marie Louise Beauvais and her children in his hut, and Pablo Gangá for the roles they 
had played in saving the lives of some of their patrons and masters during the rebellion.  
 Unlike the Matanzas-based officials, however, José Ildefonso Suárez did not believe that 
enacting swift and severe punishments was a priority. Governor Ayllón had conducted his 
investigation as part of a broader military response to the uprising, and had thus articulated a 
strategy for regaining control of the situation that was about suppressing the rebellion as much as 
it was about terrorizing the enslaved population of Matanzas into submission. By contrast, 
Suárez framed his recommendations in a way that reflected pragmatic considerations for 
governing societies that rested on enslaved labor. Beyond merely regaining control of the 
countryside, the Military Commission was to play an instrumental role in restoring a social order 
within which rewarding slave loyalty, in the hope of encouraging other slaves to behave 
similarly, would be an important part of maintaining the peace and ensuring productivity.66 
Suárez thus set about plotting a course for the tribunal that “appropriately discharges onto the 
bad the severe sword of the law, and proportions to the good their deserved prize and reward.”67 
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 But Suárez’s sense of social order extended beyond the coffee and sugar fields of 
Matanzas. In outlining the tribunal’s course, Suárez focused on the investigation’s legal 
dimensions. While Governor Ayllón found that adhering to proper legal form hindered his 
attempts to contend with the dangers of rural society, Suárez’s defense of legal form, through his 
call for deliberation, recast the countryside as an extension of a social order that was decidedly 
urban, constituted in law, and articulated through the labor of letrados (men of letters), who 
joined legal doctrine and praxis.68 Suárez had gained recognition as a letrado by placing his legal 
training at the service of individuals and interests with power and influence.69 As the Military 
Commission’s legal advisor, Suárez was now responsible for ensuring that the tribunal adhered 
to proper legal form. He thus began asserting the Military Commission’s ownership of the 
process by rebuking the Matanzas-based officials for the deficiencies in their investigation. 
“They have taken many declarations superficially when what was required was exhaustive and 
careful examination,” he wrote, “and even now, having written 250 folios, they have achieved 
only the slightest flashes of insight regarding the origin of such horrors.”70 
 In this final regard, Suárez signaled the most crucial way the Military Commission’s 
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investigation would differ from that of Governor Ayllón. By sending the tribunal to Matanzas, 
Captain General Vives had already revealed his initial impulse to consider the uprising as a 
possible expression of the revolutionary forces that had all but destroyed Spain’s empire in the 
Americas. As a functionary of a legal institution operating at Vives’s discretion, Suárez was now 
responsible for channeling his legal knowledge in ways that promoted Vives’s interests. As 
Suárez continued with his consulta, then, he rejected Felix de Acosta’s interpretation of the 
provision in the Recopilación that the exigencies of the moment required the abrogation of 
proper legal form, asking, “what will this country achieve from hanging twenty blacks who 
killed their masters if [we] do not discover the schemes they carried out in preparation for the 
rebellion, with its sources and origins remaining in place?”71 Suárez thus concluded that the 
tribunal needed to continue interrogating prisoners to uncover the conspiracy preceding the 
rebellion. Despite his criticism of Ayllón’s investigation, Suárez advised President Cadaval to 
assign one of the tribunal’s fiscales to bring charges against those determined to be leaders of the 
rebellion in order to enact “swift and severe punishment.” Suárez also recommended that a 
second fiscal continue investigating the rebellion in order to bring charges against a second 
round of prisoners, and in doing so hopefully determine the origins of the uprising.72 
President Cadaval assigned Francisco Lamadriz to conclude Governor Ayllón’s 
investigation and bring charges against those prisoners determined to be leaders of the 
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rebellion.73 Lamadriz thus began a process of verifying existing testimonies and collecting 
confessions from those he intended to charge. On July 21, for instance, Lamadriz brought Pablo 
Gangá before him in order to take his confession. After the requisite formalities of reviewing and 
verifying Pablo’s previous statements, Lamadriz charged him with being a leader of, obtaining 
gun powder for, and firing shots during the rebellion. Pablo denied the charges, reiterating his 
previous claim that he had unknowingly handled a package that happened to contain gun 
powder, but that he had not been involved in its purchase. He added that he had no 
foreknowledge of the plan to rebel and mentioned how he had saved his mistress’s life during the 
uprising. In concluding the proceeding, Lamadriz asked Pablo if he had anything else to say in 
his defense. Pablo responded by reiterating his previous denials.74 
On August 18, Lamadriz submitted his final report and sentencing recommendations to 
the Military Commission’s main deliberative body, the Consejo de Guerra (War Council). 
Comprised of the tribunal’s president and six senior military officers, the Consejo was 
responsible for passing judgements and sentencing prisoners.75 As most of the members of the 
Consejo de Guerra had little exposure to the particulars of the case, Lamadriz began his report 
with a summary of the rebellion and its aftermath. He then listed the nine individuals he 
considered to have been the principle leaders. Among them were Federico Carabalí and Lorenzo 
Lucumí, who had initiated the rebellion with the murders of Joshua Armitage and his family, and 
Cristóval Carabalí and Tomás Carabalí, Jean Fouquier’s mayoral and contramayoral, who had 
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been killed by soldiers under questionable circumstances following the rebellion. Since these 
nine individuals had all been killed during or after the rebellion, Lamadriz presented the Consejo 
with charges against ten prisoners who had also played leading roles and were currently being 
detained. Among the ten was Pablo Gangá, whom Lamadriz charged with purchasing gun 
powder, stealing his master’s horse and trabuco, and discharging the weapon. Their crimes, 
Lamadriz continued, broke the laws “of the kingdom and the military ordinances according to 
which this commission adjudicates,” which “impose on homicide, arson, and sedition the 
ultimate punishment.” Lamadriz thus recommended that the prisoners be executed by a firing 
squad, their bodies decapitated, and their heads displayed near the site of the rebellion so that the 
slaves of the area would be sure to see them.76 
That is, however, with the exception of Pablo Gangá. “By virtue of having saved the life 
of his mistress at the risk of his own,” wrote Lamadriz, “and considering the recommendation 
made of him by his mistress and her husband and that we have no evidence that he killed anyone, 
[I recommend] that we commute his death sentence, because he made himself worthy with his 
prior actions, to 200 lashes at the hands of the executioner while tied to a pillory and that he then 
be handed over to his owner, who is obliged to employ him for two years in chains in the 
plantation’s harshest and most unpleasant tasks.”77 In a unanimous vote, the Consejo de Guerra 
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chose to follow Lamadriz’s recommendations but reduced the number of lashes Pablo Gangá 
was to receive from 200 to 100.78 
The Consejo then forwarded their decision to Captain General Vives for his approval. 
Vives conferred with his official advisor on military matters, auditor de guerra (judge advocate) 
Felipe Martínez. Martínez approved of the Consejo’s sentences and added that “the punishment 
should be prompt and exemplary, so as to terrify the bad and encourage the good in their sound 
principles.”79 Toward that end, he commended the Military Commission’s decision to commute 
Pablo Gangá’s death sentence to corporal punishment.80 Following Martínez’s recommendation, 
Vives approved the tribunal’s sentences on August 22.81 On September 1, the nine prisoners 
condemned to death were executed.82 On September 20, Pablo Gangá received his 100 lashes 
and was then handed over to the custody of Juan Bautista Tosca.83 
Despite Governor Ayllón and Félix de Acosta’s hopes that the Military Commission 
would prosecute the leaders of the rebellion in a quick and exemplary manner that would also 
serve to dissuade future slave resistance, the first round of executions took place more than two 
months after the rebellion had been fully suppressed. For tribunal officials such as fiscal 
Francisco Lamadriz and asesor José Ildefonso Suárez, the threat of renewed slave violence was 
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less pressing than demonstrating command and competence in what was the tribunal’s first major 
prosecution. While these institutional considerations did not preclude the execution of slaves 
judged to be leaders of the rebellion, they also left room for acts of mercy. Questions remained, 
however, regarding the origins of the rebellion. 
 
Sovereignty and Authority 
With the first round of executions, Military Commission officials had attempted to strike a 
balance between the impulse of officials in Matanzas to use a legal process to repress the regions 
enslaved population and Captain General Vives’s need to gain intelligence regarding threats to 
insular security. As attention turned to the tribunal’s second prosecution, which asesor José 
Ildefonso Suárez had recommended attend to the rebellion’s origins, two incidents revealed the 
ways in which the tribunal’s mission was not contained solely within the ostensibly opposing 
imperatives of repressive and interrogatory modes of justice and their attendant concerns over 
slave resistance and insular security. At stake was also the issue of Spanish sovereignty over 
Cuba and who had authority to act in its interest.   
While Francisco Lamadriz worked to conclude the investigation initiated by Governor 
Ayllón, fiscal Anastasio Castellanos began a second investigation aimed at uncovering the 
depths of the conspiracy leading up to the rebellion. Castellanos soon fell ill and returned to 
Havana. His replacement, Lieutenant Francisco Seidel, arrived in Matanzas on July 24 and 
formally took up the investigation the following day.84 After reviewing the existing case file, 
Seidel began conducting his own interrogations. On August 20, he visited the ruins of Joshua 
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Armitage’s plantation. The plantation’s mayoral was still on the premises. He informed Seidel 
that while most of the other slaves had either been killed during the rebellion, imprisoned in its 
aftermath, or were missing, there were two boys milling about. 
One of the boys was named Esteban. A native of New Orleans, Esteban had been one of 
the slaves Armitage had brought with him to Cuba. Since he had been sleeping in his master’s 
house, Esteban presented Seidel with a first-hand account of the initial moments of the rebellion. 
Though he claimed not to have been privy to specific conversations on account of his youth, he 
did provide Seidel with a sense of the social world from which the uprising had emerged. For 
instance, Joshua Armitage had been in the habit of allowing his slaves to gather on Sundays to 
play drums and dance. Pablo Gangá had frequented these dances and could often be seen 
conversing with his friend Federico Carabalí. Esteban also recounted how Pablo had seemed 
anxious upon arriving at Armitage’s plantation on the night of the rebellion. After asking to see 
the bodies of the dead, Pablo had distributed packets of gun powder to some of the rebels. Pablo 
had then ordered all the rebels to proceed to the next plantation.85 
Esteban’s account of Pablo Gangá’s actions on the night of the uprising proved 
problematic for the new fiscal. On August 31, Seidel learned of the sentences given in Francisco 
Lamadriz’s case, and was alarmed to see that Pablo Gangá’s death sentence had been reduced to 
corporal punishment. Believing that Esteban’s revelation that Pablo had distributed gun powder 
during the uprising was important new evidence, Seidel asked Governor Ayllón to suspend 
execution of Pablo’s sentence until he could determine if new charges were warranted, a request 
                                                 





to which the governor acceded.86 Seidel then sent President Cadaval an update, before heading to 
the prison in the city of Matanzas to question the nine prisoners slated for execution about Pablo 
Gangá’s precise role in the rebellion.87 
Though Francisco Seidel may have thought himself to be acting in a diligent manner, his 
superiors believed otherwise. Asesor José Ildefonso Suárez lambasted Seidel for countermanding 
the Consejo de Guerra’s judgement regarding Pablo Gangá’s sentence, commenting that the 
fiscal’s actions might have been justified if he were presenting new evidence attesting to Pablo’s 
innocence. Since Seidel was actually presenting evidence of a lesser crime to argue that Pablo 
deserved a more severe punishment, however, Suárez believed there was no reason for the 
Military Commission to reconsider the matter. Through an “excess of zeal,” Seidel’s actions 
threatened to “discredit” the “reputation” of the tribunal. Suárez thus considered the fiscal’s 
offense to be serious enough to warrant raising the matter with the captain general.88 
Vives in turn referred the matter to auditor de guerra Felipe Martínez, who responded 
that “there are no examples in the annals of the Spanish military of a fiscal suspending a sentence 
imposed by a consejo de guerra and approved of by a captain general!”89 Such actions, he 
continued, “give the public the sinister impression that the Consejo de Guerra and the captaincy 
general are acting either unfairly or in a confused manner, and lack the facts to impose 
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penalties.”90 Pablo Gangá’s fate aside, Seidel’s actions had been problematic because of “the bad 
impression possibly left in [the island’s] inhabitants regarding the rashness of the fiscal, against 
the Military Commission, and against all that justifies the superior authority of [the captain 
general.]”91 
Felipe Martínez’s criticism passed from Captain General Vives to President Cadaval to 
Francisco Seidel himself.92 In his own defense, Seidel took issue with Martínez’s 
characterization of his action, arguing that in an effort to comply with his duty he had merely 
presented Governor Ayllón with some new information and an opinion regarding what to do 
next. If anyone had undercut the authority of the tribunal’s Consejo de Guerra and Captain 
General Vives, Seidel argued, it had been Governor Ayllón.93 But if Seidel understood this 
incident to be simply about the integrity of the chain of command, he had not fully understood 
Martínez’s critique. At stake was far more than the formal integrity of a judicial process carried 
out by military men. 
The metropolitan government had mandated the establishment of Cuba’s Military 
Commission in order to bolster the legal powers of captains general to prosecute threats against 
the state. In doing so, they had endeavored to extend to Cuba parallel efforts to centralize 
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governance in Spain. In announcing the establishment of Cuba’s Military Commission on March 
4, 1825, Captain General Vives had cast the tribunal as an expression of the King’s desire to 
protect Cubans from the “horrors and ruin brought on by the unrest that has been experienced in 
his American domains.”94 Cuba’s precarious position within the Empire was indeed foremost on 
Vives’s mind, but he was also following orders. On November 23, 1824, Spain’s Ministry of 
War had ordered Vives to establish a Military Commission in Cuba in conformity with a royal 
order dated January 13, 1824, requiring that Military Commissions be established in all the 
provincial capitals of Spain.95 
Even as Vives presented the Military Commission as an institution attending to problems 
particular to Cuba, the royal order of January 13, 1824, situated its origins in the urban and rural 
spaces of the Iberian Peninsula. “In some of the kingdom’s towns there exist men,” the order 
read, “who, persistent and stubborn in their wanderings, or who are accustomed to living and 
thriving in disorder, have altered the public peace.”96 Aggravating the matter, “the security of the 
public roads has been compromised,” the order continued, “by armed gangs that interrupt 
commerce and transit, causing damages and harm that are now well-known.”97 
Since the mid-eighteenth century, uneven economic development and steady population 
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growth had created high levels of social dislocation in Spain. The increasing prevalence of 
displaced men was accompanied by the emergence of large gangs engaging in smuggling and 
other forms of banditry. In 1781, Carlos III deployed the military to pacify regions deemed to be 
in a state of unrest. This military response was followed by new laws empowering regional 
courts to prosecute such crimes. The Napoleonic invasion of 1808 and the years of military 
struggle that ensued wreaked further havoc throughout portions of rural Spain. After his 
restoration to power in 1814, Fernando VII also deployed the military to reassert his authority 
over the countryside. Instead of amplifying the legal powers available to regional courts for the 
prosecution of vagabonds and bandits, however, he empowered the military to mete out its own 
justice by authorizing the creation of ad hoc military tribunals to try cases in the field.98 
In 1820, Spanish liberals succeeded in establishing a constitutional monarchy organized 
around the Constitution of Cádiz of 1812. By 1823, European powers wary of three years of 
liberal rule in Spain turned to France’s Louis XVIII, who sent French troops into Spain once 
again, this time to restore Fernando VII as absolute sovereign. When Fernando then moved to 
purge liberals from government, his conservative supporters pressured him to reinstate the Holy 
Inquisition for the task.99 Facing greater pressure from his moderate backers, including the 
French, Fernando reconfigured his Consejo de Ministros (Council of Ministers) with more 
moderate members.100 From this moderate consejo came the idea of repurposing the ad hoc 
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military tribunals Fernando had originally authorized for rural pacification towards political 
ends. In drafting the royal order of January 13, 1824, establishing Military Commissions in all 
the provincial capitals of Spain, then, they added to the vagabonds and bandits constituting the 
original targets of such military tribunals in the past, those “uttering expressions against the 
legitimate rights of the Throne and in favor of the abolished constitution.”101 The new Permanent 
and Executive Military Commissions promised to amplify executive authority in legal matters by 
situating the tribunals within a chain of command atop of which sat the King, thus affording 
Spain’s central government in Madrid increased independence from the Church and regional 
courts.102 
As it crossed the Atlantic, however, the royal order of January 13, 1824, passed into a 
different political context, where dissidents did not merely seek the reconfiguration of Spanish 
sovereignty, but in their own ways sought to reject Spanish sovereignty all together. With 
wealthy and influential planters signaling that their continued loyalty to Spain was contingent on 
their continued prosperity, Captain General Vives’s authority to govern derived from his position 
as the highest-ranking agent of the Spanish Empire in Cuba, but was also contingent on his 
ability to govern in a way that would satisfy planters. While the Military Commission was 
intended to empower Vives, it also introduced a new instrument of governance he was 
responsible for and upon which his credibility resided. Whether the tribunal adjudicated the 
rebellion with an eye towards repressing slaves or gathering intelligence, it was imperative that it 
demonstrate competence in doing so. As signaled by José Ildefonso Suárez and explicitly stated 
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by Felipe Martínez, then, Francisco Seidel’s actions were offensive precisely because they 
threatened to undermine the credibility sustaining Captain General Vives’s authority, and upon 
which Spain’s fragile sovereignty over Cuba rested. 
In his overzealous attempt to live up to his responsibilities as a fiscal of the Military 
Commission, Francisco Seidel had failed to attend to his responsibilities as an agent of the 
Spanish Empire. A contemporaneous set of events involving local authorities eager to involve 
themselves in the tribunal’s work also raised the ire of governing officials in Havana for related 
reasons. On August 14, 1825, Sebastián Braz, acting as interim governor of Matanzas, had 
informed Seidel that Andrés Máximo Oliver, capitan de partido of the district of Guamacaro, 
had uncovered a new conspiracy of slaves preparing to rebel. Seidel immediately traveled to 
Guamacaro to meet with Oliver and then began interrogating slaves, before informing his 
superiors that he was looking into these allegations of a new conspiracy.103 
Two weeks later, Seidel became embroiled in a second allegation regarding a new 
conspiracy. On August 30, a resident of Matanzas named Francisco Hernández Morejón sent 
letters to Seidel, Governor Ayllón, and Captain General Vives in Havana announcing that he had 
uncovered yet another conspiracy of slaves planning to rebel.104 The son of a wealthy family, 
Hernández Morejón was a captain in the local militia who had gained recognition pursuing rural 
bandits. During the trienio liberal, he had been elected to the city council of Matanzas and had 
also played a role in the initial phase of the prosecution of alleged members of the Soles y Rayos 
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de Bolívar.105 On at least one occasion, Hernández Morejón had been called on to serve as 
interim governor of Matanzas.106 
In his various letters, Hernández Morejón reported that capitán de partido Andrés 
Máximo Oliver had recently learned that a captured maroon had confessed to the existence of a 
new conspiracy. Hernández Morejón also reported that he had instructed Oliver to interrogate the 
slave, and included a copy of the interrogation record in his letter to Seidel.107 On the surface, the 
interrogation record described a seemingly reasonable set of events. On August 27, Oliver had 
travelled to a coffee plantation owned by an Englishman named William Bowen. In a barn, with 
the assistance of the plantation’s mayoral and a secretary, Oliver interrogated the maroon, whose 
name was Martín Gangá, ostensibly according to all the legal requirements. When asked why he 
had run away and where he had been during his absence, Martín presented a simple, yet alarming 
story. He had first stayed at the house of a free person of color who lived adjacent to Bowen’s 
plantation for two days, during which time three different slaves had visited to talk about 
“making war against the whites in order to kill them all.” Martín then went to a neighboring 
plantation, where he hid out for three days, overhearing two conversations between 
contramayorales from that plantation and slaves from neighboring plantations about how they 
were soon going to “make war against the whites.” Then Martín hid out for a couple of days on 
his master’s plantation during which time he met with several slaves behind the chicken coop 
and talked about the coming war. Martín then stole a horse and headed towards the city of 
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Matanzas, where he was apprehended and imprisoned.108 
In his letter to Captain General Vives, Francisco Hernández Morejón described how he 
had ordered Andrés Máximo Oliver to continue investigating the new conspiracy. He also 
recommended that a cavalry unit be deployed to the countryside in case the rebellion did break 
out, that all district captains throughout Matanzas be put on full alert, and finally that Oliver be 
commended in some official way.109 Of his own volition, Hernández Morejón had inserted 
himself into a matter that he had as of yet not been a part of. Because of his social standing and 
because all feared the break out of a new rebellion, the captain general took his allegations of a 
new conspiracy seriously. 
These two allegations of new conspiracies emerged just as Francisco Seidel’s superiors 
were contending with his interference in the matter of Pablo Gangá. After auditor de guerra 
Felipe Martínez had finished criticizing Seidel for countermanding the Consejo de Guerra’s 
sentence, he lamented that “this obsession with talking about new conspiracies has become an 
epidemic,” adding that there would be “bad consequences” if they turned out to be false. Having 
doubts about Seidel’s competence, Martínez suggested that President Cadaval recall Seidel to 
Havana so as to review the evidence he had gathered pertaining to the alleged new 
conspiracies.110 And even as José Ildefonso Suárez advised Cadaval to investigate the allegations 
of new conspiracies, he suggested that these were but echoes of the original conspiracy that had 
preceded the rebellion of June 15.111 
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With Francisco Seidel’s competence under increasing scrutiny, it fell on fiscal Francisco 
Lamadriz to follow up on Francisco Hernández Morejón’s allegations. While under questioning 
by Lamadriz, Martín Gangá revealed that he had been tortured by his mayoral prior to Andrés 
Máximo Oliver’s initial questioning and had been instructed to provide false testimony about the 
existence of the conspiracy. He also revealed the wounds on his back from the torture he had 
received.112 
 On September 10, Francisco Seidel returned to Havana to face asesor José Ildefonso 
Suárez’s scrutiny.113 After reviewing the documents Seidel had brought with him, and with news 
coming from Matanzas that Martín Gangá’s confession may have been a fabrication, Suárez 
emerged from the meeting with a sense of confidence, writing to President Cadaval on 
September 19. “I have the satisfaction of informing Your Honor,” he began, “that my judgement, 
expressed in previous consultas, about the absence of more than one conspiracy, has turned out 
to be accurate and true.”114 
 In the days and months that followed, fiscal Francisco Lamadriz continued to investigate 
Francisco Hernández Morejón’s alleged new conspiracy, perhaps out of an abundance of caution, 
but also to uncover the true depths of the deception itself. Not only did capitan de partido 
Andrés Máximo Oliver admit that Martín Gangá had been tortured prior to the interrogation, but 
when Lamadriz attempted to question the mayoral from Martín’s plantation, he learned that the 
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mayoral had left the region to attend to business elsewhere.115 Furthermore, it was later revealed 
that the mayoral was Oliver’s brother-in-law, suggesting that there had indeed been a new 
conspiracy taking place in the Matanzas countryside, not of slaves planning to rebel, but of local 
actors trying to insert themselves into a process that had long since reverted to the centers of 
power in the provincial capital of Matanzas and Havana.116 
 The entire affair was a waste of time and energy. Indeed, as Suárez reviewed the 
evidence and recommended that the Military Commission cease pursuing the case, he also 
recommended that Francisco Hernández Morejón be reprimanded in some way. But there were 
also indications that Military Commission officials were sensitive to another set of offenses. In 
his final report to President Cadaval regarding the case, fiscal Lamadriz stated that in addition to 
engendering false testimony, the use of torture against Martín Gangá was in violation of the royal 
decree of July 25, 1814, outlawing the use of torture when taking declarations and confessions 
during legal proceedings.117 This prohibition had its genesis in an 1811 decree issued by the 
Cortes de Cádiz during the Napoleonic occupation of Spain. With the defeat of the French and 
the return of Fernando VII to the throne, he issued a decree on May 4, 1814, nullifying the 1812 
Constitution and all decrees issued by the Cortes. But there was widespread support for 
prohibiting torture, and so Fernando VII issued another decree on July 25, 1814, reinstating the 
ban on judicial torture.118 
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It is unlikely that fiscal Lamadriz was overly concerned that Martín Gangá had been 
physically tortured. Most likely Martín had experienced the type of routine violence enacted on 
the bodies of the enslaved in order to compel their labor and induce their submission. The greater 
offense was that in orchestrating their deception, Francisco Hernández Morejón and capitan de 
partido Andrés Máximo Oliver had supplanted the laws of their sovereign with the practices 
sustaining their mastery over the enslaved.119   
After reporting to President Cadaval on September 19 that there were no new 
conspiracies, José Ildefonso Suárez then turned his attention to the Military Commission’s 
remaining tasks. “The Romans,” he wrote, “who were always keeping an eye on the 
subordination of their slaves, would not have left anyone alive in this territory, until the memory 
of those who killed their owners was erased.” Reiterating his initial views on the nature of the 
tribunal’s involvement in the case, he stated that the tribunal, “following the most humane and 
civil laws, should not act as judges in ways that we would not act as owners.” Suárez thus argued 
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“Because part of the legal meaning of slavery is that slaveholders have the right to inflict 
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that although “the blood of the innocent victims of June 15 cry from the grave for a just and 
severe vengeance, the interest of the country, and of the landowners as well, urgently demand 
that we not carry out excessive punishment, it being as dangerous as the original crime.”120 
 In this continued call for moderation in the tribunal’s treatment of slaves, Suárez argued 
that the island’s government could find “a model for the policing measures that should be 
established precisely to prevent a repetition of such devastating events.”121 Ever the letrado, 
Suárez articulated this opinion through legal reasoning. At the core of the “system” he had 
endeavored to establish was a negotiation between the Havana government’s desire to unravel 
the origins of the rebellion, and the need of regional officials to punish rebels in an exemplary 
manner as quickly as possible. Suárez claimed to have achieved this by directing the Military 
Commission to conduct a thorough and rigorous investigation that adhered to all the formal 
requirements of law, but that only focused on the leaders of the uprising and its worst offenders. 
By exercising discretion in choosing who to press charges against, Suárez believed he had 
attended to the legal exception included in the Recopilación, mandating that ordinary judicial 
processes be disregarded in cases of slave rebellion, while also satisfying the tribunal’s political 
mandate to amplify executive power in the administration of justice. In doing so, he noted, the 
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“commission further embraces the spirit of [the provision in the Recopilación],” by establishing 
“[the judicial process] in a simple manner in order to defend the delinquent man’s sacred right to 
be heard, that no one can deny him.”122 
 Suárez made a number of further recommendations, among them that Seidel begin 
concluding his investigation, focusing only on prisoners he deemed to be guilty of the most 
egregious crimes. The tribunal would also initiate new investigations into the alleged new 
conspiracies so as to identify suspects the tribunal might have overlooked during Francisco 
Lamadriz and Francisco Seidel’s respective investigations.123 
 Over the next two weeks, Francisco Seidel gathered the necessary declarations and 
confessions to bring charges against thirteen prisoners he had determined to have been directly 
involved in the killing of white residents.124 In his final report to the Consejo de Guerra, Seidel 
assuaged Captain General Vives’s initial fears that the rebellion might have been an expression 
of one of the regional conflicts threatening Spanish sovereignty over Cuba, attributing the 
rebellion entirely to the planning and efforts of the slaves themselves, as evidenced by “its 
ferocity, its simplicity, and its ignorance.”125 
All told, approximately 200 slaves had participated in the rebellion, twenty-four estates 
had been damaged, and fifteen white residents, forty-three slaves, and two free men of color had 
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been killed.126 On December 24, the consejo unanimously voted to condemn the thirteen to death 
by firing squad.127 Captain General Vives gave his approval on January 12, 1826, and on 
February 1 the thirteen were executed in the presence of other prisoners.128 Over the next month, 
Seidel tied up loose ends before certifying on March 10 that the judicial process was complete 
and the case file was in order. In a final act signifying the colonial state’s newly assumed 
commitment to confronting massively organized slave resistance through legal means in the 
name of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba, but which also suggested a sense of relief, Seidel’s 
secretary signed off on the case file with a final note to “file it away,” punctuating the imperative 
with a forcibly written exclamation point.129 
 
*** 
The Guamacaro rebellion of 1825 revealed the violent potential of a rural population of African 
captives willing to channel their resistance to slavery through rebellion organized on a large 
scale. By assigning the newly formed Military Commission to assume jurisdiction over the 
investigation and prosecution of the rebellion, Captain General Vives also revealed the ways the 
colonial state sought to institutionalize its capacity to respond to such threats through legal 
means. This was an exercise subject to interpretation, however, as regional officials, local 
authorities, and slaveholders had their own ideas about the need to use the law in the service of 
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repression and terror when confronting slaves bent on resisting their enslavement. For agents of 
Spanish empire in Havana such as the captain general and the officials of the Military 
Commission, on the other hand, the interests of insular security required that they interrogate 
slaves with deliberation as they worked towards determining the precise nature of the threats 
facing the island. For all involved, wielding the law thus meant contending with the ways in 
which emergency and crisis could unravel any sense that the law had a singular meaning and a 
singular purpose. Extending law into rural Matanzas to grapple with slave resistance, then, was 
also an exercise in extending a sense of sovereign authority concentrated in the powers of the 










An Intractable Problem: Free People of Color and Insular Security, 1826-1832 
 
 
On January 24, 1826, José Emeterio Lazo returned to Havana. A soldier in the pardo (mulatto) 
battalion of the free black militia, Lazo had spent the previous year stationed at the fortress San 
Juan de Ulúa.1 The fortress overlooked the port of Veracruz and housed the last of Spanish 
forces on the American mainland. Following a prolonged siege, the fortress’s garrison 
succumbed to disease, forcing their capitulation on November 21, 1825.2 Thus ended over three 
centuries of Spanish military presence on the American mainland. 
 José Emeterio Lazo first headed to his battalion’s Havana barracks, where he spent most 
of the day.3 Since the earliest days of the Spanish Empire, free men of color had played 
important roles in defending Spanish settlements and colonies from the forays of pirates and the 
armies of rival empires.4 From this proud tradition of colonial defense, the free black militias 
emerged as important social institutions, where free men of color with means derived social 
standing and material benefits. Officers in the free black militias often held relatively prestigious 
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occupations and passed wealth to their descendants as property in real estate and in persons.5 But 
the free black militias also served as sources of income for free men of color who were not so 
well off. A mere soldier, Lazo worked as a carpenter when not deployed with his battalion. He 
had little money and appears not to have owned any property. Upon leaving his barracks, he 
went to spend the night at his mother’s house in the municipality of Guanabacoa, in the eastern 
outskirts of Havana.6 
 That same day, the warden of the prison in Guanabacoa informed the municipality’s 
mayor that he had intercepted a letter delivered by what he described as a white man of nineteen 
or twenty years, intended for an inmate named Francisco Javier Lazo.7 “Long live the sacred 
Mexican republic,” the letter began, before recounting the experience of the inmate’s friend, who 
had been garrisoned at San Juan de Ulúa and had defected to the Mexican side in the final days 
of the siege. Along the left-hand margin, scribbled in a rough hand, the letter’s author implored 
“unresponsive Habaneros” to “break the tyrannical […] that have oppressed you so much,” and 
to “be free Americans, my beloved countrymen!”8 The mayor found the contents of the letter 
alarming enough that he initiated a preliminary investigation into the matter. Despite the 
warden’s initial description of the courier, the recently returned José Emeterio Lazo emerged as 
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the key suspect, in part because the letter’s intended recipient was his brother. Authorities 
arrested him soon after.9 Owing to the nature of the letter, the mayor forwarded the documents he 
had amassed thus far to Captain General Francisco Dionisio Vives.10 
 Captain General Vives learned of José Emeterio Lazo just as the Military Commission 
was concluding its prosecution of the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825.11 The largest slave uprising 
in Cuban history to that point, the rebellion had thrown into stark relief the risks to insular 
security accompanying the growth in Cuban slavery. Yet, even though the tribunal had 
concluded that the rebellion had been planned and executed by the slaves themselves, an 
underlying assumption pervading its prosecution was that slaves did not possess the capacity to 
pull off such a feat and that they must have been assisted by free people of color. During the 
waning days of the prosecution, fiscal Francisco Lamadriz had even compiled a report regarding 
all the free people of color who had been caught up in the tribunal’s investigation of the 
rebellion. Of the seven free men of color addressed in the report, Cristóval Carabalí and Félix 
Carabalí, Jean Fouquier’s mayoral and contramayoral who had been apprehended immediately 
after the rebellion and killed by soldiers during a supposed attempt to escape, were the only 
confirmed rebels.12 Even so, Lamadriz cautioned that “though it is fortunate that we have not 
been presented with cause to proceed against the free blacks found in this report, I judge that it 
will always be useful that territorial authorities closely monitor their behavior, though without 
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disturbing them in any way, unless thereafter they should change their behavior.”13 
Concerns that free people of color were inclined to form alliances with the enslaved had a 
long history in Cuba. Despite the historical role free soldiers of color had played in colonial 
defense, for instance, colonial officials maintained reservations about deploying them against 
bands of maroons or to put down slave rebellions, for fear that they might switch sides.14 It was 
the more recent example of the Haitian Revolution, however, that had revealed to the full range 
of the island’s inhabitants, as inspiration or as threat, what was possible when the supposed 
incapacity of slaves was coupled with the apparent capacity of free people of color.15 Though 
some believed the upheaval of the Haitian Revolution could not occur in Cuba because of the 
demographic superiority of the island’s white population and the supposed beneficence of Cuban 
slavery, the slave rebellions of 1812 organized by black militia officer José Antonio Aponte 
revealed that even Cuba was susceptible to a coalition of free and enslaved people of color 
striking out against slavery.16 When free soldiers of color who had participated in Spain’s 
military campaigns against the liberation forces of Spanish America began returning to Cuba, 
then, Captain General Vives expressed concerns they might channel their growing pride against 
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the colonial state if they were rewarded too generously for their service.17 
At a time when the forces of American liberation and slave rebellions threatened Cuba 
from without and from within, the allegation that José Emeterio Lazo had transported a letter 
from Mexico exhorting Cubans to rise up against the Spanish raised many red flags. Captain 
General Vives thus ordered the Military Commission to assume jurisdiction over the case and on 
January 31 fiscal Anastacio Castellanos began to investigate the matter in haste.18 
 As the Military Commission began prosecutions on a regular basis, the way in which 
local authorities in Guanabacoa had arrested Jose Emeterio Lazo and conducted their own 
preliminary investigation before forwarding the matter to Captain General Vives emerged as the 
primary way the tribunal took on new cases. Even if Captain General Vives, his advisers, and 
tribunal officials entertained specific and particular ideas about the nature of the threats 
challenging Spanish sovereignty over Cuba, the cases that eventually appeared before the 
tribunal reflected the various ways local authorities and area residents interpreted those threats. It 
remains unclear exactly how it was that the mayor of Guanabacoa decided that José Emeterio 
Lazo had been the courier of the letter even after the prison warden’s initial claim that it had 
been a white man. The actions of local authorities immediately following Lazo’s arrest, however, 
suggest that material gain was a possible motive. Soon after Guanabacoa’s mayor questioned 
Lazo for the first time, local authorities went to Lazo’s mother’s house to inventory his and her 
property so that it might be embargoed in the future.19 Military Commission prosecutions, then, 
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were never precise reflections of the tribunal’s concerns, or even those of the captain general it 
served. They were always imbued with and refracted through the prejudices, proclivities, and 
motivations of local actors. 
As Military Commission fiscales prepared prosecutions to be brought before the 
tribunal’s Consejo de Guerra for final judgement, they regularly discovered that accusations 
levied against people of color were often more alarming than what the evidence supported. This 
served as a source of frustration for the tribunal, whose fiscales were burdened by the work of 
prosecuting multiple cases simultaneously and whose leaders were wary of wasting the tribunal’s 
time. For the tribunal’s asesor, José Ildefonso Suárez, these frustrations engendered new ways of 
thinking. During the tribunal’s prosecution of the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825, Suárez had 
argued that the government’s legitimacy rested on its ability to command the law. By 1831, 
however, he was conceiving of ways to truncate fully articulated legal processes in some cases 
dealing with free people of color in order to avoid their accompanying inconveniences. 
 Fiscal Anastacio Castellanos worked on José Emeterio Lazo’s case while also working 
on at least two other cases.20 When another fiscal became ill towards the end of March, 
Castellanos had to take on his work load.21 He became so overburdened that he was unable to 
resume work on Lazo’s case until August 5.22 For four months Lazo languished in prison. When 
Castellanos finally brought Lazo’s case before the tribunal’s Consejo de Guerra, he presented 
them with a tepid summation of the defendant’s crime. Suggesting that Lazo may have been 
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unaware of the ambiguous contents of the letter, he wrote that “Lazo’s offense was committed 
solely in having admitted to being the courier of a personal correspondence. Thus even though 
the letter contains expressions, more [indicative] of ignorance, than of an intention to incite 
rebellion..., we cannot, without making assumptions, be sure that Lazo had been aware of its 
contents.”23 Rather than condemning Lazo to death, which he claimed the law required for 
anyone found guilty of transporting a correspondence from an enemy, Castellanos recommended 
that the defendant be sentenced to four years in prison.24 Despite witness testimony placing Lazo 
at his barracks on the day the letter had been delivered, the consejo voted to follow Castellanos’s 
recommendation.25 A week later, Captain General Vives signed off on the sentence.26 
 When the mayor of Guanabacoa brought José Emeterio Lazo to Captain General Vives’s 
attention, or when Vives finally approved of the Consejo de Guerra’s sentence, such a 
prosecution of a black soldier transporting a letter from the breakaway republic of Mexico that 
urged Cubans towards revolution seemed to exemplify the defense of Spanish sovereignty the 
tribunal had been created to promote. In its particulars, however, the case represented a more 
complex set of circumstances and concerns, where local authorities such as the mayor and prison 
warden of Guanabacoa seem to have been inclined to conflate their official responsibilities with 
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their material interests, and in the process overlook some of the distinctions between an actual 
threat to insular security and an opportunity. 
 As the Military Commission began prosecuting cases on a regular basis, interpretative 
decisions regarding the constitution of infractions, the identification of culprits, and the 
seriousness of alleged offenses, increasingly influenced the tribunal’s work, as dramatic threats 
to insular security like the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825 gave way to a greater volume of more 
mundane incidents concentrated in urban centers. The subjective reasons why local actors, from 
petty officials to area residents, took offense, felt threatened, or otherwise decided to act, thus 
constituted the raw materials the tribunal then worked to transform into prosecutions and then 
into sentences. In the process, its adherence to legal form and the pragmatic constraints of legal 
institutions, if only nominal at times, did not always make this an easy task. The tribunal’s work 
was nonetheless consequential, for the role it played in promoting insular security, but also as a 
practice whereby officials gained experience dealing with the peculiarities that accompanied 
employing the law against free and enslaved people of color. 
From his founding of Cuba’s Military Commission on March 4, 1825, until the end of his 
tenure as captain general on May 15, 1832, Francisco Dionisio Vives signed off on sentences for 
557 defendants implicated in a total of 183 cases brought before the tribunal’s Consejo de 
Guerra. Of these 557 defendants, at least 211 were free or enslaved people of color. 27 Even as 
white defendants outnumbered defendants of color, the tribunal’s adjudication of free and 
enslaved people of color played an outsized role in shaping the sense of the threats facing Cuba. 
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In particular, these prosecutions served as a vital conduit, channeling a diverse urban world, 
variegated according to class, color, and status, through the prejudices, proclivities, and 
motivations of local authorities and area residents, through the legal machinations of the tribunal, 
into the thoughts and policy prescriptions of the captain general himself. Considering his 
numerous responsibilities, signing off on these sentences constituted a relatively minor part of 
his job. Nevertheless, these cases offered Vives a skewed perspective on the world of race in 
Cuba, one that affirmed preconceived notions about the potential threats posed by an alliance 
between free and enslaved people of color, in which violence overshadowed lawfulness, and 
where difference and distinction were collapsed into a potent sense of black threat. 
 
White Residents, Local Authorities, and the Fear of Black Violence 
A collection of statistics for the year 1827 commissioned by Captain General Vives had high 
praise for the city of Havana. “You can be assured that this capital is of the richest in the New 
World. Abundance radiates everywhere.”28 Like other port cities attached to the networks of 
Atlantic slavery, Havana’s economic growth bore overtly racial overtones, having given rise to a 
complex urban population of Africans and the African-descended.29 For free and enslaved people 
of color, life in the city was variegated, their experiences shaped by legal status, place of origin, 
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color, class, gender, and religion.30 For many white residents of Havana, on the other hand, 
people of color could serve as convenient counterpoints, demarcating realms of social life that 
they aspired to avoid, such as occupations in the trades.31 In the years after the Aponte Rebellion 
of 1812, as Cuba’s booming slave economy was accompanied by increasing slave resistance in 
the countryside, white residents could make recourse to the perceived potential of black violence 
to bolster their position of social domination over people who were at once their neighbors, their 
rivals, and perhaps even their enemies. 
 On June 19, 1830, the slave Simón Madrazo left Havana, headed for the surrounding 
countryside with a mule laden with goods for sale. His master’s wife had written him out a pass, 
authorizing Madrazo to travel from plantation to plantation selling goods such as chickens and 
textiles for a period of six months. Madrazo was a regular fixture on the roads connecting 
Havana to its hinterland, selling goods, delivering correspondences, and carrying sums of money 
from rural residents to their acquaintances and family in Havana.32 
 As a slave in the colonial capital, Simón Madrazo lived a life distinct from slaves who 
had been sent to work on plantations. Upon arriving in Havana, Madrazo began earning money 
for his owner by selling second-hand goods in a market and working on the docks. By 1827, 
Madrazo had married a slave belonging to Joaquin de Santacruz. So that the couple could live 
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together, Madrazo’s owner and Santacruz had arranged for Madrazo to live in Santacruz’s house. 
Madrazo thus enjoyed a certain measure of autonomy as he navigated life in the city and its 
hinterland.33 
 On June 28, 1830, after being on the road for nine days, Simón Madrazo was passing 
through the town of Arroyo Naranjo, south of Havana, when he decided to enter a tavern, 
perhaps to try to sell some of his goods, or simply to buy himself a drink. The tavern was 
occupied by a number of patrons, all of whom were residents of Arroyo Naranjo. At some point 
a noisy confrontation ensued between Madrazo and the other patrons.34 
 The confrontation occurred just as a local official named Mariano Laguardia, who served 
as deputy to the capitán de partido of the district of Jesús de Monte, was passing by the tavern. 
In the everyday lives of the inhabitants of Cuba, the most visible representatives of the state were 
the jueces pedáneos (local magistrates with policing powers). In rural districts they were known 
as capitanes de partido, while those in charge of urban neighborhoods were referred to as 
comisarios de barrio (neighborhood commissioners). Jueces pedáneos were often assisted by a 
number of deputies such as Laguardia. Since jueces pedáneos were unsalaried officials, they 
made livings by charging fees for issuing administrative documents such as travel licenses and 
imposing fines for infractions, both of which could blur into revenue-generating corruption. They 
were responsible for patrolling their districts and neighborhoods, and thus constituted the limited 
policing force extending the formal sovereign authority of the colonial government into urban 
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and rural Cuba.35 
As described in his report, Mariano Laguardia entered the tavern to find white patrons 
engaged in a heated exchange with Simón Madrazo. The white patrons alleged that Madrazo had 
threatened them when he declared that in two months they would all be his slaves and that he 
would bathe in their blood. Considering the nature of Madrazo’s supposed threats, Laguardia 
took him into custody. The deputy also took charge of Madrazo’s mule and all of his goods.36  
 The next day, Mariano Laguardia began conducting interviews. One of the white patrons 
who had witnessed the incident, a 30-year-old resident of Arroyo Naranjo and apothecary named 
Justo Pineda, alleged that in addition to making the threatening statements, Simón Madrazo had 
waved a piece of paper, claiming that it attested to his commission as an officer in a military unit. 
Pineda stated that when he pointed out that the paper was actually Madrazo’s travel license, 
Madrazo declared that he was a slave to no one except God. Pineda responded that he was glad 
to see that Madrazo would thus be hung, just as José Antonio Aponte had been in 1812.37 
Among white Cuban planters and slaveholders, the Aponte Rebellion of 1812 had served 
to dampen their enthusiasm for following the path of the wars of independence on the Spanish 
American mainland, as the Spanish Empire seemed to be an effective source of security against 
the forms of black violence accompanying the rise in Cuban slavery.38 On a more popular level, 
Aponte had emerged as a potent symbol for white Cubans, allowing them to project onto any 
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person of African descent the violent potential of the island’s growing population of free and 
enslaved people of color.39 While there is no way of knowing whether Justo Pineda lied about 
what happened in the tavern, merely exaggerated the nature of the confrontation, or provided 
testimony in good faith, his mentioning of José Antonio Aponte was a clear attempt to convey to 
deputy Mariano Laguardia the threatening light in which he now wanted the incident to be seen.  
Even as Justo Pineda evoked Aponte when denouncing Simón Madrazo, Mariano 
Laguardia’s questioning revealed the way the deputy tried to link Madrazo’s criminal culpability 
to his individual mobility. Laguardia began his questioning by attempting to retrace Madrazo’s 
Atlantic itinerary. After determining that Madrazo had been born in Africa and was a member of 
the Mandinga “nation,” Laguardia asked Madrazo if he had been anywhere else after being taken 
from Africa but before arriving in Cuba, perhaps in a bid to link Madrazo to regions in the 
Americas were anti-colonial or anti-slavery struggles had taken place. Madrazo answered that he 
had been taken directly to Havana from Africa. In another attempt to determine if Madrazo had 
spent time elsewhere, Laguardia asked if he spoke any languages other than Spanish and his 
native tongue. Madrazo replied that he spoke some English, but only because he had spent some 
time working on the docks.40 
After determining that Simón Madrazo’s Atlantic itinerary had no suspicious points of 
disembarkation, Mariano Laguardia turned to Madrazo’s travels within Cuba. The autonomy and 
mobility of free and enslaved people of color had long been sources of concern in Cuba, even as 
they were essential features of their social lives as domestic servants, laborers, midwives, heads 
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of households, soldiers, merchants, dentists, and sailors, to name just a few occupations. In the 
set of municipal ordinances for the city of Havana from 1574, slave owners were required to 
obtain a license before permitting their slaves to work independent of their purview or to live 
outside of their house.41 Following the 1825 slave rebellion in the Guamacaro district of 
Matanzas, the governor of Matanzas continued in this legal tradition by issuing a set of 
ordinances that aimed to, among other things, prevent slaves from coordinating future rebellions 
by restricting their ability to move and communicate across plantations.42 In response to a series 
of questions aimed at retracing his movements prior to the incident in Arroyo Naranjo, Madrazo 
revealed that he had been traveling around the countryside selling goods to plantations in the 
rural areas surrounding Havana.43 Madrazo claimed not to have been aware of the fact, but even 
this practice had recently been made illegal in Cuba. As mandated in the Bando de buen 
gobierno for the year 1828, a collection of ordinances with application throughout the island, 
“white and colored persons” were “strictly forbidden” from working in the countryside as 
“peddlers [or as] street vendors of clothes, knives, comestibles, and whatever other kinds of 
effects,” owing to the “damages, harm, and disturbances caused by free pardos and morenos of 
both sexes, who, under the pretext of selling clothes, foods, and other kinds of effects, enter the 
slave huts [on plantations], where they enter into negotiations with slaves that frequently result in 
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robberies owing to the clumsy and fraudulent exchanges that take place.”44 
Mariano Laguardia concluded his questioning of Simón Madrazo by focusing in on the 
confrontation in the tavern. Madrazo denied uttering any of the alarming expressions he had been 
accused of by the white patrons in the tavern, claiming, instead, that he had entered the tavern 
hoping to sell some chickens. When asked if he knew of any plots against the government and if 
he was really an officer in a military unit, Madrazo denied the accusations, pointing out that he 
could not be an officer because he was a slave. At the end of the interrogation, when asked how 
he could deny threatening the white patrons of the tavern even after they had all attested to his 
having done so, Madrazo replied that if he had said any of those things, it had only been because 
he had consumed some alcohol.45 
By the next day, deputy Mariano Laguardia had compiled sufficient testimonial evidence 
and forwarded it all to his superior José López Gavilán, the capitán de partido of the district of 
Jesús del Monte.46 Gavilán responded by forwarding the documents to Captain General Vives, 
who then ordered the Military Commission to look into the case.47 
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 Local authorities such as deputy Mariano Laguardia and capitán de partido José López 
Gavilán played important roles in extending state power into urban spaces and the countryside.  
Their limited numbers and the administrative need to dedicate time and effort to extracting 
money from the population, however, meant that they depended on the cooperation of local 
residents to assist in the task of policing. The Bando de buen gobierno required that plantation 
owners, administrators, and overseers report to their respective capitanes de partido regarding 
escaped slaves so that those officials would then keep the captain general regularly informed.48 
Another provision in the Bando de buen gobierno mandated that area residents assist in policing 
whenever asked.49 Area residents thus influenced who was arrested and why. Though deputy 
Mariano Laguardia was primed to consider Madrazo’s mobility as a possible source of concern, 
it had been the inclination of white residents of Arroyo Naranjo such as Justo Pineda to confront 
people of color such as Madrazo, out of fear, discomfort, or even merely out of spite, that had 
been the genesis of the case. 
 Transient slaves such as Simón Madrazo were not the only people of color capable of 
stirring the anxieties of white Cubans. In the majority black neighborhood of Jesús María, many 
white Habaneros were similarly wary of their free black neighbors. Domingo Santaya, for 
example, was born in Havana in 1806. By 1827, at the age of twenty-one, Santaya held the rank 
of first sergeant in the moreno battalion of the free black militia. He also made money by 
working out of his house as a tailor. Many of his clients were also soldiers, whose uniforms he 
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mended.50 It is possible that in addition to mending uniforms, he designed them as well, as he 
spent some of his free time sketching images of black soldiers in uniform, perhaps as they 
actually appeared in real life, or perhaps as he imagined them to be.51 He was also literate and 
was likely a member of one of the dance academies that free people of color, especially those 
born in Cuba, often formed as part of their associational lives.52 
All this seems to have done little or nothing to diminish the suspicions of some of 
Domingo Santaya’s white neighbors. One day in early April 1827, a white resident of Jesús 
Maria named Víctor José Ruiz informed Manuel Martínez, a deputy to the neighborhood’s 
comisario de barrio, that he and others had overheard a distressing conversation regarding 
Santaya between a white resident of Jesús María named Francisco Rodríguez and a slave named 
José.53 According to deputy Martinez’s recollection of Ruiz’s verbal denunciation, the slave José 
had uttered the following words during the conversation: “Look Mr. Pancho [nickname for 
Francisco], these blacks are very young. They’ve come to talk to me so that I’d enter into 
conspiracies with them, and I haven’t wanted to, because I love my master and I remember the 
nine who were hung.”54 Whether the slave José had actually uttered those words, or Ruiz had 
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merely used the slave as a vector for his denunciation, the nine in question were presumably the 
alleged leaders of the 1812 Aponte Rebellion. 
For reasons that remain unclear, deputy Martínez took Ruiz’s denunciation to Captain 
General Vives’s asesor primero, a man named Rafael Rodríguez. The denunciation concerned 
asesor Rodríguez enough that he brought the matter to Vives himself, who subsequently ordered 
Rodríguez to question all of those involved.55 
On April 10, asesor Rafael Rodríguez began interviewing those implicated in the 
denunciation, beginning with deputy Manuel Martínez, who simply recounted Víctor José Ruiz’s 
initial denunciation.56 Rodríguez then interviewed Ruiz himself. After identifying himself as a 
27-year-old worker in the tobacco industry, Ruiz said he had been motivated to make his initial 
denunciation because deputy Martínez had once advised residents of Jesús María to be 
particularly vigilant. When asked about the suspicious meetings the slave José had referred to, 
Ruiz described how he had noticed a number of black men coming and going from Domingo 
Santaya’s residence. Despite claiming that he did not know what they were up to, he was able to 
identify by name four of the black men he had seen entering Santaya’s house.57 
The asesor then interviewed Francisco Rodríguez, the man who had been seen 
conversing with José. A fisherman and resident of Jesús María, Francisco Rodríguez verified that 
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he had spoken with José, and when prompted added that at various times he had seen up to eight 
men entering Domingo Santaya’s residence. Based on his own experience, he claimed, he was 
certain that those men had been up to something. Though he could not identify any of the men by 
name, he claimed that he recognized them from around the neighborhood.58 
 Asesor Rafael Rodríguez then interviewed José. Originally from the mainland Caribbean 
port city of Cartagena, the 40-year-old José lived in the district of San Andrés with his master, 
whom he had served for the last twenty-two years. When asked about the comments he was 
alleged to have made when chatting with Francisco Rodríguez, José denied ever uttering those 
words, claiming that he had just stopped to say hello. When asked if he knew Domingo Santaya, 
he claimed that he did not.59 
 On the night of April 10, asesor Rafael Rodríguez led a raid on Domingo Santaya’s 
house with the assistance of deputy Manuel Martínez, Víctor José Ruiz, and others. Upon 
entering the house, the raiding party found four men of color, including Santaya. While 
searching the premises, they discovered some weapons and papers containing sketches of 
soldiers and lists of names, all of which they took as evidence. After confining the men in deputy 
Martínez’s house, the raiding party conducted two more raids based on Víctor José Ruiz’s 
guidance, arresting two more men.60 
 Over the next two weeks asesor Rafael Rodríguez conducted more arrests and 
                                                 
58 Declaración de D. Francisco Rodríguez, Havana, 10 April 1827, f. 5v-7, 1a pieza, exp. 7, leg. 
5, CM, ANC. 
59 Declaración del negro José de Mesa, Havana, 10 April 1827, f. 7-9v, 1a pieza, exp. 7, leg. 5, 
CM, ANC. 
60 Aprensión de los negros en el Manglar, Havana, 10 April 1827, f. 10v-12v, 1a pieza, exp. 7, 




interrogations before forwarding the case file he had amassed to the Military Commission for its 
consideration.61 
 People of color like the enslaved Simón Madrazo and the free Domingo Santaya lived 
particular lives that were also influenced by their African origins and their places within the 
economy, giving dynamism to the world of Havana in the 1820s and 1830s. As much as 
Madrazo’s world was determined by his enslavement, by becoming a husband he had been able 
to shape some aspect of his life, if only with whom he spent his free time at the end of a long 
day. And while Santaya was well on his way to taking advantage of some of the professional 
opportunities available to free men of color in Havana, his sketches hinted at an interior world 
through which he conducted his social life. By feeding off of and contributing to the growing 
fear and suspicion associated with free and enslaved people of color, however, their white 
neighbors had been able to collapse all that distinction and particularity into objects of threat that 
could provoke the colonial government’s developing concern over insular security. During the 
Military Commission’s first seven years in operation as part of Captain General Vives’s 
administration, this formal and informal security apparatus presented the tribunal with a total of 
329 potential cases involving at least 812 defendants.62 Of these defendants, at least 320 were 
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probably people of color.63 Guilty or not, these defendants and their alleged crimes constituted 
evidence in support of persistent and developing sense of the threats facing Cuba from potential 
alliances between free and enslaved people of color. 
 
Free People of Color and the Military Commission 
Cuba’s Military Commission was founded as a colonial articulation of a metropolitan 
development in the administration of justice. From the mid-eighteenth century, the Spanish 
monarchy had increasingly relied on the military and military courts to suppress and adjudicate 
instances of social unrest. Following the dissolution of the trienio liberal in 1823, Fernando VII 
extended the practice of using military courts to contend with social unrest to include political 
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dissidents as well.64 Of the 329 potential cases presented to the tribunal for its consideration 
during Captain General Vives’s administration, a few perfectly represented the types of political 
dissent the tribunal had originally been set up to combat. Between 1830 and 1831, for instance, 
the tribunal prosecuted a conspiracy of white Cubans with connections to Mexico known as the 
Águila Negra, which aspired to secure Cuba’s independence from Spain.65 In the main, however, 
the tribunal often found itself considering cases that hardly represented threats to the colonial 
state. Of the 329 potential cases, the tribunal pursued just 183 cases, the remainder either being 
forwarded to other courts or dropped altogether. Of these 183 cases, just 30 cases stemmed from 
allegations that could be characterized as dealing with threats to Spanish sovereignty over Cuba. 
While these included the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825 and conspiracies such as the Águila 
Negra, they were mostly made up of individual acts deemed to be subversive, such as José 
Emeterio Lazo’s alleged transport of a letter from Mexico.66 More to the point, the tribunal 
prosecuted a total of 148 cases involving 374 defendants that dealt with incidents of alleged 
theft, assault, carrying of prohibited weapons, and homicide.67 However metropolitan officials in 
Spain or even Captain General Vives himself had envisioned the tribunal, the reality was that it 
spent a lot of its time prosecuting cases of everyday crime. 
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A factor contributing to the number of cases of everyday crime passing through the 
Military Commission’s purview was its reliance on local authorities, who in turn relied on area 
residents, to initiate investigations over which it might then assume jurisdiction. In the case of 
Simón Madrazo, the slave who had allegedly threatened the white patrons of a tavern, the 
tribunal pursued the case for a month and a half before concluding that he posed little threat, 
sentencing him to fifty lashes, and ordering his owner to keep him in fetters for a year.68 They 
also ordered his owner to pay court costs amounting to 340 pesos and a 100 peso fine for 
violating the provision in the Bando de buen gobierno prohibiting people of color from selling 
goods to rural plantations.69 In the case of Domingo Santaya and the suspicious meetings he was 
alleged to have hosted, the tribunal’s fiscal spent more than three months determining that 
Santaya did in fact work as a tailor, and that the men seen frequenting his residence were his 
clients.70 The tribunal’s Consejo de Guerra voted unanimously to absolve all the men who had 
been arrested in connection with the case.71 As the tribunal confronted the free and enslaved 
people of color caught up in its prosecutions, its adherence to formal legal process, which ranged 
from rigorous to nominal at times, meant that its fiscales sometimes expended tremendous time 
and energy discovering that the fears and suspicions that varyingly motivated the denunciations 
against people of color were not always evidence of actual crimes. 
 On August 25, 1830, Cecilio Ayllón, governor of the jurisdiction of Matanzas, sent to 
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Captain General Vives a case file that he and his asesor, Félix de Acosta, had compiled.72 The 
case focused on a free black man named Francisco Trujillo, who had been accused of uttering 
expressions disparaging of the church and against the public peace while visiting the house of a 
free black woman named Eusebia Domínguez. White tenants living in Domínguez’s house had 
overheard Trujillo during a visit, and one of them took it upon himself to denounce Trujillo to 
the comisario de barrio in charge of the Santa Isabel neighborhood of the city of Matanzas. The 
comisario de barrio then brought the matter to Governor Ayllón’s attention.73 
 The accusations against Francisco Trujillo had sustained an investigation lasting close to 
seven months owing to three inter-related reasons. According to the initial denunciation, while 
conversing with Eusebia Domínguez, Trujillo had been overheard comparing the church to a 
prison and priests to scoundrels.74 When questioned by Governor Ayllón, Domínguez herself 
added that Trujillo had also stated that the island had once been governed by Indians, and that 
they would rule the island once again, adding that Cuban-born people of color were in the same 
family as the Indians.75 Trujillo’s comments, which combined the claims of two dispossessed 
peoples, seemed to challenge the legitimacy of Spain’s sovereignty over Cuba. 
 Francisco Trujillo’s alleged statements appeared all the more alarming when Governor 
Ayllón questioned Trujillo himself. Trujillo’s answers revealed the contours of his social world. 
Trujillo acknowledged knowing Eusebia Domínguez and her tenants, adding that he was on 
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friendly terms with all of them. In response to repeated questions about people of color he knew, 
Trujillo also provided the names of nine free men and women of color who lived in the city of 
Matanzas, in Guanabacoa, and in Ceiba Mocha, southwest of the city of Matanzas. One of the 
people he named was his sister, María Bernardina Trujillo, with whom he stayed whenever he 
visited Guanabacoa.76 
 Finally, Francisco Trujillo revealed that he regularly traveled throughout the Matanzas 
countryside visiting sugar plantations. He claimed that he did so to purchase sugar to make 
candies, which he sold in the city of Matanzas. When asked if he ever spoke with any of the 
slaves on the plantations he visited, Trujillo claimed that he only ever spoke with their owners 
and a couple of contramayorales.77 
 While Francisco Trujillo might have thought that he was representing himself as a 
harmless and productive resident of Matanzas, Governor Ayllón was primed to consider black 
sociality and mobility as antecedents to black violence.78 Ayllón and his men thus spent months 
tracking down and questioning all the free people of color Trujillo had mentioned in his 
testimony. Another source of concern was a slave rebellion that had recently broken out in the 
Matanzas countryside. Though Ayllón suspected that Trujillo might have been involved, by 
August 7 officials failed to uncover any connection between Trujillo and the slave rebellion.79 
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On the chance that the Military Commission might have its own information on Trujillo’s role in 
anything nefarious, Ayllón sent the case file to Captain General Vives, who then forwarded it to 
the tribunal. After consulting with asesor José Ildefonso Suárez, President Cadaval instructed 
fiscal Francisco Letamendi to begin a formal investigation.80 
 By assuming jurisdiction over this investigation, the Military Commission shifted the 
case’s center of gravity from the city of Matanzas to Havana, creating new delays and 
inconveniences. On September 13, within days of taking over the investigation, Francisco 
Letamendi asked President Cadaval to write to the governor of Matanzas requesting that 
Francisco Trujillo be transferred to Havana for further questioning.81 It was not until October 6 
that Cadaval heard back that Trujillo was about to be sent to Havana, and not until October 13 
that Trujillo was actually behind bars in a Havana prison.82 
 Francisco Letamendi encountered similar delays when he attempted to bring in people for 
questioning. On September 13, he had also asked President Cadaval to ask the mayor of 
Guanabacoa to arrange for the three free women of color residing in Guanabacoa that Francisco 
Trujillo had mentioned in his declaration, one of which was the defendant’s sister, to come to 
Havana for questioning.83 Trujillo’s sister, María Bernardina Trujillo, finally arrived in Havana 
more than three weeks later. In her testimony she credited her brother’s alarming statements to 
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the fact that in his old age Trujillo had begun acting “half mad.”84 
 On November 4, close to two months after he had taken responsibility over the case, 
Francisco Letamendi sent President Cadaval his first report. After reviewing Governor Ayllón’s 
case file and conducting a round of follow-up interviews, Letamendi opined that the distance 
between Havana and Matanzas was too much of an inconvenience and the case appeared to be 
less alarming than originally thought. While the allegations against Francisco Trujillo were 
certainly alarming, the expressions he was alleged to have uttered appeared to have been 
spontaneous and vague. The free people of color he was acquainted with posed no threats, and 
there was nothing connecting him to the slave rebellion in Matanzas. Letamendi concluded that 
this was clearly a case of an old man suffering from dementia, saying some inappropriate things. 
The fiscal thus recommended that the tribunal either drop the case or forward it to an 
ecclesiastical court, owing to Trujillo’s pronouncements against the church.85 
José Ildefonso Suárez disagreed with Francisco Letamendi’s recommendation. “The 
subversive expressions that are being dealt with in this case file amount to a crime,” he wrote. 
“The accused is either accused or he is not.” He thus recommended that the case be continued.86 
And so Francisco Letamendi continued prosecuting the case. On November 26, he requested that 
the governor of Matanzas conduct another round of interrogations on his behalf and on 
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December 16 he received copies of the interrogation records.87 As Letamendi began preparing 
the case to be brought before the tribunal’s Consejo de Guerra, he was required to ratify all of the 
testimonial evidence amassed thus far. The ratification process itself lasted until April 1831. On 
April 22, when Letamendi finally brought the case before the consejo, he reiterated the main 
points of his earlier report. Though Francisco Trujillo had certainly made subversive statements, 
there was no evidence indicating that they had been uttered out of malice and were most likely a 
result of his old age. Letamendi then recommended that the consejo sentence Trujillo to one year 
in prison and two years of labor on the public works.88 For reasons that were not recorded, the 
Consejo de Guerra took pity on Trujillo, sentencing him to a single year of public works.89 On 
April 26, 1831, Captain General Vives signed off on the case that officials in Matanzas had 
initiated over a year earlier.90 
 Francisco Letamendi’s frustration over having to pursue a case of such minimal 
importance emerged from the disconnect between a denunciation born out of fear and suspicion 
and a legal process within which those suspicions alone were insufficient cause for further 
action. While officials such as Governor Ayllón and fiscal Letamendi believed that Trujillo’s 
social world was a cause for concern, attempting to prove as much required time, effort, and an 
implicit disregard of other potential threats. As the Military Commission continued encountering 
defendants of color like Francisco Trujillo, these frustrations grew, stressing the tribunal’s 
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commitment to the legal foundation upon which it rested. 
 On February 17, 1831, Governor Ayllón had another case file for the Military 
Commission to consider, detailing a months-long investigation into a series of suspicious 
meetings in the house of a man identified as a moreno named Bernardo Sevillán.91 The 
investigation had begun in early December of the previous year, when a military officer 
informed the governor that an anonymous informant had told him that Sevillán was hosting 
secret meetings in his residence. Ayllón acted on the denunciation by placing Sevillán’s 
residence under surveillance.92 
 The surveillance revealed that groups of people of color, numbering between twenty and 
thirty, were meeting on a regular basis at Bernardo Sevillán’s residence with the door closed and 
with someone seemingly posted as a look out. By mid-December, they had met on four different 
occasions.93 Governor Ayllón thus arranged to get access to an adjacent house from which to 
continue the surveillance and at some point to stage a surprise raid. The house’s landlord had 
agreed to cooperate and had even been sworn to secrecy, but not before telling the governor that 
he should not be so worried, for the people coalescing in Sevillán’s house were merely 
rehearsing a play. After noticing that the reunions had stopped, and fearing that the landlord had 
alerted Sevillán of the surveillance, Ayllón ordered that the house be raided and that those who 
had been seen attending the meetings be arrested.94 
 The raid itself resulted in numerous arrests and the confiscation of much documentary 
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evidence, including some books. Bernardo Sevillán was found to own a book titled Diccionario 
o nuevo vocabulario filosófico democrático, indispensable para todos los que desean entender la 
nueva lengua revolucionaria, while his associate Jorge López also had several books, including 
one titled El bosquejo ligerísimo de la revolución de Méjico and another titled Catecismo o 
Cantón constitucional para la educación de la juventud española.95 Despite the initial suspicions 
and the presence of these books, the picture that emerged was, as the landlord had already 
suggested, quite innocent. During questioning, Bernardo Sevillán readily admitted that the 
reunions had been rehearsals for a comedy called “El triunfo del Ave María,” which they were 
preparing to perform during the next carnival.96 Others arrested during the raid and questioned 
corroborated Sevillán’s testimony. One of the men arrested revealed that a document confiscated 
as evidence was actually a list of subscribers who had each contributed five pesos to the 
endeavor, some of which was spent building a stage at Sevillán’s residence upon which they 
rehearsed. The rehearsals had apparently been called off when the grandfather of one of the 
actors had passed away.97 
 In his report to the governor, asesor Félix de Acosta concluded that there was not much 
to this case. While some of the documents and books confiscated during the raid were a cause for 
concern, they did not amount to evidence of any wrong doing, and the only laws these people 
had broken was failing to obtain authorization to hold meetings behind closed doors. Acosta thus 
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concluded that investigating further would be pointless and that they should forward the case file 
to the Military Commission on the chance that it deemed the case worth pursuing.98 
On March 4, 1831, José Ildefonso Suárez determined that the case of Bernardo Sevillán 
fell under the Military Commission’s jurisdiction.99 President Cadaval assigned the case to fiscal 
Francisco Seidel. After reviewing the case file for a few days, Seidel reported that the case file 
contained numerous deficiencies dealing with the rigor with which people had been questioned 
that impeded his ability to properly consider the case. Before he could begin prosecuting this 
case, Seidel asked that the case file be sent back to Matanzas and fixed.100 On March 10, 
President Cadaval sent the case file back to Matanzas so they could bring it up to standards.101 
 Over the next two weeks Governor Ayllón coordinated the series of re-interviews needed 
to bring the case file up to Francisco Seidel’s standards. On March 27, Seidel commented on the 
recently returned case file, stating that it was now clear to him that Bernardo Sevillán and the 
others had in fact been rehearsing for a play. If the Military Commission were to pursue the case, 
Seidel counselled, it should only do so in relation to some of the books collected as evidence 
during Governor Ayllón’s raid, which he deemed to be subversive.102 
After reviewing Francisco Seidel’s recommendation, José Ildefonso Suárez advised 
President Cadaval to consider dropping the case, as there was no evidence of any real crime. As 
for the suggestion that the Military Commission might pursue charges against Sevillán for 
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possessing subversive books, Suárez suggested that instead of initiating a new prosecution 
concentrating on the books, the tribunal should instead develop “a system of moderate 
reprimands” for cases dealing with incidents born out of ignorance, rather than criminal intent. 
“A prosecution and a judgement according to all legal procedures,” he added, “will be reserved 
for major crimes.”103 Suárez thus suggested that instead of preparing the case to be judged by the 
tribunal’s Consejo de Guerra, they should punish the owner of the subversive books with six 
months of public works. He also advised that they burn the books.104 
Following José Ildefonso Suárez’s recommendation, President Cadaval personally 
sentenced Bernardo Sevillán to six months in public works and ordered that the books be burned 
without bringing the matter before the Consejo de Guerra.105 After consulting with his auditor de 
guerra, Captain General Vives signed off on this abbreviated course of action.106 
While the Military Commission did pursue a few high-profile prosecutions, it spent most 
of its time prosecuting cases of relatively minor importance. As the cases of Francisco Trujillo 
and Bernardo Sevillán suggest, however, prosecutions against free people of color could provoke 
frustrations among tribunal officials not because they were of minor importance from the 
beginning, but because they were revealed to be less serious as their prosecutions progressed. In 
this regard, the cases against Trujillo and Sevillán were extreme examples of a general trend. In 
the case of Francisco Trujillo, the suggestion that Indians and people of color were planning to 
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take over the island turned out to be the ramblings of an old man. In the case of Bernardo 
Sevillán, the secret meetings turned out to be rehearsals for a play. During its first seven years in 
operation, the Military Commission certainly contended with some serious challenges to Spanish 
sovereignty over Cuba. But it also dealt with a number of cases revealing that white Cubans and 
local authorities were willing to exaggerate and inflate, if not fabricate, the threats posed by free 
and enslaved people of color in Cuba. 
 This is not to suggest, however, that Military Commission officials were devoid of 
prejudices and bigotries when contending with defendants of color. In the case of José Emeterio 
Lazo, who had been accused of transporting a subversive letter, though the evidence was by no 
means definitive regarding his guilt, the tribunal sentenced him anyway. But after the 
investigation into the allegations against Bernardo Sevillán turned up nothing, José Ildefonso 
Suárez became sufficiently annoyed by the waste of time that he began to contemplate ways of 
sidestepping formal procedures when handling such cases. His goal might not have been to apply 
the law in less rigorous ways in cases that were revealed to be of less importance, but rather to 
bypass the law altogether. 
 
Free People of Color and the Captain General 
Francisco Dionisio Vives served as Cuba’s captain general from May 2, 1823, until May 15, 
1832. Though he came to power during trying times for the Spanish Empire, he succeeded in 
ushering the colony through a period of growing prosperity.107 His tenure as captain general was 
certainly eventful, as independence conspiracies such as the Soles y Rayos de Bolívar and the 
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Águila Negra and slave uprisings such as the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825 ensured that 
defending Spanish sovereignty over the island from internal threats became an important aspect 
of colonial governance. 
In governing Cuba, however, Vives did not draw from a vast pool of experience in the 
Americas. Born in 1775 in the North African city of Orán, then under Spanish control, Vives had 
followed in his father’s footsteps and joined the military at a young age. During a storied career 
in Europe, Vives rose through the ranks, becoming a Brigadier General in 1810, during the 
struggle against Napoleon’s forces. Following the expulsion of the French and the restoration of 
Fernando VII to the Spanish throne in 1814, Vives served in various capacities before being sent 
to Washington, D.C., as ambassador to oversee the transfer of Florida to the United States. He 
returned to Spain in 1821, before being called on once again to serve Spain’s interests abroad, 
this time as captain general of Cuba.108 His time as captain general was very much a learning 
experience, one that imperial administrators in Spain were eager to mine. It may have come as a 
surprise, then, that after nine years at the helm of the colonial state, it was not separatist 
conspiracies nor slave rebellions the former captain general claimed was the biggest threat to 
Spain’s sovereignty over its most precious remaining colonial possession. Rather, Vives pointed 
to the island’s population of free people of color as his greatest source of concern. 
On September 10, 1832, Spain’s Minister of War, the Marqués de Zambrano, sent 
Francisco Dionisio Vives a questionnaire aimed at gleaning information from the former captain 
general regarding his time in Cuba. The questionnaire contained fifteen questions, the first six of 
which focused exclusively on white Cubans. Vives was asked to provide demographic 
information regarding Cuba’s white population and on the nobility. He was also asked to assess 
                                                 




the nobility’s influence throughout the island, to describe the make-up of Cuba’s merchant class, 
to provide a sense of how white laborers were represented within the population, and to say a 
few things about the opinions that predominated among the island’s white residents. Though 
Cuba’s position within the Spanish Empire in 1832 appeared secure, it was by no means assured. 
These questions reflected the concerns of imperial administrators attempting to secure Spain’s 
most important remaining colonial possession from the social and political forces that had 
resulted in independence on the American mainland. 
 In answering these questions, Vives pushed back against the metropolitan focus on 
Cuba’s white population. He reported that the 1827 census listed the white population at 
311,051, and that there were an additional 26,075 soldiers stationed on or passing through the 
island. While this represented an increase from previous counts, Vives was quick to point out 
that in relation to the number of free and enslaved people of color, the proportion of whites in the 
overall population had actually contracted. When addressing the nobility’s influence throughout 
the island, Vives was even more explicit that attention should instead be focused on Cuba’s 
population of color. Putting it bluntly, “the nobility has little influence in a country where the 
only and principle division depends on an individual’s color. The whites need to retain a 
[demographic] superiority that diminishes the numerical strength of the colored people.”109 
 In shifting focus to Cuba’s population of color, Vives revealed that security concerns 
were foremost on his mind when he concluded that Spain had nothing to fear from elite Cubans. 
“The happy coincidence of circumstances noticed on this island appear not to leave any doubt 
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that it will remain united with the metropolitan government,” he wrote. “Wealthy Cubans and 
residents of the island, fully aware of the consequences of a separation, are convinced of the 
advantages that will result from remaining under the shade of a protector government, enjoying 
peace, security, and other benefits offered to them by the King.”110 
 Only two questions in the questionnaire explicitly dealt with free and enslaved people of 
color, and in answering them Vives elaborated on where he claimed the actual threat to Cuba lay. 
When asked to report on the number of slaves on the island, he quickly moved beyond the 
demographic implications of the question and turned to matters of security. In a show of 
confidence, Vives discounted the threat that slave rebellions, in and of themselves, posed to the 
island. “The slaves have accomplished nothing but partial movements of brief consequence,” he 
wrote. In a statement clearly reflecting his experience at the head of government during slave 
uprisings such as the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825, Vives added that this could be “credited to 
the efforts of white [Cubans],” who had been successful in suppressing slave rebellions “without 
the need of involving the regular army.”111 
 In purely military terms, then, Vives concluded that the island had nothing to fear from 
the enslaved if they attempted to rise up on their own. “The distribution of the army throughout 
the territory,” he wrote, “the new facilities we have given to the rural militias, the creation of 
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urban corps in each of the districts, and the vigilance of the government, contribute to 
maintaining [the slaves] subjected [such] that they do not undermine public security.”112 
 When it came to free people of color, however, Vives rang a more cautionary tone. In 
response to a question vaguely asking about the desirability of free people of color in Cuba, 
Vives provided his longest answer to any of the questions in the questionnaire. “The existence of 
free blacks and mulattos amidst the enslavement of their comrades is an example that will be 
very prejudicial one day.”113 What followed was not a blanket condemnation of all people of 
color based on universal stereotypes and prejudices, but a nuanced calculation that drew from his 
many years of experience governing Cuba. 
 At the core of Vives’s calculation was his belief that “not all free blacks are dangerous to 
the same degree.”114 He described a first group of free people of color who “live submerged in 
vice, who have bad habits, and who possess a disposition towards engaging in a life of crime.”115 
It was unfortunate, he continued, that this first class of free people of color lived in close contact 
with a second class “made up of honorable artisans and good fathers of families, who own urban 
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properties and slaves.”116 This second class of free people of color, he added, “should not inspire 
distrust, [owing to] the commendable merit that they have acquired through their constant loyalty 
to the King, which results in our being able to count on their help in maintaining public order.”117 
 Nevertheless, Vives contended that even this second class of free people of color could 
not be fully counted on, “it being normal,” he wrote, “and most expected that in case of a well-
coordinated revolution of people of color, they will be swept away by the torrent.” Vives thus 
cautioned that even this second class of free people of color “should be considered indirectly 
dangerous.”118  
 In response to the suggestion that the problem of the island’s population of free people of 
color could be dealt with by deporting them all, Vives argued that deportations would engender 
precisely what the Spanish Empire hoped to avoid. “Having previously committed the error of 
not placing restrictions that would have made freedom difficult and slow to obtain,” he wrote, 
“and having made matters worse by indifference to the growth of this group, it would be very 
imprudent to want to correct omissions and defects now that we can only come to regret, because 
we cannot take a step toward reform without running into injustices that would awaken 
discontent and inevitably produce the ruin of this country.”119 
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According to Vives, the main problem with the idea of deporting all free people of color 
was that he could not envision enacting such a program lawfully. During times of peace, 
administering justice was a core competency of the colonial state. As shown during the Military 
Commission’s prosecution of the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825, however, colonial officials such 
as the captain general and the heads of the tribunal also believed that the legitimacy of the 
colonial state depended on its ability to demonstrate competence in the administration of justice 
even during times of emergency. If the concern in 1825 had been that white Cubans might seize 
upon any hint of government incompetence as a pretense for beginning their own struggle for 
independence, Vives’s dismissal of mass deportation as a solution for the perceived threats posed 
by the island’s free population of color revealed the extent to which he also considered the 
proper administration of justice as a main reason why free people of color, even if only the good 
ones, remained loyal to the King. As he put it, “free people of color, born and raised on the 
island, witnesses to the protection afforded to them by private interest, and, certain of the 
impunity of their crimes, unable to find anywhere the advantage they enjoy, would raise the cry 
of insurrection that would, without a doubt, raise the enslaved on the plantations.”120 
 The only solution Vives could offer, then, was that of deporting free people of color in a 
lawful manner. He suggested that when free people of color were sentenced to prison in criminal 
cases, that they be sent to prisons in Spain’s possessions in Northern Africa, from which it would 
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be too difficult for them to return to Cuba.121 
 Captain General Vives’s focus on the dangers posed by free people of color was informed 
by his particular experience as the island’s chief executive, in which his relationship with the 
Military Commission played an important role. The tribunal was a unique juridical institution 
precisely because it answered directly to the captain general. During the seven years from its 
inception until the end of Vives’s administration, the tribunal channeled a steady stream of 
information regarding the state of social unrest and political dissent to the captain general. 
Through his relationship with the Military Commission, Captain General Vives had his finger on 
the pulse of the threats perceived as challenging social stability and political continuity in Cuba. 
 Vives’s sense of the sources of instability in Cuba, however, was not an objective 
reflection of the social and political strains affecting Cuban society. Owing to the local contexts 
in which incidents became crimes worthy of the Military Commission’s attention, Captain 
General Vives’s window onto the world was necessarily shaped by the ways the island’s white 
inhabitants, local authorities, and his own subordinates could choose to portray the objects of 
their prejudices, bigotries, enmities, and fears as threats to Spanish sovereignty over the colony. 
Despite the fact that a majority of the defendants charged by the Military Commission were 
white and that defendants of color were not always found to be guilty of the accusations levied 
against them, then, Captain General Vives could thus see cause to single free people of color out 
as the biggest threat against the colony. 
For seven years, Vives signed off on every case judged by the tribunal’s Consejo de 
Guerra. In the aggregate, these cases mapped out the contours of a contentious world, one that 
may not always have been borne out by the facts, but that nonetheless situated free people of 
                                                 




color at the center of the social and political dislocations threatening Spanish sovereignty over 
Cuba. Even if the tribunal’s Consejo de Guerra found a particular defendant of color to be 
innocent or less guilty of the crimes they had been accused of, that defendant was still situated 
within a collection of information, the totality of which served as a measure of the threats against 
Cuba that the captain general was charged with confronting. Military Commission prosecutions 
thus served as a conduit, channeling prejudices, enmities, and anxieties regarding Africans and 
the African-descended from the streets and taverns of cities like Havana and Matanzas into the 
worldview of Vives himself. 
 
*** 
Even though Military Commission officials were the ones who did the work revealing that 
people of color were often being denounced of crimes they were not committing, or that were 
less severe than was being alleged, the measure of how compelling these allegations were can be 
seen in the way tribunal officials and the captain general himself came to view formal legal 
process as hindering the promotion of insular security. For asesor José Ildefonso Suárez, 
attending to the processual requirements of law meant that the tribunal expended tremendous 
time and energy prosecuting cases that turned out to be of relatively minor importance. His 
response to learning of Bernardo Sevillán’s innocence was to start thinking of ways the tribunal 
could, in certain instances, disregard formal legal process and move directly to issuing sentences. 
And even though Captain General Vives credited the proper administration of justice with 
engendering loyalty from what he deemed to be the good segment of Cuba’s free population of 
color, he also pointed to the law as the main obstacle preventing the colonial state from fully 




deportations. In terms of insular security and race, then, a sense was emerging that following the 
law in matters related to free people of color and their potential alliances with the enslaved could 










 “An Imprudent Anomaly”: Colonial Exceptionality and the Limits of 




On February 9, 1834, José Ildefonso Suárez wrote to the Ministry of Justice in Madrid to express 
how news of Queen Isabel II’s ascension to the throne had marked his heart “with tears of the 
purest joy and happiness.”1 The Queen’s ascension had not been uncomplicated. Her father, 
Fernando VII, had had to alter the law of succession to allow his daughter to take the throne at 
the expense of his brother Carlos’s claim. Upon Fernando VII’s death on September 29, 1833, 
the three-year-old Isabel became sovereign and her mother, María Cristina de Borbón-Dos 
Sicilias, was named Queen Regent.2 
 Suárez’s letter also expressed more material concerns. After nine years serving as the 
Military Commission’s asesor without a salary, Suárez claimed to be on the verge of ruin. He 
assured the Ministry of Justice, however, that he would serve the “innocent and legitimate 
queen,” even if it meant “spilling [his] last drop of blood.”3 Through this emphatic protestation 
of loyalty, Suárez registered with his superiors in the metropolitan government a pressing 
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concern that was at the same time personal and systemic. 
On a personal level, Suárez’s concern emanated from his professional history as a trained 
jurist who had staked much of his livelihood on service to the colonial government. Born in 
Cuba on April 21, 1785, he had attended university in Havana, and then followed in his father’s 
footsteps, apprenticing under two notable judges before becoming a lawyer in 1815. The 
following year the Real Audiencia, the island’s highest court, had authorized Suárez to practice 
law in Havana. He was soon providing occasional legal advice to Captains General José 
Cienfuegos y Jovellanos (1816-1819) and Juan Manuel de Cagigal (1819-1821) as Simón 
Bolívar led liberation forces on the American continent.4 
As Spain’s empire in the Americas was in decline, however, Cuba’s economy prospered. 
With sugar production spreading from its historic centers around Havana, the district of Güines, 
southeast of the capital, had emerged as a center of cane cultivation, eventually being linked to 
Havana through the island’s first railroad.5 In 1820, Captain General Cagigal had commissioned 
Suárez to serve as judge in a legal action over water rights to the Güines River brought by the 
Real Consulado, a consultative body made up of members of the economic elite who advised 
captains general on matters pertaining to economic development.6 
These years had also coincided with political turmoil in Spain. In 1820, Spanish liberals 
revolted against Fernando VII’s absolutist regime, instituting the period of liberal governance 
                                                 
4 Relación de los méritos, grados, y servicios de Don José Ildefonso Suárez, 27 April 1829, no. 
11, exp. 20, leg. 1661, Ultramar, AHN; José Ildefonso Suárez, Breve memoria escrita por el 
oidor honorario de la Audiencia de Cuba (Paris: Imprenta de Everat, 1839), 5. 
5 Manuel Moreno Fraginals, El ingenio: Complejo económico social cubano del azúcar (Havana: 
Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1978), 1: 52-62, 151. 
6 Francisco de Paula Hornillos to La Junta Económica Consular, Havana, 7 June 1826, exp. 310, 




that would later be known as the trienio liberal. Though the ascendancy of Spanish liberalism 
did not fundamentally alter Cuba’s colonial relationship with Spain, liberal reforms did begin to 
transform aspects of colonial governance.7 In 1821, Captain General Cagigal began to restructure 
Cuba’s system of lower courts in accordance with the 1812 constitution by dividing the island 
into judicial districts to be presided over by jueces de letras (judges trained in law), naming José 
Ildefonso Suárez to serve as judge of the district of San Antonio Abad.8 
Even as Spanish sovereignty over Cuba endured the disruptive years of the trienio 
liberal, the island had nonetheless been susceptible to the anti-imperial currents affecting 
Spanish domains. In 1823, authorities had uncovered the Conspiracy of the Soles y Rayos de 
Bolívar. The conspiracy had been distributed in nature, organized around masonic lodges 
throughout the island. The state’s adjudication of the conspiracy thus began in a similarly 
distributed way, with district and municipal courts overseeing the investigatory phase of the 
prosecution.9 Captain General Francisco Dionisio Vives commended Suárez for his investigation 
into the members of the conspiracy residing in San Antonio Abad, and rewarded him with the 
title of oidor honorario (honorary judge) of the Real Audiencia in recognition of his service.10 
By 1825, Suárez had impressed important men in powerful positions in a career that had 
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intersected with the major institutions of colonial governance. When Captain General Vives 
established Cuba’s Military Commission in 1825, then, Francisco Arango y Parreño, the planter 
and statesman who had played a decisive role in developing Cuba’s sugar economy, who had 
been one of the Real Consulado’s founding members, and who was currently serving as 
superintendent of the Intendancy, recommended Suárez for the position of the tribunal’s 
asesor.11 And yet after nineteen years practicing law in the service of the state, Suárez felt 
compelled to write to his superiors in a thinly veiled request for more money. 
On a systemic level, José Ildefonso Suárez’s 1834 letter to the Ministry of Justice noting 
his loyalty and service also revealed how the administration of justice afforded jurists such as 
himself a precarious living even as the colonial state relied on them to help run the government, 
staff the judiciary, and, as reflected in his work for the Military Commission, defend Spanish 
sovereignty over the island. Though some officials within Cuba’s legal system such as the 
oidores of the Real Audiencia earned salaries, most carved out livings by collecting fees on a 
per-signature or per-page basis. 
At the heart of Suárez’s letter, then, was a conundrum. The collapse of Spain’s empire on 
the American mainland at the hands of liberation armies, the growing number of enslaved 
Africans propelling the rise of Cuba’s plantation economy, and the decades-long struggle in 
Spain between defenders of absolutism and proponents of liberalism had all emerged as forces 
capable of disrupting, if not destroying, Spanish sovereignty over Cuba. Even as metropolitan 
and colonial officials relied on jurists like Suárez to help amplify the government’s capacity to 
defend Cuba and the Spanish Empire from these threats through law, they found that 
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administrative structures rooted in politics that distributed sovereign authority across multiple 
governing institutions could stand in the way of an escalated, decisive, and sustained response. 
Attending to the threats posed by a world in transformation thus meant enabling jurists like 
Suárez who were inclined to lend their services in this endeavor to earn satisfactory incomes, 
thus requiring transformations in the way colonial governance was administered. 
Suárez’s career as the Military Commission’s asesor reveals some of the challenges 
accompanying the renewed emphasis placed on insular security in the administration of colonial 
governance. After French forces ended the trienio liberal by restoring Fernando VII as absolute 
monarch in 1823, metropolitan officials refocused attention on Cuba’s position within the 
empire. Soldiers passing through the island on their way to or returning from the American 
continent constituted a sizable garrison, poised to defend the island from invasion and internal 
rebellion.12 Metropolitan officials also sought to increase the captaincy general’s ability to 
defend Cuba from less bellicose threats to Spanish sovereignty and were particularly eager to 
amplify its control over the legal means with which to confront political dissent.13 
But amplifying the legal competencies of executive power was no panacea, as the law 
itself presented its own set of obstacles. The myriad courts populating Cuba’s judicial landscape, 
each with its own jurisdiction and interests, and the processual and administrative requirements 
inscribed in legal texts such as the Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias, were not designed to be 
attentive to the political exigencies of colonial governance at any given moment. Rival courts 
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contesting jurisdiction over cases, and defendants finding refuge behind lengthy appellate 
processes, special corporate rights, and local patronage networks, all worked against the swift 
enactment of justice towards specific political ends.  
 Though the law itself could hinder decisive executive action, wholesale reform of the 
administration of justice in a governing context in which divisions of administrative authority 
had been negotiated over decades and were vigorously guarded was bound to be disruptive.14 As 
metropolitan officials considered ways to amplify the legal dimensions of executive power, they 
eschewed major reforms in favor of two workarounds that could empower captains general to 
bypass the legal system when acting in the interest of insular security. The first of these tools 
were the extraordinary powers given to Captain General Vives in a royal order dated May 28, 
1825. Following a legal tradition affording exceptional powers to governors of cities under siege, 
these extraordinary powers authorized Vives to dismiss and deport officials whose presence he 
deemed to be prejudicial. They also gave Vives discretion in implementing all royal orders from 
Spain.15 The second tool was the Military Commission, which allowed Vives complete oversight 
over prosecutions against people deemed to be enemies of the state and disturbers of the peace.16 
But even the introduction of a court of limited jurisdiction and specific intent proved to 
be problematic. As the Military Commission began prosecuting cases, seemingly mundane 
matters regarding operational expenses and salaries placed the tribunal and the captaincy general 
it served in delicate negotiations with the Intendancy, the institution responsible for government 
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revenues and expenditures. Though the Intendancy recognized among its responsibilities the 
funding of colonial defense, its superintendents were equally committed to maintaining 
administrative independence from the captaincy general. And though the Real Audiencia was the 
institutional center of Spanish law on the island, it saw the new tribunal as usurping an entire 
class of prosecutions that had once fallen under its purview. The Military Commission’s 
interactions with the Intendancy and the Real Audiencia thus mapped out the dispersed nature of 
sovereign authority in Cuba, where governance took place in a complex world of institutional 
rivalry and cooperation, and through which imperial designs necessarily had to traverse. 
Even as the Military Commission navigated the institutional world of colonial 
governance, it was steered by individuals acting on their own interests towards particular ends. 
Though José Ildefonso Suárez’s title of oidor honorario had not been accompanied by any sort 
of financial reward, for instance, it had other value. As a Cuban born outside of the networks of 
patronage and privilege upon which personal wealth, social mobility, and political influence 
were often predicated, Suárez had achieved professional success by offering his legal training in 
the service of the state.17 Honorary titles were thus a form of professional capital, promising 
more important commissions and, perhaps, greater rewards. And in this last regard, Suárez was 
particularly attuned. While Suárez often professed his loyalty and zeal for the Spanish monarchy, 
he was no less propelled by his own material interests. Following his role in the prosecution of 
the Soles y Rayos de Bolívar, Suárez had asked the Intendancy for an honorarium of 1,300 
pesos. The Intendancy rejected the request, arguing that functionaries with salaries should not 
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receive honorariums for attending to their obligations.18 If the state proved less than reliable as a 
source of income, however, it appears that Suárez was not above enriching himself through other 
means. Around this time, Suárez also acquired a sugar plantation in the district of Güines, where 
only a few years before he had worked to settle disputes over water rights. Rumors circulated 
that he had purchased the plantation with money he had extorted from defendants during the 
prosecution of the Soles y Rayos de Bolívar.19 
As the Military Commission’s asesor, Suárez’s material interests coincided with the 
captaincy general’s governing interests. His efforts to build up the tribunal as a vehicle for his 
own ambitions required that he advocate for the tribunal’s legitimacy by asserting its 
prerogatives, and those of the captaincy general it served, in its prosecution of cases and as a 
legal institution. The style and substance of Suárez’s consultations, which were often written in 
the margins of official correspondences and reports, thus infused the captaincy general’s 
interactions with other governing institutions in tribunal-related matters with an antagonistic 
edge that was only smoothed over by the shared imperatives of insular security. When Miguel 
Tacón became captain general of Cuba in 1834, however, he sought to extend the legal discretion 
and leeway his office had enjoyed when contending with racial violence and political dissent 
towards the promotion of social order. In doing so, Tacón engaged Suárez’s services, who 
brought with him into the context of civil governance the assertiveness that characterized his 
direction of the Military Commission. While institutions like the Intendancy and the Real 
Audiencia had accommodated, if sometimes begrudgingly, the amplification of the legal powers 
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of the island’s executive when it was seen as forestalling another Haitian Revolution or the 
perceived ruin that had recently befallen the American continent, they were less willing to 
acquiesce when they deemed the goal to be the concentration of sovereign authority within the 
office of the captaincy general. As Tacón and Suárez both learned, Cuban interests were too 
powerful and Spanish politics too chaotic for any fundamental reconfiguration of sovereign 
authority within the colonial government to take place. 
 
The Intendancy and the Costs of Military Justice 
Captain General Vives’s establishment of the Military Commission in 1825 served practical and 
political purposes. By empowering Vives with a juridical instrument for contending with threats 
against the colony that operated at his discretion, the new tribunal played a role in extending the 
sovereign authority of captains general by amplifying their legal powers. José Ildefonso Suárez, 
however, saw the tribunal as an opportunity. Though the position of asesor came without a 
salary, it afforded Suárez a stable foothold within the government, in whose service he had 
already staked much of his career. The interests of Suárez, the tribunal, and the captaincy general 
they both served thus became inextricably linked. For instance, Suárez’s efforts to shape the 
Military Commission into a viable court of law often took place through his efforts to transform 
the tribunal into a sustainable source of employment. Vives’s contestations with the Intendancy 
regarding the tribunal’s finances further exemplified this convergence of interests even as they 
revealed some of the limits of executive power during his tenure as captain general.  
 Administrative considerations regarding the organization and management of the Military 
Commission’s functionaries emerged soon after Captain General Vives established the tribunal, 




Luís de Michelena, regarding the work the tribunal would do. Citing other obligations that 
prevented him from managing the tribunal’s activities on a regular basis, Michelena proposed 
that the tribunal meet twice a month, during which time fiscales would update him on their 
respective prosecutions and he would issue all appropriate orders. This proposition did not sit 
well with Suárez, who responded with an assertiveness and attention to detail for which he would 
become renowned and reviled. He argued that the royal order of January 13, 1824, establishing 
Spain’s system of Permanent and Executive Military Commissions, mandated a much more 
rigorous rhythm of work. Article 6 of the royal order, for instance, stipulated that fiscales consult 
with the asesor by directing their correspondences through the president, while Article 8 stated 
that the president consult with the asesor before presenting a case to the Consejo de Guerra for 
final judgement and sentencing. According to Suárez, then, the tribunal’s president was 
responsible for overseeing the prosecution of cases from beginning to end; a procedure that 
would presumably involve the asesor every step of the way.20 The outbreak of the slave rebellion 
in the Guamacaro district of Matanzas on June 15, 1825, soon forced everybody’s hand. 
Following Vives’s order that the Military Commission investigate the origins of the rebellion, 
Michelena promptly submitted his resignation.21 His replacement, Brigadier General José 
Cadaval, embraced the daily requirements of managing the tribunal’s adjudication of the slave 
rebellion, ensuring that both he and Suárez would be fully occupied during all of the tribunal’s 
subsequent prosecutions.   
As tribunal officials made preparations to leave for Matanzas, the topic of compensation 
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arose. Upon informing Captain General Vives that he would personally travel to Matanzas to 
oversee the tribunal’s first major case, along with Suárez, two fiscales, and two secretaries, 
President Cadaval asked Vives to submit a request to the Intendancy for funds to cover their 
anticipated expenses.22 The Intendancy’s superintendent, Francisco de Arango y Parreño, did not 
share Vives or Cadaval’s sense of urgency, waiting two days before replying that he needed a 
precise amount before releasing those funds, and that any amount would have to be paid back.23 
Cadaval apparently wrote directly to Arango y Parreño with a request for 1,500 pesos, prompting 
the superintendent to declare that the request would have to come directly from the captain 
general.24 The protracted exchange tested Vives’s patience, for he summoned the superintendent 
to a meeting the next morning to discuss the matter, after which Arango y Parreño agreed to 
advance the two fiscales 200 pesos each to cover their expenses.25 
The money provided by the Intendancy proved to be an ad hoc and temporary solution. 
On August 14, 1825, President Cadaval informed Captain General Vives that the Military 
Commission needed more money. One of the two fiscales who had traveled to Matanzas had 
fallen ill, and his replacement, Captain Francisco Seidel, had traveled to Matanzas at his own 
expense. Rather than approach the Intendancy again, Cadaval asked Vives to provide his men 
with some sort of bonus as a means to cover their expenses. Vives replied that he did not have 
the power to disperse funds in such a way and advised Cadaval to confer with José Ildefonso 
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Suárez about a permanent solution to this problem of operating expenses, suggesting as he did 
that planters affected by the rebellion might be a source of funds.26  
Over the next six months, as the Military Commission pursued and concluded its 
prosecutions related to the slave rebellion, Suárez engaged in a protracted debate with Captain 
General Vives’s legal advisor on military matters, auditor de guerra Felipe Martínez, regarding 
the tribunal’s finances. While both men were committed to turning the tribunal into a fully 
functioning court that promoted the interests of executive power in the service of insular 
security, they did so as functionaries whose positions depended on their opinions being respected 
and acted upon. During this formative period for the tribunal, then, the rivalry between Suárez 
and Martínez helped shape the tribunal’s institutional development.   
In terms of the Military Commission’s prosecution of the slave rebellion in Guamacaro, a 
consensus emerged around the captain general’s suggestion that the tribunal ask planters affected 
by the rebellion for funds. Supporting the proposal, Suárez cited a law in the Recopilación de las 
leyes de Indias, which he claimed mandated that the costs of suppressing “black runaways and 
rebels” be divided between the Intendancy, merchants, and area residents who had benefited 
from such efforts.27 Suárez noted that the law was not strictly applicable because the tribunal had 
not participated in suppressing the rebellion. He argued, though, that the tribunal’s work was no 
less important and thus, using the law as a guide, recommended that they ask planters from the 
affected areas for 600 pesos to reimburse the Intendancy for the 400 pesos it had already 
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advanced to the tribunal and to cover Francisco Seidel’s expenses.28 
Felipe Martínez concurred with Suárez’s recommendation, but did so by pointing out two 
flaws in the very idea of institutionalizing a military tribunal in colonial Cuba. The first was that 
military tribunals were not authorized to charge fees to cover their operational expenses.29 
Martínez cast this lack of a financial stake in the outcome of cases as a positive feature, though it 
did cut the tribunal off from a standard practice for funding judicial proceedings. Even if the 
Military Commission was granted that right, Martínez pointed out that slaves had nothing of 
value to confiscate, and that it would be unfair to confiscate the property of their owners instead. 
Since they could not expect fiscales to pay for the legitimate expenses they incurred while 
carrying out their duties, however, Martínez felt that they had no choice but to turn to the 
planters for money.30 On October 7, 1825, then, Captain General Vives ordered the Governor of 
Matanzas to collect 600 pesos from area planters affected by the rebellion.31 
The core of the discussion addressed the lack of any structure for funding the tribunal’s 
operating expenses beyond the salaries that tribunal officials earned as commissioned officers in 
the military. Suárez suggested that the tribunal pay its fiscales a monthly allowance to cover 
necessary expenses such as travel costs and the price of paper.32 Though not rejecting Suárez’s 
proposal, Martínez added that an alternative solution would be to institute a system of expense 
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accounts that fiscales could draw from by submitting periodic expense reports.33 Captain General 
Vives ultimately decided to follow his auditor de guerra’s recommendation.34 The tribunal’s 
fiscales were not pleased about the tedious work of registering all their expenses, however, and 
asked President Cadaval if they could instead receive monthly allowances as originally suggested 
by José Ildefonso Suárez.35 After consulting with Suárez, who saw nothing objectionable about 
raising the fiscales’s concern with the captain general, Cadaval forwarded the fiscales’s 
complaint to Vives.36 
Felipe Martínez advised Captain General Vives to deny the fiscales’s request to follow 
Suárez’s recommendations regarding monthly allowances, citing a number of royal orders, 
issued over the years and in different contexts, mandating that officials recoup expenses by 
submitting expense reports. He also pointed to a royal order dated February 6, 1824, revealing 
that the metropolitan government had already determined that the operating expenses of the 
Military Commissions in Spain were to be covered through a system of expense accounts backed 
by the Intendancy.37 Following Martínez’s counsel, Vives rejected the fiscales’s request and on 
March 2, 1826, informed the Intendancy of his decision.38 
There was one other thread pervading the discussion about the Military Commission’s 
short- and long-term finances, having to do with the unremunerated position of the tribunal’s 
                                                 
33 Martínez to Vives, Havana, 3 October 1825, leg. 2085, Cuba, AGI. 
34 Vives to Cadaval, Havana, 7 October 1825, leg. 2085, Cuba, AGI. 
35 Lamadriz, Rosete, and Seidel to Cadaval, Havana, 5 December 1825, leg. 2085, Cuba, AGI. 
36 Suárez to Cadaval, Havana, 16 January 1826, leg. 2085, Cuba, AGI. 
37 Martínez to Vives, Havana, 23 February 1826, leg. 2085, Cuba, AGI. 




asesor, who, unlike the other members of the tribunal, was not a military officer. In his written 
opinion in which he had proposed giving fiscales monthly allowances in order to cover their 
operating expenses, Suárez had concluded by pointing out that the tribunal’s asesor did not 
receive a salary. Though Suárez refrained from making any recommendations on this matter, 
perhaps in a show of strategic deference and humility, President Cadaval advocated on his behalf 
when writing to Captain General Vives, stating that Suárez had also incurred expenses when the 
tribunal travelled to Matanzas to investigate the slave rebellion.39 
Suárez revealed just how much he valued his position within the Military Commission 
when Felipe Martínez suggested, in response to Suárez’s financial plight, that fiscales consult 
with local letrados when in the field, so as to not force the tribunal’s asesor to incur unnecessary 
expenses.40 Suárez responded forcefully, arguing that there was no way of assessing whether 
local letrados warranted the tribunal’s confidence in delicate matters. Forgoing his previous 
deference and humility, Suárez then suggested that Captain General Vives use his extraordinary 
powers to assign a salary to the Military Commission’s asesor, a competency that fell outside the 
purview of those extraordinary powers. Perhaps suspecting Martínez’s motivations, he also 
argued that the auditor de guerra should register his opinion on the matter in writing.41 In follow 
up consultations, however, Martínez conspicuously failed to mention Suárez’s financial 
predicament, and Captain General Vives signaled the resolution of the matter when he ordered 
the Intendancy to set up expense accounts for the Military Commission without broaching the 
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topic of Suárez’s lack of a salary.42 
Even as the internal rivalry between José Ildefonso Suárez and Felipe Martínez 
influenced the Military Commission’s integration into the colonial government, the divisions in 
administrative authority within the government itself shaped the institution’s design. The tribunal 
had already begun working on other cases when the Intendancy’s new superintendent, Claudio 
Martínez de Pinillos, informed Captain General Vives on March 2, 1826, that the Intendancy 
would not comply with Vives’s order to set up expense accounts for the tribunal. Even though 
the tribunal was a military court, Martínez de Pinillos argued, it prosecuted cases that would 
otherwise be tried in the island’s ordinary courts, where the costs of such prosecutions would be 
covered by confiscating the property of defendants.43  
With the Intendancy refusing to play a role in financing the Military Commission’s 
operations, what had been an internal discussion between functionaries of the executive branch 
of government became a more consequential matter, pitting distinct branches of government 
against each other. Following the British occupation of Havana in 1762, Cuba’s Intendancy had 
become the focus of reforms giving it greater autonomy in determining economic policy and 
increased control over colonial finances, with the hope that the island could play a greater role in 
financing its own defense. These reforms coincided with the emergence of wealthy Cuban 
planters as an influential lobby. Their particular interests merged with the institutional interests 
of the Intendancy when Francisco Arango y Parreño was given the position of superintendent of 
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the Intendancy in 1823, followed by his protégé Claudio Martínez de Pinillos in 1825. Asserting 
the Intendancy’s autonomy took on an added valence as it articulated the aspirations of a planter 
class wanting to have a greater say in colonial governance.44  
For the captaincy general and the imperial order it was charged with defending, however, 
such autonomy was a source of concern, raising fears of the spirit of independence that had 
brought about the end of Spain’s empire on the American continent. When Captain General 
Vives asked for his opinion, Felipe Martínez espoused the logics of executive power, arguing 
that the royal orders establishing Spain’s system of Permanent and Executive Military 
Commissions and outlining their funding mechanisms superseded any doubts Cuba’s Intendancy 
may have had regarding the tribunal’s purpose.45 By way of reaffirming his original order, then, 
Vives forwarded Martínez’s consultation to the Superintendent Claudio Martínez de Pinillos.46 
Though the Intendancy’s internal deliberations on this matter remain unclear, by mid-1827 Vives 
was regularly forwarding expense reports from tribunal fiscales to the Intendancy for payment.47 
As the institutional voice of a planter class whose economic prosperity depended on 
continued productive stability, the Intendancy was committed to supporting insular security, 
which may explain their acquiescence on this particular matter. But that did not mean that they 
would simply open up their vaults. On November 19, 1827, President Cadaval sent Captain 
General Vives a copy of the royal order that auditor de guerra Felipe Martínez had cited when 
arguing that the Intendancy had a responsibility to cover the expenses of the Military 
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Commission’s fiscales. Pointing out that rental payments figured among the expenses mentioned 
in the order, Cadaval asked Vives to order the Intendancy to pay the rent for the tribunal’s 
headquarters.48 Superintendent Claudio Martínez de Pinillos rejected the idea, replying that the 
Intendancy could not comply with Vives’s request unless they received explicit orders to do so 
from their governing ministry in Madrid.49 During their earlier, failed attempt to avoid covering 
the tribunal’s operating expenses, the Intendancy had called into question the definitiveness of 
the royal order requiring that they do so. This time around, they couched their resistance in the 
administrative mechanism structuring their independence from the captaincy general.50 
Captain General Vives informed President Cadaval of the Intendancy’s decision, offering 
to refer the matter to Madrid. Perhaps Cadaval believed that his response would be more forceful 
if presented as his own opinion, or perhaps José Ildefonso Suárez was concerned about the 
seemingly antagonistic relationship he had develop with Vives’s auditor de guerra. For whatever 
reason, Cadaval echoed Suárez when writing directly to Vives, arguing that “when a sovereign 
resolution is communicated by any ministry and openly fulfilled by the captain general of a 
province, all of his employees, whatever [branch of government] they belong to, must execute 
[the order] the same.” For instance, Cadaval pointed out that the Real Audiencia had accepted 
Vives’s establishment of the Military Commission even though they had not been explicitly 
ordered to do so by the Ministry of Justice in Spain. Furthermore, the Intendancy had already 
complied with some of the royal order of February 6, 1824, and had thus acknowledged that 
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aspects of the Military Commission’s finances were its responsibility. It did not make sense, 
then, for the Intendancy to acknowledge the tribunal’s legitimacy by complying with portions of 
a royal order, and then refuse to act on another portion of the same order unless told to do so 
from their responsible ministry in Spain. The Intendancy’s actions undermined the sovereign will 
of the King and the authority of the captain general, Cadaval argued, and so it was in the interest 
of Vives and his office to order the Intendancy, once again, to comply with the law.51 
During his time governing Cuba, Captain General Vives had maintained good relations 
with leading segments of Cuban society. His support of the slave trade despite treaty obligations, 
and his attention to social niceties ingratiated Vives within the social world of Cuban elites.52 
This social integration also had political ramifications, as the metropolitan government relied on 
Cuban revenues to subsidize its depleted coffers. His prowess in this regard did not merely come 
from his willingness to hand out titles and rewards, but extended to his governing style. Rather 
than confront the Intendancy again, Vives asked the Ministry of War to increase President 
Cadaval’s annual salary by 1,000 pesos, with the additional funds being earmarked to cover the 
tribunal’s rent payments.53 This solution had the benefit of directing the Intendancy to proportion 
additional funds to the Military Commission as part of the institution’s acknowledged 
responsibility to pay for military salaries. The matter worked its way through the system for 
almost two years before the Ministry of War issued a royal order increasing President Cadaval’s 
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salary by 1,500 pesos to cover such expenses.54 The matter had taken so long to resolve because 
Cuba’s Intendancy had been asked to consult on the matter and had advised that an annual 
increase of 1,500 pesos would be more appropriate than the proposed 1,000 pesos.55 With its 
autonomy respected, the Intendancy accepted the solution. 
Guided by a shared interest in colonial defense, Captain General Vives and the 
Intendancy maintained a positive relationship as they got the Military Commission up and 
running. This had required a delicate and diplomatic touch on the captain general’s part, one that 
was not reflected in any of José Ildefonso Suárez’s opinions directed to President Cadaval, or 
through the president to Vives himself. Though at times contentious, these disputes between 
branches of government were the inevitable consequence of putting policy into practice. On 
August 5, 1828, the Ministry of War issued a royal order giving military courts working on cases 
in the ordinary jurisdiction the right to sentence defendants to pay court cost and to have their 
property confiscated if need be. This authorization paved the way for José Ildefonso Suárez to 
claim rights to an honorarium as part of the cost of a prosecution.56 
Despite these efforts to shore up the Military Commission’s finances, Cuba was not 
fertile terrain for a court primarily prosecuting cases of everyday crime to finance its operations 
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on the backs of its defendants.57 During an 1830 review of the tribunal’s pecuniary practices, 
President Cadaval revealed that he had as of yet only recovered thirty pesos from his share of 
court costs, while fiscal Francisco Letamendi reported that the tribunal regularly sentenced 
defendants to pay court costs knowing full well that they did not have the means to do so.58 
No one was more directly affected by the Military Commission’s precarious financial 
situation than José Ildefonso Suárez. Though he had gained the right to claim fees against court 
costs, he still worked without a salary. As late as June 28, 1829, President Cadaval was still 
mentioning Suárez’s lack of a salary in his status reports to Captain General Vives.59 Finally, on 
March 14, 1831, Suárez played his only remaining card. In a letter to President Cadaval, Suárez 
announced that he was renouncing his rights to a portion of recovered court costs, asking that 
they instead be given to the colonial treasury. As these rights had never generated much revenue, 
Suárez’s move was mostly symbolic. Its symbolism was strategic, though, in that renouncing his 
rights was meant to bolster his reputation among his superiors. Undoubtedly in coordination with 
Suárez, President Cadaval announced soon after that all of the other members of the tribunal, 
including himself, had decided to follow Suárez’s example.60 In an institutional context where 
the tribunal’s place was acknowledged but by no means guaranteed, such a move was mostly 
symbolic, but had the potential to play a major role in future contestations regarding the 
tribunal’s place in the colonial government. 
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The Real Audiencia and the Boundaries of Military Justice 
While the Military Commission and the Intendancy developed a working relationship guided by 
their shared commitment to promoting Cuba’s security, the tribunal’s relationship with Cuba’s 
highest court, the Real Audiencia, proved to be contentious. Captain General Vives’s inclusion 
of the Military Commission within Cuba’s judicial landscape necessarily infringed upon the 
jurisdiction of the island’s system of civil courts, atop of which sat the Real Audiencia. A degree 
of antagonism was inevitable, as the Military Commission was created precisely so that the 
captain general could bypass existing courts in the prosecution of threats against the colony. This 
antagonism was not specific to Cuba and had served to undermined previous efforts to use 
military courts in civil contexts in Spain. For José Ildefonso Suárez, however, this antagonism 
threatened the very existence of the tribunal and thus his attempts to use it as a vehicle for his 
own ambitions. Suárez thus assumed an assertive posture when advocating for the tribunal, a 
disposition that engendered discord with one of the major institutions of the colonial 
government, but which was compatible with resurgent efforts to centralize governing authority 
within the office of the captaincy general. 
 The system of Permanent and Executive Military Commissions established throughout 
the Spanish Empire between 1824 and 1825 was only the latest attempt to use military courts in 
civil jurisdictions. In response to the social unrest that followed the expulsion of Napoleon’s 
forces from the Iberian Peninsula in 1814, Fernando VII had authorized the military to employ 
ad hoc military tribunals to prosecute the alleged vagrants and bandits they had apprehended, 
rather than turning such prisoners over to local authorities. Civil courts at the municipal and 




monarchy suspended the use of these ad hoc military tribunals on October 15, 1815.61 
 The next steps towards deploying such military tribunals against political targets, 
however, took place in 1823, after the French, fearful of the entrenchment of liberal governance 
along their southern border, again invaded the Peninsula to put an end to the trienio liberal and 
restore Fernando VII as absolute monarch. On August 18, 1823, before Fernando VII officially 
retook the throne, the head of French forces ordered the Royal Commission of Andalusia to 
establish a military tribunal in Seville in order to prosecute enemies “of the altar and the throne,” 
in light of “the critical and dangerous circumstances in that city.” The Real Audiencia of Seville 
resisted the move, arguing that the exigencies of the moment did not warrant diminishing its 
jurisdiction. In a bid to curry favor with conservative elements supporting Fernando’s 
restoration, Seville’s Real Audiencia argued that the military tribunal would also infringe upon 
the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts.62  
 The Real Audiencia of Seville’s objection presaged the one forwarded by the Consejo de 
Castile, one of the monarchy’s oldest consultative bodies, when Fernando VII’s government 
issued the royal order of January 13, 1824, establishing the system of Permanent and Executive 
Military Commissions. The Consejo stated that they would not have objected to the new military 
tribunals if they were only to handle cases dealing with “thieves and criminals that were 
apprehended by the army on rural roads and estates,” quoting language in the royal order, as 
those were powers that captains general already enjoyed. Giving these new tribunals jurisdiction 
over cases dealing with disloyalty and other forms of political dissent, however, would infringe 
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upon the jurisdiction of existing civil courts and engender the same kind of problems that had 
forced Fernando VII to suspend the use of similar military tribunals in 1815. Citing the 
prominent role elements of the military had played in the uprising that had resulted in the trienio 
liberal, the Consejo went so far as to speculate on whether the military could even be trusted 
with such expanded powers. As they saw it, the courts and other legal institutions constituting 
Spain’s system of civil law, which had remained loyal during the trienio liberal, were the 
backbone of Spanish society, channeling the power of the state to the people, while protecting 
the individual rights of all. By undermining the legal foundations upon which Spanish society 
resided with military courts that were of questionable loyalty and capacity, “the effective result 
of this new provision would be to invite anarchy, encouraging disturbers of the peace and His 
Majesty’s enemies with guarantees and safeguards they lacked before.”63 As in 1815, opposition 
to the new system of permanent military tribunals grew until Fernando VII ordered that they be 
suspended on August 4, 1825, at the same time authorizing captains general at the head of 
provincial governments throughout Spain to keep their respective Military Commissions in 
operation if they deemed it necessary for maintaining the peace.64 
 Captain General Vives’s establishment of Cuba’s own Military Commission on March 4, 
1825, provoked some public derision. The liberal educator and public intellectual Father Félix 
Varela, who had represented Cuba in Spain during the trienio liberal and was currently in exile 
in New York City, saw the new tribunal as an escalation in a form of military governance run by 
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“men who are not interested in the good of [Cuba], with the exception of their jobs and the 
exactitude with which they are paid their salaries, and who, having returned to Spain with honor, 
that is, having attended to the wishes of their masters, have gained everything, though at the 
expense of the island.”65 The tribunal’s notable success in prosecuting the slave rebellion in 
Guamacaro, however, validated the new court in Vives’s eyes as a tool for defending insular 
security. When he received a royal order dated October 15, 1825, mandating that he suspend 
Cuba’s Military Commission as had been done on the Peninsula, he thus used his extraordinary 
powers to disregard the order and keep the tribunal in operation, an act that received Spain’s 
approval the following year.66 
Leading figures in Cuba also supported the Military Commission for its perceived role in 
preserving the peace. While the tribunal occasionally dealt with high-profile cases such as the 
Guamacaro rebellion of 1825 and the separatist conspiracy known as the Águila Negra in 1830-
1831, it directed most of its energies to prosecuting cases of everyday forms of crime, such as 
murder and theft, in and around Havana.67 When Mariano Ricafort replaced Francisco Dionisio 
Vives as captain general in 1832, he pointed to anecdotal evidence of rampant crime when 
spearheading an effort to determine if the Military Commission should have its powers 
expanded. While the tribunal counted the whole island within its jurisdiction in cases of political 
dissent, it only handled cases of crime if they occurred within a one league radius of Havana. 
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Captain General Ricafort proposed extending this radius to ten leagues, and asked some of 
Havana’s most prominent residents for their opinions. The Conde de Fernandina, one of the 
largest slaveholders in Cuba, supported the idea, crediting the tribunal with a decline in violent 
crimes in the city.68 Though the superintendent of the Intendancy claimed that he could not offer 
a specific opinion unless ordered to do so from Spain, he did state that in the past he had 
supported the idea of increasing the number of fiscales working for the tribunal.69 Owing to the 
growing sense that the tribunal was playing a vital role in securing the island from slave 
rebellions and everyday forms of crime, then, Cuba’s Military Commission avoided the 
overwhelming pushback that had doomed its counterparts in Spain. By 1832, it had become a 
seemingly permanent fixture on the institutional landscape of the colonial government. 
Permanence, however, did not necessarily entail acceptance. Like their counterparts on 
the Peninsula, members of Cuba’s Real Audiencia saw in Captain General Vives’s establishment 
of the Military Commission an unnecessary transgression of their own authority. The mere 
presence of the new tribunal upon the island’s judicial landscape thus engendered tension 
between the island’s high court and the purveyors of increased executive authority. This was 
exemplified in early September 1828, when the Commandant General in charge of the eastern 
department of Cuba informed Captain General Vives that a man named Antonio Arango had 
disembarked in the city of Manzanillo without a passport and under an alias. Arango had fled 
Cuba in 1823, after being implicated in a case of treason being prosecuted by the Real 
Audiencia. Wary of Arango’s return to Cuba, the Military Commission ordered his transfer to 
Havana for questioning. The Real Audiencia, on the other hand, claimed Arango as their own as 
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part of their unfinished prosecution from 1823.70 
In counseling President Cadaval on the matter, José Ildefonso Suárez argued that the 
Military Commission’s claim over the imprisoned Antonio Arango was substantiated by Article 
16 of the royal order of January 13, 1824, establishing the system of Permanent and Executive 
Military Commissions. The article stated that courts prosecuting cases that would subsequently 
be handled by the new system of military tribunals would be allowed to conclude those 
prosecutions if they had been initiated prior to the establishment of the new tribunals. While it 
was true that the Real Audiencia’s claim over Arango was based on a case that predated the 
Military Commission’s founding, Suárez argued that Arango had now been arrested for activities 
that clearly fell within the tribunal’s jurisdiction, thus giving its claim priority. Suárez’s opinion 
won the support of auditor de guerra Felipe Martínez and Captain General Vives, who ordered 
the commandant general of the Eastern Department to have Arango transferred into the tribunal’s 
custody.71 
The Real Audiencia responded to the commandant general’s order with silence. When 
word of this slight got back to the Military Commission, Suárez advised that the incident be the 
basis of a formal complaint against the high court to be sent to Captain General Vives. As part of 
this complaint, one of the tribunal’s fiscales compiled a list of other incidents in which the Real 
Audiencia had slighted the Military Commission by, for example, failing to acknowledge receipt 
of documents or even to respond to official correspondence. On November 27, 1828, Cadaval 
sent the complaint to Captain General Vives, asking that he refer the matter to the responsible 
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ministries in Spain.72 
 While it remains unclear what came of the Military Commission’s complaint, it appears 
that the Real Audiencia acquiesced and transferred Antonio Arango into the tribunal’s custody. 
By September 7, 1829, the tribunal had concluded its prosecution against Arango, finding no 
evidence of any wrongdoing other than entering Cuba without a passport and under an alias. 
While the tribunal’s Consejo de Guerra voted to drop the case, they nonetheless sentenced 
Arango to pay the cost of his prosecution. The tribunal then transferred Arango back to the Real 
Audiencia, along with copies of important documents from its investigation, so that the high 
court could continue with its original prosecution from 1823.73 Even in this seeming act of inter-
institutional cooperation, the tribunal’s precedence in matter related to insular security was being 
affirmed. 
The tensions in the institutional relationship between the Military Commission and the 
Real Audiencia were exacerbated by José Ildefonso Suárez, who was as interested in furthering 
his own professional and material aspirations as he was in promoting the interests of insular 
security. Since the tribunal’s legitimacy hinged, in part, on having cases to prosecute, Suárez had 
an incentive to keep the tribunal busy by claiming the jurisdiction necessary to initiate 
prosecutions. Each case the tribunal prosecuted, moreover, also had the potential of generating 
revenues.  
Conflicts over jurisdiction between the Military Commission and the Real Audiencia 
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took place within a division of administrative authority that had been negotiated over time and 
for specific reasons. The introduction of the tribunal was certainly disruptive, but the tensions 
and antagonisms that ensued were more or less within the bounds of normal governing practices. 
Inter-institutional contestations soon took on greater significance, however, with the wholesale 
reconfiguration of the governing order itself. After Fernando VII’s death, his wife María Cristina 
served as Queen Regent for their three-year-old daughter, who formally ascended to the throne 
as Queen Isabela II. Fernando VII’s brother Carlos contested his niece’s succession, sparking the 
First Carlist War (1833-1840). In response, María Cristina formed a governing alliance with 
liberals in order to fend off Carlos’s conservative challenge. The alliance resulted in a number of 
reforms in Spain, the most notable of which was the Royal Statute of 1834, which instituted a 
legislature with an appointed upper house, an elected lower house, a limited franchise, while 
maintaining that national sovereignty resided with the monarchy.74 
This new political order in Spain also resulted in the naming of Miguel Tacón as captain 
general of Cuba on March 7, 1834. A life-long man of the Spanish navy and military, Tacón had 
distinguished himself as a military leader during the wars for independence in South America 
before returning to Spain in 1819. He had been an active supporter of Spanish liberalism during 
the trienio liberal, serving as the Governor of Málaga and then Seville, and counted as his 
friends and acquaintances leading political figures in the new liberal order. Following the 
restoration of Fernando VII in 1823, however, Tacón retreated from public life. With María 
Cristina’s alliance with liberals after Fernando VII’s death, Tacón came back into favor, being 
named the captain general of Andalucía before ultimately being given the captaincy general of 
                                                 





Miguel Tacón’s arrival in Cuba in early June 1834 was accompanied by royal orders that 
reaffirmed the extraordinary powers that had been enjoyed by his predecessors. In response to 
earlier attempts by Francisco Arango y Parreño to obtain greater policy-making powers for 
Cuban planters on economic matters, contemporaneous royal orders also reaffirmed the 
captaincy general’s supremacy at the head of colonial governance, signaling the metropolitan 
government’s commitment to isolating Cuba from the political transformations taking place in 
Spain.76 Despite the hopes of proponents of liberalism such as Cuban statesman and intellectual 
José Antonio Saco that the liberal turn in Spain would result in the lifting of prohibitions on 
certain types of public expression, Tacón continued Mariano Ricafort’s policy of press 
censorship. And just as Francisco Dionisio Vives had maintained a productive and working 
relationship with Superintendent Claudio Martínez de Pinillos, Tacón continued in this spirit of 
cooperation when he ordered Saco to leave the island at the superintendent’s urging because of 
Saco’s outspoken opposition to the slave trade.77 Tacón’s tenure thus began as an extension of 
the administrations of his predecessors. Though he had been guided by liberal ideals as a partisan 
in Spain, he approached colonial governance in Cuba as an agent of the Spanish Empire, 
committed to maintaining Cuba’s booming economy servicing the financial needs of the 
metropole.78 
                                                 
75 Pérez de la Riva, Correspondencia reservada, 13-17. 
76 Fradera, Colonias para después de un imperio, 133-140. 
77 Larry R. Jensen, Children of Colonial Despotism: Press, Politics, and Culture in Cuba, 1790-
1840 (Tampa, FL: University of Florida Press, 1988), 110-111. 




Reverberations from the political changes taking place in Spain nonetheless reached 
Cuba in other ways. On July 29, 1834, Queen Regent María Cristina called for the immediate 
suspension of the remaining vestiges of the system of Permanent and Executive Military 
Commissions established by her late husband, as part of a greater effort to shore up her 
governing coalition by making concessions to regional autonomy within the peninsula.79 A week 
later, the Ministry of Justice in Madrid sent a royal order to Regent Ignacio Escoto, the head of 
Cuba’s Real Audiencia in Puerto Príncipe, mandating that he put María Cristina’s decree into 
immediate effect. Escoto received the royal order on January 8, 1835, and published the decree 
in Puerto Príncipe’s newspaper eight days later. He then forwarded the documents to Tacón, with 
the expectation that the captain general would disband the Military Commission and transfer its 
ongoing prosecutions to the Real Audiencia.80 
Upon receipt of Escoto’s communication, Captain General Tacón asked auditor de 
guerra Felipe Martínez for his opinion. Martínez pointed to a number of provisions in the 
Recopilación de las leyes de Indias structuring the relationship between the captain general, who 
was also the titular head of the Real Audiencia, and the high court’s regent. The captain general 
was the regent’s superior in all matters, he argued, thus making Escoto’s communication to 
Tacón, a communication that read like a command, a serious breach of protocol. Turning to the 
substance of the matter, Martínez then argued that the Military Commission should not be 
disbanded owing to its proven role in defending the island from large-scale slave rebellions, rural 
banditry and urban crime, and the multiple conspiracies attempting to foment political 
revolution. In his opinion, neither the jueces pedáneos policing rural districts and urban 
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neighborhoods nor the lower courts of the ordinary jurisdiction were sufficiently capable to 
prevent, contend with, and punish these threats in ways that were quick and exemplary. That is 
why Captain General Vives had founded the tribunal in the first place, he continued, and why 
Vives had used his extraordinary powers not to comply with Fernando VII’s royal order of 
October 15, 1825, disbanding the system of Military Commissions he had established the year 
before.81 
Considering the vital role the tribunal played in securing Cuba, Martínez warned, “all this 
would disappear with the removal of this tribunal, because it is indisputable that the Military 
Commission, made up of high ranking judges, of fiscales and secretaries of principle and honor, 
guided by a decorated and reputed asesor, subject to the immediate supervision of [the captain 
general], who approves and corrects its sentences, and assisted by the full power of [the captain 
general], is the only [court], that at this remove, and in our position and circumstances, can fulfill 
the objective of its founding, the security and conservation of this part of Her Majesty’s 
domains.”82 
Citing the Real Audiencia’s known antipathy towards the Military Commission, Martínez 
concluded by advising Captain General Tacón to use his extraordinary powers to disregard the 
royal order calling for the suspension of Cuba’s Military Commission in order not to deny the 
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government a useful tool for maintaining the peace.83 In a decree dated February 23, 1835, Tacón 
stated that though the metropolitan government had deemed it appropriate to suspend the 
remaining Military Commissions in Spain, circumstances in Cuba made the tribunal essential for 
maintaining the peace. He thus ordered that copies of his decree be sent to all local and regional 
authorities for publication in local newspapers. All this, Tacón argued, would help to undo the 
damage the Real Audiencia had done by failing to consult with the captain general before 
mandating the suppression of the Military Commission. As a final reprimand to the Real 
Audiencia, Tacón ordered that henceforth only the captain general was authorized to publish 
royal orders and decrees.84 Unlike his predecessors who had had to acquiesce some to the levels 
of administrative independence and sovereign authority enjoyed by institutions like the 
Intendancy and the Real Audiencia as a pragmatic strategy for maintaining Cuba within the 
empire, Tacón would pursue a different tack, attempting to concentrate authority within the 
office of the captaincy general.  
The discord between the Military Commission and the Real Audiencia emerged as 
metropolitan and imperial politics were undergoing drastic transformations, turning questions of 
legal jurisdiction and governing authority into objects of intense contestation. Within this 
dynamic context, José Ildefonso Suárez’s professional aspirations for the tribunal and Captain 
General Tacón’s political goals for colonial governance converged such that defense of the 
tribunal and its prerogatives could stand in for more consequential disputes over the distributed 
nature of sovereign authority in Cuba. As Tacón’s wishes to concentrate power within the office 
of the captaincy general and the Real Audiencia’s efforts to maintain its institutional autonomy 
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pitted these two pillars of the colonial government against each other, the ensuing conflicts 
mapped onto emerging fault lines between the central government in Havana and regional 
centers like the city of Puerto Príncipe. 
 
The Court of Vagrants and Picapleitos 
Captain General Tacón’s struggle with the Real Audiencia did not end with his use of his 
extraordinary powers to keep the Military Commission in operation. The Real Audiencia soon 
appealed to the Consejo de Indias, charging that for a captain general to disregard royal orders 
from Spain was incompatible with a well-ordered society.85 Tacón, in turn, portrayed the courts 
of the ordinary jurisdiction as standing in the way of efforts to promote security and stability on 
the island. He assumed a more assertive disposition towards extending executive power into the 
judiciary and called on the Military Commission to increase its prosecutions of cases of everyday 
crime, charging that the ordinary courts were failing to meet their obligations.86 
 Tacón’s increasing dependence on the Military Commission to adjudicate cases of 
everyday crime, however, did nothing to reduce José Ildefonso Suárez’s dissatisfaction with the 
tribunal as a source of income. As much as he valued the recognition he had gained through 
advising the tribunal, he also hoped to take some other position within the government. Some 
years earlier, Suárez had sought the recently vacated position of asesor primero, the captain 
general’s primary legal advisor on matters pertaining to civil governance.87 In his final days in 
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Cuba, Captain General Vives had advocated on Suárez’s behalf, petitioning the Secretary of 
State in Madrid to award Suárez with the salary of an oidor of the Real Audiencia in recognition 
of his years of service.88 Vives’s successor, Captain General Mariano Ricafort had similarly 
solicited a salary for Suárez, adding that Suárez’s sugar plantation in Güines had lost fifty-six 
slaves during a recent cholera epidemic and that Suárez, his wife, and their eight children were 
on the brink of financial ruin.89 And shortly after arriving in Cuba in 1834, Tacón had taken heed 
of President José Cadaval’s recommendation of Suárez and asked the Secretary of State to 
consider appointing Suárez as an official oidor of the Real Audiencia.90 In spite of these efforts, 
no salary or new position had been forthcoming. 
As Captain General Tacón assumed a more assertive disposition in promoting insular 
security, he extended his focus towards behaviors that, though perhaps not security threats in 
themselves, transgressed his vision of a well-ordered society. Towards that end, he would soon 
solicit José Ildefonso Suárez’s assistance, as Suárez had years of experience practicing law in the 
service of security, repression, and domination. On September 22, 1834, Tacón issued a set of 
instructions resurrecting and updating a neglected royal ordinance from 1775 outlining 
procedures for dealing with vagrants outside the ordinary system of law. According to Tacón, the 
1775 ordinance rested on a legal tradition stretching back to the fourteenth century, authorizing 
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local authorities to take vagrants into custody and subject them to forced labor or corporal 
punishment, not as a sentence for a crime, but as a corrective measure meant to dissuade future 
criminal activity. In his instructions for Cuba, Tacón ordered jueces pedáneos to detain men 
deemed to be vagrants found within a five-league radius of Havana, to collect testimony from 
two witnesses capable of attesting to their vagrant status, and then to imprison them. The 
instructions were sweeping for their broad definition of what constituted a vagrant, including any 
man over sixteen years of age without an occupation, property, or other sources of income, men 
living off of an inheritance who spent all their time gambling and frequenting places of ill repute, 
drunkards, beggars, men who were otherwise good but demonstrated arrogance, and men 
carrying prohibited weapons. Pointing to a provision in the Novísima recopilación de las leyes de 
España giving captains general in Spain exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving vagrants 
captured by soldiers, and pointing to the soldiers used by jueces pedáneos to apprehend these 
men, Tacón concluded by claiming that in cases of vagrancy, other courts could not contest 
jurisdiction and the vagrants themselves could not appeal their sentences.91 A few weeks later, on 
October 7, 1834, Tácon updated his instructions, extending their reach to encompass the entire 
island. Though he would still personally oversee cases against vagrants only within a five-league 
radius of Havana, the ordinary courts overseeing the others were to send him summary reports.92 
Tacón’s anti-vagrancy initiative encountered its first obstacle a few months later, when 
authorities arrested a man who was a ship’s pilot by profession, but who had not worked as such 
since arriving in Havana in 1828. This alone made the man a vagrant according to Tacón’s broad 
definition. His presence in Havana was deemed further prejudicial because he made a living as a 
                                                 
91 Bando, Havana, 22 September 1834, exp. 56810, leg. 1448, GSC, ANC. 




picapleito, a catch-all term denoting men who worked in legal capacities without being 
sanctioned members of the legal profession. Indeed, the Bando de buen gobierno of 1828 defined 
picapleitos as “pernicious men… who, without any title, and to the dishonor of the brilliant 
profession of the law and to the detriment of the proper administration of justice, appear to have 
sworn to ruin landowners through litigation and to perpetuate discord, in order to enrich 
themselves with the fortunes of honorable families.”93 Furthermore, the Bando de buen gobierno 
stipulated that picapleitos were to be punished as vagrants.94 Owing to the man’s original 
profession as a ship’s pilot, however, the Naval Court claimed that they had jurisdiction in this 
matter. Tacón wrote to the Secretary of State outlining his claim to jurisdiction in all cases of 
vagrancy, arguing that his efforts to promote social order in Cuba would be undermined if other 
courts had the ability to slow down or halt these prosecutions by contesting jurisdiction. He thus 
asked the Secretary of State to refer the matter to the Queen Regent, suggesting that other courts 
cede their rights to contest jurisdiction for the good of the public.95 
Captain General Tacón’s claim that he had exclusive jurisdiction in cases of vagrancy 
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replicated the Military Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over cases of political dissent and 
extended his predecessors’ reliance on the tribunal to contend with forms of everyday crime in 
and around Havana. His anti-vagrancy initiative was an innovation, however, as it extended the 
juridical reach of the captaincy general, not just in matters of insular security and crime, but in 
the promotion of social order as well. To anchor this move in juridical arguments, his best bet 
was to seek the advice of José Ildefonso Suárez, longtime champion of executive authority. 
Taking advantage of the sudden departure of his official asesor primero, Tacón named Suárez to 
the position on an interim basis, soon after informing his superiors in Madrid of the appointment 
to ask for their approval.96 
By the time Suárez began formally advising Captain General Tacón on governing 
matters, Tacón face multiple challenges in his relationships with different segments of Cuban 
society. His continued practice of press censorship and his deportation of José Antonio Saco 
antagonized an emerging cohort of liberal-minded intellectuals increasingly dissatisfied with the 
nature of Cuba’s relationship with Spain. His use of his extraordinary powers to keep the 
Military Commission in operation despite directives from Spain had placed him at odds with the 
Real Audiencia. And unlike his predecessors, Tacón was unable to maintain an amicable 
working relationship with Claudio Martínez de Pinillos, engaging in a series of disputes with the 
superintendent of the Intendancy regarding railroad construction, public works, and a growing 
list of social slights against the superintendent’s peers and allies.97 Within this contentious 
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context, Suárez pursued his duties as the captain general’s asesor primero with the rigor and 
assertiveness that had characterized his work for the Military Commission, transferring the 
defense of executive authority he had promoted in criminal and security contexts into the realm 
of civil governance, often triggering political conflict. 
One incident is telling. As a result of the alliance Queen Regent María Cristina had made 
with liberals in order to stave off the Carlist challenge, she had agreed to hold elections 
throughout Spanish domains, including its overseas possessions, in order to select deputies 
according to the Royal Statute of 1834. The elections were structured in a way that placed 
significant control in the hands of municipal governments. Given the contentious relationship 
Tacón had developed with certain municipal governments, including Havana’s city council, and 
fearing that the electoral process would work against the captain general’s interests, Suárez 
advised Tacón to postpone and reconfigure the elections in a way that might result in more 
favorable outcomes. The results were nonetheless a fiasco for Tacón, resulting in the election of 
the exiled José Antonio Saco as one of Cuba’s deputies.98 
Meanwhile, Tacón’s dispute with the Naval Court over the errant ship’s pilot worked its 
way through the system for over a year before the metropolitan government issued a royal order 
dated April 7, 1836, authorizing him to act exclusively in proceedings against vagrants and 
picapleitos and prohibiting other courts from contesting jurisdiction in such cases. The royal 
order nonetheless affirmed that such proceedings were to be considered civil cases, not military 
cases, requiring that the captain general consult with his asesor primero, and not his auditor de 
guerra, regarding the prosecution of these cases.99 Tacón thus turned to Suárez for an opinion on 
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how to proceed. 
In advising Tacón on the anti-vagrancy initiative, Suárez’s revealed the influence of his 
time directing the Military Commission as an instrument of executive power. He began by 
advising Tacón to notify the governors and lieutenant governors of all the departments and 
jurisdictions in Cuba that he would from here on out be the exclusive judge in cases dealing with 
vagrants and picapleitos. He then recommended that Tacón elect an asesor to oversee the 
prosecution of these cases. In a final move that spoke of his institutional history, Suárez advised 
Tacón to announce throughout the island the installation of what he now referred to as a new 
court.100 A few days later Tacón named Suárez as the asesor of the new court.101 
It is unclear whether Captain General Tacón’s anti-vagrancy initiative had always 
intended to treat picapleitos as vagrants, as none of Tacón’s orders regarding the initiative made 
explicit mention of picapleitos. Though the dispute with the Naval Court that had initiated this 
process had involved a man who made a living as a picapleito, he had been arrested owing to his 
status as a vagrant. The royal order of April 7, 1836, however, included picapleitos as well as 
vagrants in its grant of jurisdiction to Tacón. Suárez’s first action as the new court’s asesor was 
to draft instructions outlining a method for identifying picapleitos through the creation of a 
registry of men legitimately working within the legal profession. These included jurists, notaries, 
secretaries, and apprentices working for the government or private practices. If anyone arrested 
as a vagrant or picapleito tried to gain special treatment by claiming to be attached to the legal 
profession, they would have to appear on the registry for their claim to be taken seriously.102 
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Upon learning of the royal order of April 7, 1836, and having read José Ildefonso 
Suárez’s consultations on the matter, the members of the Real Audiencia registered their 
discomfort in a terse letter to Tacón. Though they recognized the captain general’s exclusive 
jurisdiction in cases dealing with vagrants and picapleitos, the new court could not disregard 
standard legal practices and procedures. Indeed, they encouraged Tacón to remind Suárez that he 
was expected to follow the law without introducing “innovations,” such as the new instructions 
for identifying picapleitos.103 
 In his response to the Real Audiencia’s criticism, Suárez revealed that the main point of 
contention was whether or not the high court had the right to hear appeals from defendants being 
tried by the new court of vagrants and picapleitos, as defendants apprehended beyond a five-
league radius of Havana were tried by courts in the ordinary jurisdiction. Referencing a number 
of royal orders issued in Spain in the late-eighteenth century, Suárez argued that the Real 
Audiencia did not have the right to hear appeals in these cases because in Spain the issue of 
vagrancy was treated as a policing matter, not a legal matter. As such, cases of vagrancy were 
handled exclusively by provincial captains general and defendants could not make appeals. In 
Cuba, he continued, the captain general was military and political chief of the island. The captain 
general’s policing powers as the island’s military chief thus extended throughout the branches of 
the island’s civil government. By virtue of the military authority under which those cases were 
being adjudicated, Suárez argued, the Real Audiencia did not have a right to hear appeals.104 
Approving of his asesor’s interpretation of the law, Tacón informed the Real Audiencia that he 
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was referring the matter to his superiors, with copies of all the pertinent royal orders, so that they 
could resolve the dispute.105 
 Events in Spain and Cuba quickly altered the governing terrain upon which Tacón’s 
dispute with the Real Audiencia was taking place. Unsatisfied by the pace of reforms, liberals in 
the Spanish military staged a revolt and on August 12, 1836, forced Queen Regent María 
Cristina to call a constituent assembly to craft a constitution, and rule under the 1812 
Constitution of Cádiz in the meanwhile.106 When news of these events reached Cuba in 
September, the Governor of the Eastern Department of Cuba, General Manuel Lorenzo 
proclaimed the restoration of the 1812 Constitution without consulting Captain General Tacón. 
In October, Tacón informed Lorenzo that Spanish officials had declared that the restored 
constitutional order was not to be extended to the colonies. Lorenzo then appealed directly to 
Spain, instigating a standoff with the captain general that dissipated when Lorenzo began losing 
local support in the face of Tacón’s willingness to use military force to suppress what he clearly 
saw as a rebellion.107 The episode contributed to the exclusion of colonial deputies during the 
crafting of the Constitution of 1837, and of the colonies from the constitutional order that 
followed, leaving them to be governed by “special laws” to be determined at a later date.108 
Tacón earned praise for his handling of the Lorenzo affair and it appeared that Suárez 
might also receive some sort of reward. On January 5, 1837, Tacón wrote to his superiors 
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praising Suárez for his service during the Lorenzo affair and requesting that either Suárez’s 
position as interim asesor primero be made permanent or that he be given another position 
within the government.109 On April 6, 1837, the Ministry of Justice informed Tacón that while 
Suárez’s case merited attention, they could not officially give him the position of asesor primero 
until after the new constitution had been ratified. Suárez was to continue in his current interim 
role until such time that they could address the matter.110 
 While Suárez’s professional future looked promising, Cuba’s emerging position of 
exclusion from Spain’s new constitutional order appeared to have worked against Tacón and 
Suárez’s designs for the court of vagrants and picapleitos. On May 4, 1837, the Ministry of 
Justice rejected Tacón’s argument that his military authority gave him exclusive jurisdiction in 
cases dealing with vagrants and picapleitos, stating that the provisions in the Novísima 
recopilación de las leyes de España he had pointed to in substantiating his case were not 
applicable in Cuba. Though the captain general retained jurisdiction, prosecutions against 
vagrants and picapleitos were to be carried out as though they were civil cases, thus giving the 
Real Audiencia the right to hear appeals.111 In an ironic twist, Tacón’s attempt to promote social 
order through an exceptional mode of legal practice that relied on his military authority to bypass 
the island’s ordinary system of law had now been rejected in part because the precedent for such 
a practice originated in a metropolitan legal context, from which Cuba was to be excluded. 
 Responding to the Ministry of Justice’s decision to reverse the royal order of April 7, 
                                                 
109 Tacón to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho dela Gobernación de Ultramar, Havana, 5 
January 1837, no. 53, exp. 20, leg. 1661, Ultramar, AHN. 
110 Ministry of Justice to Tacón, Madrid, 6 April 1837, no. 55, exp. 20, leg. 1661, Ultramar, 
AHN. 




1836, that had affirmed executive authority by denying the Real Audiencia any role in the 
captain general’s prosecutions of vagrants and picapleitos, José Ildefonso Suárez counselled 
Tacón to take action, claiming that this seemingly minor quibble regarding a new court of 
questionable importance had broader implications for Tacón’s attempts to concentrate sovereign 
authority within the office of the captaincy general. “Suspending [the royal order] now and 
annulling it,” Suárez argued, “would be a regressive step that would very much endanger Her 
Majesty’s interests, in that her enemies would see with pleasure the authority of the captain 
general of this island withered and tarnished.”112 While Suárez’s evocation of the Queen’s 
“enemies” was most likely an overstatement designed for dramatic effect, Cuba was not without 
critics of aspects of colonial governance who maintained their loyalty to the Spanish Empire. 
Indeed, by mid-1837, Tacón appeared to have garnered broad antipathy, most notably from 
Superintendent Claudio Martínez de Pinillos, who was publicly accusing the captain general of 
aspiring to name himself Cuba’s viceroy.113 
As the Military Commission’s asesor, Suárez had developed an assertive style that 
advanced his own personal interests while promoting the amplification of the legal powers of the 
executive branch of government. His assertiveness informed the captaincy general’s relationship 
with governing institutions such as the Intendancy and the Real Audiencia in tribunal-related 
matters, engendering friction and discord. Owing to the tribunal’s acknowledged role in 
promoting insular security, and with the support of a metropolitan government committed to 
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defending its sovereignty over the island, however, the tribunal became a permanent fixture on 
the governing landscape and Suárez’s style and expertise an acknowledged asset to the practice 
of colonial governance. 
 The amplification of the legal powers of the captaincy general through the Military 
Commission, when perceived to be in the service of protecting the island from racial violence 
and political revolution, could overcome objections, whether they originated from critics of 
Spanish sovereignty over Cuba or from the major institutions of colonial governance like the 
Intendancy and the Real Audiencia. When the concentration of sovereign authority within the 
captaincy general was directed towards concerns deemed to be less critical, like the social 
disorders wrought of vagrancy and the questionable activities of picapleitos, the effort soon 
stalled. In the case of the court of vagrants and picapleitos, José Ildefonso Suárez’s promotion of 
executive power, which served him well as the Military Commission’s asesor, failed to 
withstand the Real Audiencia’s willingness to assert its own claims to sovereign authority in 
legal matters. And with metropolitan finances increasingly dependent on Cuban revenues 
collected and dispersed by the Intendancy, Superintendent Martínez de Pinillos’s influence in 
Spain had never been stronger. With Tacón’s administration engendering unprecedented levels 
of discord within the colonial government and throughout Cuban society more broadly, Tacón’s 
days as captain general and Suárez’s position as asesor primero were numbered. 
 
* * * 
On January 5, 1838, the Ministry of War issued a royal order relieving Captain General Tacón of 
his command.114 Despite earning praise for successfully staving off the challenge posed by 
                                                 




General Manuel Lorenzo, Tacón had run afoul of Cuba’s planter elite, who took advantage of 
Spain’s precarious economic position owing to the Carlist War and its unsettled political 
situation following the liberal resurgence that had resulted in the Constitution of 1837 to 
successfully orchestrate his recall to Spain.115 Before departing Cuba on April 22, 1838, Tacón 
had time to advocate on José Ildefonso Suárez’s behalf one more time, with a letter to the 
Secretary of State requesting that Suárez be given a salaried position somewhere in the 
government.116 The day after Tacón’s departure, Suárez sent a petition directly to the Queen, 
expressing his surprise and hurt upon learning that the position of asesor primero had been 
assigned to someone else and asking that the decision be reconsidered or that he be given another 
position within the government.117 It seems, though, that Suárez’s time had passed. 
Captain General Tacón’s departure from Cuba was accompanied by a judicial proceeding 
known as a juicio de residencia, a standard legal practice in which governing officials such as 
viceroys and captains general, as well as their asesores, were subjected to a review of their 
conduct while in office, during which time aggrieved parties could make claims against the 
officials.118 Owing to the unpopularity of Tacón’s administration, numerous individuals voiced 
grievances and made claims against the departing captain general during his juicio de residencia, 
which was overseen by an oidor of the Real Audiencia. Though the metropolitan government 
had already acquiesced to the economic and political realities substantiating those grievances and 
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claims when recalling Tacón to Spain, it was not about to allow dissatisfaction with one 
particular executive to descend into a more general critique of the imperial order.  In conclusion, 
then, the judge presiding over the juicio de residencia determined that none of the grievances or 
claims levied against Tacón had any merit.119 
 Suárez’s juicio de residencia, however, did not go as well. Over the course of a career 
that had been characterized by his assertive and aggressive style, Suárez had made numerous 
enemies. With Suárez’s most powerful patron out of the picture, his enemies now turned to his 
juicio de residencia for retribution. The charges levied against Suárez by his accusers focused on 
incidents of wrongful imprisonment and indefinite detention during his time as asesor to the 
Military Commission and the court of vagrants and picapleitos. The same oidor of the Real 
Audiencia who had presided over Captain General Tacón’s juicio de residencia found Suárez 
guilty of the charges and prohibited him from serving as the Military Commission’s asesor for a 
period of six years. The accumulated value of the fines, penalties, and recompense required 
approached 5,000 pesos.120  
In an effort to escape the immediate reach of his enemies, and to better defend himself as 
he appealed the results of his juicio de residencia, Suárez travelled to Spain in 1839.121 While 
overseeing the lengthy appeals process, he engaged in a public quarrel with some of his 
detractors, much of which took place through published pamphlets and books with titles such as 
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Breve resumen de los escesos y arbitrariedades cometidas por Don José Ildefonso Suárez, 
Mordaza puesta al famoso criminal D. José Ildefonso Suárez, and Breve memoria escrita por el 
oidor honorario de la Audiencia de Cuba.122 In one of his own publications, Suárez framed his 
current legal predicament as stemming from a lack of consideration of the way the legal world of 
Spanish colonies was different from that of Spanish law. 
It would indeed be an imprudent anomaly and very momentous, if, having been 
informed by our current constitution that the islands of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and 
the Philippines are to be governed by laws for the Indies and royal orders 
applicable there, public functionaries [of those islands] were to be judged in the 
Peninsula according to its current laws and by judges, who being very devoted 
to and passionate about Peninsular law, had little or no knowledge of [the laws] 
of those distant lands.123 
As a functionary of the Spanish Empire in one of its remaining colonies, Suárez thus argued that 
failure to attend to Cuban difference in a legal sense could drive a wedge between Cuban 
functionaries and the imperial order they worked to uphold. Regarding his experience as the 
Military Commission’s asesor, Suárez wrote: 
If when dealing with events of this sort, that took place [in Cuba], Peninsular 
judges were not sufficiently discreet, informed, and keen to distinguish between 
one body of legislation and the other, and were not sufficiently versed in [the 
laws of Cuba], the honor and fortune of American employees would be 
endangered, while the sentences of the peninsular [judges] could appear as 
though inspired by the spirit of partisanship rather than dictated by impartial and 
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The key to maintaining loyal Cubans such as himself working in the service of Spain’s colonial 
interests, then, was not to treat them as though they worked apart from the imperial order they 
served, but rather to recognize the ways they occupied an exceptional legal space required for 
colonial governance. 
At a time when the metropolitan government’s exclusion of the colonies from the 
governing order established with the Constitution of 1837 had raised the ire of some of his fellow 
countrymen, who saw in a future governed by “special laws” something from which to distance 
themselves, José Ildefonso Suárez embraced the recognition of Cuban exceptionality as requisite 
for Spain’s continued dominion over the island. As a way of governing a colonial society 
increasingly fractured along fault lines of race, class, origin, and ideology, however, this mode of 
exceptional legal practice, pioneered in many respects by Suárez himself, would soon have its 
day. But Suárez would not live to see this development. His prolonged efforts to rehabilitate his 
public and professional name came at the cost of the fortune he had accumulated during his 
storied career in Cuba. Though by 1841 Suárez would find himself absolved of all the charges 
levied against him during his juicio de residencia, in 1843 he died in Seville a ruined man.125 
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“As Exceptional as Slavery Itself”: Inquiry and Repression in 




General Gerónimo Valdés arrived in Cuba in 1841 after a storied career in the Spanish military. 
He had come to prominence during the Wars of Independence in Spanish America and had been 
present at the decisive defeat of Spanish forces at the Battle of Ayacucho in 1824. Upon his 
return to Spain, he maintained a low profile until the death of Fernando VII in 1833, after which 
he fought in the Carlist War in support of Isabella II’s claim to the throne. Valdés’s commanding 
officer during the war and fellow veteran of the failed campaigns in Spanish America, General 
Baldomero Espartero, leveraged the prestige he had attained for defeating the Carlists to displace 
Queen Regent María Cristina from Spanish politics, first as prime minister and then as regent 
himself. In recognition of his service, Espartero rewarded Valdés with the captaincy general of 
Cuba.1 
 Though Spanish politics had entered an ostensibly liberal phase, organized around a 
constitutional monarchy where national sovereignty emanated from the people and contestations 
over power would be carried out between supporters of moderate and progressive forms of 
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liberalism, Cuba had already been excluded from this developing liberal order.2 Moreover, in 
spite of the victory Cuban interests claimed with Miguel Tacón’s recall to Spain in 1838, the 
metropolitan government began implementing colonial reforms concentrating sovereign 
authority within the purview, if not yet powers, of the captaincy general. 
On June 16, 1838, the Spanish Ministry of Justice had issued a royal decree establishing a 
new high court in Havana known as the Real Audiencia Pretorial.3 The designation pretorial 
signaled that a given real audiencia was not fully subordinate to the viceroy ruling the region 
within which it had jurisdiction, and in this case was probably meant to signal that Havana’s high 
court was superior to the one in Puerto Príncipe.4 Debates about relocating the Real Audiencia 
from Puerto Príncipe to Havana dated back to the time the Real Audiencia in Santo Domingo had 
been relocated to Cuba in 1797. Tacón had resuscitated the debate during his administration and 
the move had the support of Cuba’s Intendancy and Spain’s Consejo de Indias.5 Though the Real 
Audiencia in Puerto Príncipe would remain in operation, its jurisdiction was reduced to 
encompass only Cuba’s central and eastern departments. And even though the powers of the new 
high court and its formal relation to the captaincy general remained unchanged, the decree’s 
mandate that the new high court be housed in the Palace of the Captain General carried with it a 
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symbolic significance, suggesting that captains general could more easily exercise their powers 
of oversight as the high court’s president.6 
Captain General Valdés revealed a way the establishment of the Real Audiencia Pretorial 
concentrated sovereign authority under the auspices of his office when he issued a decree on 
April 7, 1841, updating the Military Commission’s mandate. Whereas the Military Commission 
had been founded to prosecute liberal partisans following the reinstitution of Fernando VII’s 
absolutist regime, espousing support for the Constitution of 1812 could hardly be considered a 
crime against the state in the new era of constitutional governance in Spain. Valdés thus removed 
such language from his reformulation of the crimes falling within the tribunal’s jurisdiction. He 
also stripped the tribunal of the additional powers Captain General Ricafort had assigned it in 
1833, citing the beneficial influence the new Real Audiencia Pretorial was having on the prompt 
administration of justice.7 Finally, he formalized one of the tribunal’s foundational practices 
when he decreed that the Military Commission would prosecute “the slaves who rebel, whatever 
the pretext or motive, whenever the number of conspirators exceeds three.”8 Perceiving that the 
Real Audiencia Pretorial served the interests of insular security to a greater degree than its 
counterpart in Puerto Príncipe, Valdés could thus focus the Military Commission’s energies 
towards more pressing matters. 
Indeed, Captain General Valdés’s explicit inclusion of slave rebellions within the 
Military Commission’s jurisdiction reflected growing concerns over the island’s restive 
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population of enslaved laborers. From 1821 to 1840, imports of enslaved Africans had sustained 
Cuba’s growing fortunes, as the contraband slave trade introduced an additional 322,560 slaves 
to the island.9 The risks of this endeavor became all the more apparent in 1841, when a census 
revealed that the island’s combined population of free and enslaved people of color was greater 
than its white population, unsettling the assurance, if only rhetorical, that the events of the 
Haitian Revolution could never occur in Cuba because of the demographic superiority of 
whites.10 In an effort to forestall the outbreak of slave violence, Valdés thus issued an update to 
the Bando de buen gobierno of 1828 that included a section regulating the management of 
plantation slavery.11 The new slave regulations were based on a set of regional slave codes 
promulgated by governor of Matanzas Cecilio Ayllón following the Guamacaro rebellion of 
1825.12 Despite their lack of representation in the Spanish Cortes, Cuban planters were 
nonetheless a powerful lobby, and their refusal to comply with the new regulations on the 
grounds that they undercut their “domestic sovereignty” over their slaves effectively rendered the 
regulations a dead letter.13 
While the struggles between governing officials and planters regarding the treatment of 
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the enslaved expressed the planter class’s continued authority in some matters related to the 
island’s slave-based economy, forces outside and inside the island placed increasing pressure on 
Cuban slavery and threatened the future of Spain’s claims over the colony itself. The contraband 
slave trade to Cuba, operating in clear violation of Spain’s treaty obligations with Great Britain, 
had become a central concern of British abolitionists. Their interests, and those of British 
diplomacy, converged with the appointment of David Turnbull as British consul to Cuba. From 
1840 to 1842, Turnbull raised the ire of governing officials and slave interests in Cuba as he 
promoted his avowedly abolitionist agenda in ways that transgressed diplomatic norms. Owing 
to the growing opposition to Turnbull’s activities, Britain’s Foreign Secretary stripped him of his 
consulship, after which Turnbull left the island.14 
It appears that David Turnbull had indeed moved beyond agitating simply for the 
abolition of the slave trade to Cuba. During his time as consul, he had cultivated associations 
with prominent white Cubans and free people of color possessing varying degrees of sympathy 
for the ideas of Cuban independence and slave emancipation. While his white associates seem to 
have lost heart when speculative conversations began transitioning into concrete plans of action, 
his associates of color appear to have taken steps to extend these conversations and plans beyond 
the urban centers of Havana and the city of Matanzas.15 
Among this cohort of free people of color was the noted poet Gabriel de la Concepción 
Valdés, also known as Plácido. Born in Havana, Valdés had emerged from obscurity owing to 
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his literary talents, obtaining the admiration of prominent members of Cuban high society.16 His 
poetry maintained a strategic ambivalence, resonating with the sentiments of Cuban 
independence and anti-slavery while remaining within the bounds of acceptable public 
expression.17 After dividing his time between Havana and the city of Matanzas, he settled 
permanently in Matanzas in 1836.18 Though the precise nature of his associations and activities 
are vague, by 1841 it appears he was participating in conspiratorial meetings and on April 6, 
1843, he was arrested while travelling in the jurisdiction of Villa Clara, suspected of 
conspiratorial activities.19 As his travels brought him deeper into the heart of Cuban slavery, 
however, he would have found that a related movement was already underway. 
During his travels, Valdés would have passed through, if not interacted with, a rural 
population of free people of color who made their livings cultivating small plots of land and 
working on plantations as contingent and skilled laborers, and as contramayorales and 
mayorales.20 He may have even met with Agustín Jiménez. A former slave, Jiménez had been 
detained in connection with the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825 and had even been questioned by 
the Military Commission.21 By 1844, Jiménez owned a plot of land in rural Matanzas with three 
small houses and two slaves of his own. He earned a living as a day laborer and by renting a 
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portion of his land to other cultivators.22 Some claimed that he hosted meetings in his residence 
with free and enslaved people of color from the area during which they made plans for a regional 
uprising.23 Others even claimed that the poet Valdés had participated in some of those 
meetings.24 
Throughout the region of Matanzas, similar encounters were taking place along rural 
roads, in the fields, and in the huts and barracks occupied by plantation slaves. One host of such 
meetings was Pablo Gangá. By 1844, at the age of forty-five, Pablo was an old man for a slave. 
It had been nineteen years since he had led slaves in the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825.25 He had 
been spared execution by the Military Commission because he had saved his mistress’s life 
during the uprising.26 His recently deceased owner had followed the prevailing economic trends 
and moved from growing coffee beans to sugar cane. Whereas Pablo had once worked as a 
carriage driver, he now drove slaves in the labor of cane cultivation as a contramayoral.27 He 
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also worked in concert with his wife, a former slave named Juana Carabalí, organizing slaves on 
their plantation La Sabanilla and the surrounding area for future action.28 
The meetings hosted by Agustín Jiménez, Pablo Gangá, and Juana Carabalí were the 
distributed foci of an insurgent movement made up of free and enslaved people of color that had 
developed in tandem with the growth of Cuban slavery in rural Matanzas.29 This movement 
developed independent of, though with links to, conspiratorial associations in urban centers such 
as Havana and the city of Matanzas, in which prominent white Cubans, socially mobile free 
people of color, and foreign abolitionists considered futures for Cuba independent of Spain and 
without slavery.30 In the aggregate, this collection of associations, movements, and conspiracies 
had the potential to challenge Cuban slavery and Spanish empire, as agents of Spanish 
sovereignty in Cuba, including planters, local authorities, and governing officials, had always 
feared. Following a series of slave rebellions in the region of Matanzas in 1843, the two largest 
of which were investigated and prosecuted by the Military Commission, many believed those 
fears were on the verge of coming true. 
 In December 1843, the revelation of an enslaved woman to her master that his slaves 
were on the verge of rebelling thus sparked a multifaceted response that saw area planters and 
local authorities work in coordination with soldiers and officials of the jurisdiction of Matanzas 
to uncover the origins and scope of the alleged rebellion. With the approval of the captain 
general in Havana, this investigatory process explicitly excluded the Military Commission, 
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owing to criticisms that the tribunal adhered too faithfully to the law to effectively extract useful 
information from slaves. Indeed, the captain general had even authorized portions of the 
investigatory process to employ “extrajudicial methods” when questioning slaves. 
Whether the men participating in this investigatory process were propelled by ambition, 
duty, an interest in the potential material rewards of their activities, a desire to commit violence 
against Africans and the African-descended, or some combination of the four, their collective 
efforts soon outpaced the colonial state’s ability to materially sustain their investigations. As the 
investigatory process enveloped rural dwellers like Agustín Jiménez, Pablo Gangá, and Juana 
Carabalí to find evidence that urban free people of color like Gabriel de la Concepción Valdés 
were involved in a conspiratorial network led by abolitionists like David Turnbull, it quickly 
ballooned to administratively unmanageable proportions, stressing the Intendancy’s ability to 
financially sustain the endeavor and compelling Captain General O’Donnell to institutionalize 
the process under the purview of the Military Commission. 
To the extent that the investigatory process was guided by a desire to uncover the depth 
and scope of the suspected conspiracy, it also became the most dramatic and high-stakes 
expression of a process of colonial state formation, stretching back to the Military Commission’s 
prosecution of the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825, whereby the amplification of the legal powers 
of the captaincy general to contend with threats to Cuban slavery and Spanish empire necessarily 
developed in tandem with the government’s ability to fund such measures. In this instance, 
however, the propensity of a range of planters, authorities, and officials to interpret the threat of 
slave rebellion as a material opportunity, to channel a fear of black revolution into exemplary 
repression, and to transform the exigencies of insular security into a program of social 




keep the powers of the captaincy general in check. Whether inadvertently or by design, the 
Escalera process saw Captain General O’Donnell channel a mode of plantation governance, 
authorized by the “domestic sovereignty” slaveholders held over their human chattel and 
expressed through violence and repression, towards a mode of colonial governance characterized 
by the concentration of sovereign authority within the office of the captaincy general. 
 
 
The Rebellions of 1843 and the Origins of the Escalera Process 
On March 27, 1843, slaves on plantations in the Matanzas districts of Macurijes and Cimarrones 
joined forces with slaves working on the railroad in the town of Bemba in an uprising involving 
approximately 500 rebels.31 Governor of the jurisdiction of Matanzas Antonio García Oña 
personally led military units in suppressing the rebellion.32 Five days later, the governor 
convened a consejo de guerra in the field to try the leaders of the rebellion in an expeditious and 
exemplary manner.33 He then appointed Captain Apolinar de la Gala as fiscal, charging him with 
investigating the origins of what was now being referred to as the Bemba rebellion.34 On May 8, 
1843, Captain General Valdés ordered the Military Commission to take over De la Gala’s 
investigation.35 
Military Commission officials investigated the Bemba uprising as a series of smaller 
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slave rebellions disturbed the Matanzas countryside from May through July.36 Back in Spain, 
moderate liberals led by General Ramón María Narváez successfully rebelled against the regency 
of Baldomero Espartero, declaring Queen Isabella to be of age, forcing Espartero to abandon 
Spain for England on July 30, 1843, and naming Narváez prime minister.37 Narváez then named 
Leopoldo O’Donnell, moderate liberal partisan and hero of the Carlist War to replace progressive 
liberal Gerónimo Valdés as Cuba’s captain general.38 
The Military Commission was reaching the end of its prosecution of the Bemba uprising 
when another large slave rebellion consumed the district of Sabanilla. On November 5, 1843, 
slaves on the plantation Triunvirato rose up in an action that quickly spread to neighboring 
plantations. Though the rebel force contained approximately 300 individuals, soldiers sent by 
Governor García Oña were able to suppress the rebellion.39 
This most recent incident compounded fears that rural security in the jurisdiction of 
Matanzas was not up to the task of contending with increasing slave violence such that ninety-
three planters from the area petitioned the recently arrived Captain General Leopoldo O’Donnell 
to ramp up the military presence in the region.40 The state’s response to the rebellion, however, 
followed a familiar script. As he had done after the Bemba uprising, Governor García Oña 
ordered his subordinates to convene a consejo de guerra in the field, which then hastily 
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sentenced eight slaves to death. They were divided into groups of two, with each group being 
executed at a different plantation in the presence of slaves from those and neighboring 
plantations.41 One of García Oña’s subordinates then began a preliminary investigation into the 
origins of the rebellion at Triunvirato. On December 3, 1843, the Military Commission assumed 
jurisdiction over the investigation.42 
In early December 1843, a planter in the district of Sabanilla named Esteban Santa Cruz 
de Oviedo announced that his slave and concubine Polonia had revealed to him the existence of a 
plot to rebel amongst the slaves on his plantation.43 On the heels of the rebellion at Triunvirato, 
Governor García Oña’s response was swift, ordering cavalry units from the city of Matanzas to 
secure the areas surrounding Santa Cruz de Oviedo’s plantation. Once again, García Oña 
followed the legal script he had employed after the rebellions at Bemba and Triunvirato, placing 
Apolinar de la Gala in charge of prosecuting the alleged rebels. This time, however, De la Gala 
worked in coordination with Santa Cruz de Oviedo’s cousin, area planter and militia officer 
Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Hernández Morejón.44 Though it is unclear precisely how 
Hernández Morejón leveraged his familial relation to Santa Cruz de Oviedo to become involved 
in the preliminary investigation, it was a role he undoubtedly relished. During the Military 
Commission’s investigation into the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825, he had, after all, orchestrated 
the false confession of a slave, extracted under torture, in a failed attempt to involve himself in 
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the Military Commission’s investigation.45 
Apolinar de la Gala and Francisco Hernández Morejón quickly concluded that the plan to 
rebel involved seven plantations. On December 21, 1843, Governor García Oña personally 
convened a consejo de guerra at the sight of the rebellion. After a quick trial in the field, the 
consejo sentenced sixteen slaves to death, six to imprisonment in Africa, and fifteen to receive 
100 lashes after which they were to wear fetters for five years on their respective plantations.46 
Miguel de Aldama, son of Domingo de Aldama, one of the wealthiest planters in Cuba, 
witnessed these events and recounted watching the prisoners “suffer under the torment of the 
lash,” while slaves from the surrounding area were then forced to witness the execution of the 
sixteen slaves sentenced to death.47 Finally, the consejo granted Polonia her freedom and 
awarded her 500 pesos, in accordance with article 38 of the Bando de buen gobierno.48 
 Suspecting that outside agitators were behind the plan to rebel, Captain General 
O’Donnell ordered Apolinar de la Gala to continue investigating the origins of the thwarted 
rebellion. Governor García Oña then asked Francisco Hernández Morejón and Esteban Santa 
Cruz de Oviedo to pursue a parallel investigation towards similar ends. This parallel 
investigation differed from De la Gala’s, however, in that the governor authorized them to use 
what he would later describe as “coercive measures” when interrogating slaves.49 After 
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interrogating five slaves, including a twelve-year-old boy, with recourse to what amounted to 
torture, the two men informed the governor that they believed that the plan to rebel was much 
vaster than had been determined by the consejo de guerra of December 21, 1843.50  
 As he had in 1825, Francisco Hernández Morejón saw an opportunity to increase his 
level of participation in the government’s response to the thwarted rebellion. He consulted with 
noted jurist and plantation owner Anastasio Carrillo y Arango in drafting a letter to Governor 
García Oña, proposing that the parallel investigation he and Santa Cruz de Oviedo had just 
concluded be given official sanction to continue.51 Following a tumultuous year governing a 
jurisdiction that had been plagued by slave rebellions, including two of the biggest uprisings ever 
seen on the island, the governor was particularly receptive to the idea.  
On January 8, 1844, Governor García Oña informed Captain General O’Donnell of 
Francisco Hernández Morejón and Esteban Santa Cruz de Oviedo’s parallel investigation. 
Pointing to the revelations extracted from the slaves under torture, García Oña claimed that the 
two men had obtained such useful information because, being the owners of plantations and 
slaveholders themselves, they knew best how to deal with slaves. He continued: 
Only by combining the authority of the masters, with all their prestige, and the 
coercive measures that they can use, will we be able to subdue the blacks into 
confessing, and unravel those plots, that are no longer isolated incidents 
contained within the limits of one or two plantations, but vast plans conceived 
with audacity and that have as their objective, ridiculous if you will, but no less 
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grave and ambitious, to seize dominion over the land.52 
He justified this proposal by pointing to the recent cycle of rebellions, investigations, and 
prosecutions. The investigation into the Bemba uprising had been unable to uncover the 
rebellion’s origins because, he now judged, his men and the Military Commission had 
“proceeded by the regular means.”53 And he now suspected that the rebellion at Triunvirato 
might have been a premature action connected to the planned rebellion that Hernández Morejón 
and Santa Cruz de Oviedo had uncovered, a possibility that the preliminary investigation into 
Triunvirato had failed to suggest. 
The governor argued that “it is indispensable to turn to special measures, as exceptional 
as is slavery itself and the relations that emerge from it, whatever those means may be.”54 He 
thus recommended that the captain general officially authorize Hernández Morejón and Santa 
Cruz de Oviedo to continue their extrajudicial investigation, in coordination with other planters, 
so they could “administer punishments to their slaves according to the severity that [the slaves] 
have come to deserve.”55 The governor’s recommendation included one caveat, however. Since 
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the prevailing wisdom held that the enslaved had been encouraged to rebel by outside parties, the 
governor recommended that an additional official be assigned to the investigation, in case the 
process enveloped white people and free people of color, against which “we cannot proceed 
except in accordance with the law.”56 
Though never invoked, the 1814 prohibition on judicial torture initially passed by the 
Cortes de Cádiz during the Napoleonic occupation of the Iberian Peninsula and maintained by 
Fernando VII’s first restorationist government loomed large over García Oña’s recommendation 
that Hernández Morejón and Santa Cruz de Oviedo be authorized to torture slaves. Seven years 
after the Constitution of 1837 had excluded Spain’s remaining colonies from the resultant liberal 
order to be governed by “special laws” that were never forthcoming, Governor García Oña’s 
recommendation may have been influenced by ambiguities regarding the continued applicability 
of the 1814 prohibition on judicial torture in the colonies.57 In this moment of apparent crisis, 
however, García Oña need only point to the particularities of the institution of slavery itself to 
argue that slaves merited an exception from the protections of law. On January 13, 1844, after 
consulting with auditor de guerra Antonio Armero, Captain General O’Donnell announced his 
approval of Governor García Oña’s recommendation, adding that the governor should provide 
Hernández Morejón with whatever assistance he might need.58 Three days later, the governor 
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informed Hernández Morejón that the captain general had approved of his plan and that he could 
proceed in his investigation as fiscal.59 
 
The Investigatory Phase of the Escalera Process 
Francisco Hernández Morejón began his extrajudicial investigation charged by Captain General 
O’Donnell to uncover evidence of what they already believed: that white people and free people 
of color were conspiring to incite the enslaved to rise up en masse. The security situation in 
Matanzas was sufficiently serious and the legal script for attending to slave rebellions had been 
shown to be sufficiently ineffectual in preventing future uprisings that deviations from the letter 
of the law seemed warranted. The key to his success, then, lay in the captain general’s 
authorization to use torture when interrogating slaves. The ensuing investigatory process was far 
from lawless, though, as it adhered to legal forms even as its protagonists had been sanctioned to 
act extrajudicially. For instance, the authorization effectively marshalled the lawful violence of 
plantation slavery towards a legal process carried out by the state that served the interests of 
territorial security. And even though Hernández Morejón described his work as “extrajudicial” in 
nature, he nonetheless kept a written record of his interrogations that appeared legalistic in its 
composition and organization.60 In order to effectively deal with what auditor de guerra Antonio 
Armero referred to as the “common desire” of slaves to “remove themselves from the 
exceptional state in which they live,” colonial officials were willing to engage in exceptional 
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practices themselves.61 In so doing, they nonetheless made recourse to other types of law and 
familiar legal practices.  
Fearing that the planned insurrection could erupt at any moment, Hernández Morejón 
maintained an ardent pace as he coordinated troop movements, travelled between plantations 
interrogating slaves, and initiated a growing number of ancillary investigations. On the evening 
of January 17, 1844, Francisco Hernández Morejón headed to the plantation La Andrea in the 
district of Macurijes with soldiers Governor García Oña had placed at his disposal. In a letter to 
Hernández Morejón, the plantation’s owner had claimed to have discovered that his slaves and 
those of a neighboring plantation owned by Miguel Coto, were planning to rebel.62 Over three 
days the fiscal interrogated three slaves from La Andrea, with his secretary keeping records of 
the proceedings. According to the testimony of an enslaved adolescent named Martín Gangá, 
contramayorales from both plantations had been meeting in secret for some time. The original 
plan to rebel on January 6 had been put off, however, after the wife of La Andrea’s owner had 
ordered the detention of two of these contramayorales for reasons that were unclear.63 It appears 
that Hernández Morejón did not feel the need to torture Martín Gangá during the interrogation. 
Such was not the case during his interrogation of Antonio Lucumí. Though Antonio’s account of 
the clandestine meetings was similar to Martín’s, the fiscal suspected that he was holding 
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something back. As noted by the secretary, “in this state, the interrogator knowing that the 
declarant is hiding the majority of what he knows, the proceedings have been suspended, to be 
continued tomorrow, [the interrogator] occupying his time in maneuvers that, from experience, 
he knows are the means of obtaining frank declarations.”64 
The interrogation resumed the next day. Though Antonio’s subsequent testimony lacked 
new details about the clandestine meetings, it included the names of fifty slaves from La Andrea, 
from the Coto estate, and from two neighboring plantations that he claimed were involved in the 
plan.65 For Hernández Morejón, details about clandestine meetings merely substantiated what he 
already suspected. The names of slaves, on the other hand, were fuel for his investigation, each 
name potentially leading to proof of what he was hoping to verify. 
On January 20, four days into his investigation, Hernández Morejón informed Governor 
García Oña that he had uncovered a new plan to rebel in the district of Macurijes involving 
slaves from multiple plantations. Fearing an outbreak of violence, he announced that he would 
continue investigating this new plan, with La Andrea serving as his headquarters.66 Over the next 
two days, he interrogated four more slaves from La Andrea, learning that some of them had tried 
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to meet with a gang of maroons led by a former slave named José Dolores a few months prior.67 
Dolores was a notorious figure in the area who had spent the previous few years raiding 
plantations with his gang and avoiding capture.68 Maybe Hernández Morejón believed that the 
revelation that La Andrea’s slaves had sought out and perhaps received outside help sufficiently 
confirmed his suspicions. Or perhaps he believed that La Andrea’s slaves were unlikely to hide 
the truth after the punishment he had already meted out to Antonio Lucumí. Whatever the 
reason, his secretary did not make further note of his use of torture. 
On January 23, Hernández Morejón informed Governor García Oña that he had found 
evidence that white people and free people of color had been involved in the plan to rebel. 69 
Over the last two days, he had interrogated three slaves from the Coto estate, attempting to learn 
more about the mysterious gang of maroons. In at least two of these interrogations, he had 
promised pardons in exchange for full cooperation, a promise he did not have authority to make. 
Gil Gangá had claimed that Coto’s slaves had also tried to contact the gang and that he had heard 
that they were accompanied by three white men who provided them with weapons and fraudulent 
travel licenses.70 In response to questions about the gang, Perico Criollo had pointed to an area 
known as El Palenque, the term for a maroon community, where a group of free black men 
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lived.71 The last slave Hernández Morejón had interrogated claimed that he too had heard about 
the gang and their free allies and had recounted a meeting attended by one of the free black man 
from El Palenque.72 
Within this morass of rumor, hearsay, desperate fabrication, and possible lies, Francisco 
Hernández Morejón saw confirmation of what he was looking for. Because his authorization to 
use torture did not extend to interrogations of free people, and because the scale of the 
investigation was growing, he suggested that the governor name an additional fiscal to the 
investigation who could conduct interrogations in accordance with the prohibition against 
judicial torture.73 
Hernández Morejón also took steps to make his extrajudicial investigation appear more 
like an ordinary legal process. In addition to compiling the records of his extrajudicial 
interrogations into a formal case file, he ratified the three declarations he had taken from Coto’s 
slaves that had attested to the involvement of free people of color in the plan to rebel, a standard 
part of a legal process.74 While Gil Gangá and German Gangá claimed they had nothing to add to 
their original declarations, Perico Criollo asserted that one of the two men from El Palenque was 
named Agustín Jiménez. Perico claimed that Jiménez was a noted brujo (witch) and one of the 
leaders of the plan to rebel. He had not mentioned Jiménez before, he claimed, because they 
                                                 
71 Declaración del mulato Perico Criollo, esclavo de D. Miguel Coto, edad 30 años, Eno 23, no 
place, 23 January 1844, f. 27-28, exp. 1, leg. 37, CM, ANC. 
72 Declaración del negro German Gangá de Don Miguel Coto, como de 40 años, Eno 23, 23 
January 1844, f. 28v-29v, exp. 1, leg. 37, CM, ANC. 
73 Diligencia de haberse hecho la Segunda comunicación al Sor. Gobernador de Matanzas, La 
Andrea en Partido de Macurijes, 23 January 1844, f. 29v-30v, exp. 1, leg. 37, CM, ANC. 
74 Diligencia de agregación á esta actuación las del expediente extrajudicial, Ingenio Andrea en 




were friends and because Jiménez carried great prestige throughout the area.75 
It is unclear from the documentary record how Hernández Morejón worked through the 
differing and confused accounts of maroons, free people of color, and white people participating 
in the plan to rebel. The only recorded direction his investigation took, however, was towards the 
four men living on the plot of land known as El Palenque. On January 24, he ordered their 
apprehension.76 
Prior to interrogating the men from El Palenque, Francisco Hernández Morejón received 
a communication from Governor García Oña responding to his initial report that the plan to rebel 
in the district of Macurijes involved several plantations, but which had not yet made mention of 
free people of color or white people. As though anticipating this eventuality, however, the 
governor reminded Hernández Morejón that if he started questioning free people, “they should 
not be harmed with domestic corrections.”77 
Having already acknowledged that the interrogation of free people would have to be 
conducted without recourse to torture, and with the governor of Matanzas now having reinforced 
that point, Hernández Morejón began interrogating Agustín Jiménez by asking the prisoner to 
identify himself. Jiménez replied that he had been born into slavery in the nearby district of 
Sumidero and had been freed by his owner. He was not married and currently worked as a 
laborer. Jiménez denied knowing the reason for his detention, and when asked if he had ever 
                                                 
75 Ratifications of Gil Gangá, Perico Criollo, and German Gangá from Coto, Macurijes, 24 
January 1844, f. 30v-31v, exp. 1, leg. 37, CM, ANC. 
76 Diligencia de aprehensión a los cuatro negros libres, La Andrea (Macurijes), 24 January 1844, 
f. 33-33v, exp. 1, leg. 37, CM, ANC. 
77 García Oña to Hernández Morejón, Matanzas, 24 January 1844, f. 34-36v, exp. 1, leg. 37, CM, 




been detained before he mentioned being arrested during the Military Commission’s 
investigation of the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825. When asked if he knew Perico Criollo from 
the Coto estate, Jiménez acknowledged that they had worked together clearing forest. He denied 
being a brujo as well as having any knowledge of the planned rebellion. He added that he would 
have alerted authorities if he had known about the rebellion, as he owned a small tract of land 
and two slaves of his own, so he had something to lose.78 Two of the other free men living in El 
Palenque also denied knowing anything about the planned rebellion, while the fourth 
acknowledged that he had heard slaves from Coto’s estate mention something about a 
rebellion.79 
The governor’s warning against torturing free people should not be taken as evidence that 
Hernández Morejón refrained from doing so when questioning the men from El Palenque. A 
comparison of these interrogations with his prior interrogations of slaves from La Andrea and the 
Coto estate, however, suggests that it was unlikely. When interrogating slaves using a 
combination of physical coercion and the promise of rewards, he never failed to obtain 
acknowledgments that a rebellion was being planned, though the details were seldom stable or 
uniform. Agustín Jiménez and the other men from El Palenque, by contrast, all denied having 
any knowledge beyond a passing whisper of the planned rebellion. If Hernández Morejón indeed 
tortured them, they seem to have proven uniquely capable of resisting his methods. It seems 
more likely that he did not. Having collected a series of denials, then, the fiscal ordered that the 
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four men be transferred to the prison in the city of Matanzas.80 
Over the previous week and a half, Francisco Hernández Morejón had closed in on the 
figure of Agustín Jiménez. In the days that followed, however, as he endeavored to learn more 
about Jiménez and the men from El Palenque, new revelations splintered the investigation in 
several different directions. On January 28, Hernández Morejón interrogated a slave named 
Tomás Criollo, who worked as a carriage driver on a plantation owned by Francisco Adan. 
Tomás, perhaps under torture, provided cooperative testimony, denouncing six free people of 
color from the city of Matanzas who he claimed knew about the plan. He identified five of them 
by name. He also claimed that he had seen the sixth man, a mulatto, four months earlier in the 
town of Corral Falso. Though he did not know the man’s name, he knew that the man was from 
the city of Matanzas and was married to the daughter of a woman named Pilar Poveda. Tomás 
added that he had seen the mysterious man at Jiménez’s house, where the guest had discussed 
events in the place he referred to as “Santo Domingo,” presumably Saint-Domingue/Haiti.81  
Whether through prior knowledge or through reflection, the mysterious mulatto was 
determined to be none other than the poet Gabriel de la Concepción Valdés, also well-known as 
Plácido. Following the Bemba rebellion in March 1843, regional officials had been placed on a 
heightened state of alert.82 On April 6, the governor of the jurisdiction of Villa Clara had ordered 
Valdés’s arrest, as the poet’s travels through the region had engendered suspicions. Valdés 
remained in jail until October 11, 1843, at which point he was released and returned to the city of 
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Matanzas.83 While Hernández Morejón already had evidence that free people of color had 
participated in the plan to rebel, the revelation linking Agustín Jiménez to a public figure who 
was known to associate with distinguished white Cubans suggested that the regional plan to rebel 
might be part of a much vaster conspiracy. Tomás Criollo’s testimony prompted authorities to 
arrest Valdés again on January 30, 1844.84 On February 1, Lieutenant Francisco de Paula 
Espinoza questioned Valdés in relation to Tomás Criollo’s declaration. The poet denied ever 
being in Corral Falso or having met or otherwise heard of Agustín Jiménez.85 For over a month 
Valdés remained in prison before interim governor of Matanzas Fulgencio Salas, who had taken 
over command of the jurisdiction on a temporary basis, ordered the creation of a formal 
investigation into his activities.86 
Just as Francisco Hernández Morejón’s investigation was splintering off in new 
directions, Captain General O’Donnell responded to his report of January 23. Since the 
extrajudicial investigation had uncovered evidence that free people of color and white people 
were involved in the plot, O’Donnell ordered Captain Apolinar de la Gala to take over the 
extrajudicial investigation, freeing up Hernández Morejón to follow leads and look for more 
evidence regarding the origins of the planned rebellion.87 On February 26, he uncovered what he 
took to be a new plan to rebel by slaves on a plantation named San Francisco de Paula. Not 
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wanting to deviate from his current line of inquiry, he ordered one of his subordinates in the local 
militia, Lieutenant Luís Dulzaides, to go to the plantation to begin a preliminary investigation.88 
Over the next month, Hernández Morejón initiated at least four more investigations in this way.89 
Over two days, Luís Dulzaides interrogated seven slaves at San Francisco de Paula.90 
Though the declarations reflected a range of responses, they consistently pointed to two men as 
leaders of the planned rebellion: a free black man named Meliton Sotolongo, who lived adjacent 
to the plantation La Carolina, and Pablo Gangá from La Sabanilla.91 Two days later, while 
interrogating slaves on the plantation San Fernando, Luís Dulzaides continued to learn about the 
leadership Meliton Sotolongo and Pablo Gangá had apparently provided in organizing the 
rebellion across multiple plantations.92 
On February 28, Luís Dulzaides began interrogating slaves at La Sabanilla.93 Three of the 
declarants described a series of clandestine meetings between slaves and free people of color 
across seven to nine plantations. They all referred to Pablo Gangá and Meliton Sotolongo as 
among the main organizers. They also claimed that Pablo’s wife, the free woman Juana Carabalí, 
                                                 
88 Hernández Morejón to Dulzaides, Ingenio Atrevido, 26 February 1844, f. 1-1v, exp. 1, leg. 43, 
CM, ANC. 
89 Coleccion de fallos, cases 15, 24, 35, and 63. 
90 De la Gala to Dulzaides, Macurijes, 29 February 1844, f. 30, exp. 1, leg. 43, CM, ANC. 
91 Declarations of Joaquin Carabalí, Casémiro Gangá, Pablo Gangá de Hernández, Luis Chiquito 
Ganga, Millo Carabaly, Leon Locumy, and Diego Ganga, Lagunillas, 26-27 February 1844, f. 
2v-14v, exp. 1, leg. 43, CM, ANC. 
92 Declarations of Ylario Ganga, Miguel Mina, Nicolas Mina, Agustín Locumy, and Juan 
Bautista, Lagunillas, f. 15-23v, exp. 1, leg. 43, CM, ANC. 
93 Diligencia de pasar á tomar declaraciones, Lagunillas, 28 February 1844, f. 23v, exp. 1, leg. 




was one of the leaders, with one of them stating that “Juana was the queen here.”94 
Before leaving La Sabanilla to return to San Francisco de Paula, Luís Dulzaides 
interrogated Pablo Gangá. In a declaration remarkable for its length and level of detail, Pablo 
claimed that the plan to rebel involved eight plantations and was expanding. It was a group of 
free black men who worked in the regional economy as carpenters, muleteers, and slave drivers 
who did much of the coordinating between different plantations. Until they had been discovered, 
most of their efforts had been directed towards raising money to buy weapons. Towards that end, 
Pablo described how he had tried to collect some money from Meliton Sotolongo from the sale 
of two pigs, but Sotolongo had had no money at the time.95  
 Pablo Gangá’s testimony, so full of incriminating details, may well have been provided 
under torture. The level of specificity in the testimony nonetheless suggests that Dulzaides was 
looking for information rather than seeking simply to confirm what he already believed. Pablo’s 
answer to the fiscal’s final question is thus noteworthy. When asked about his motivations for 
rebelling, Pablo provided an answer that the secretary recorded as follows: 
The motive was the desire to be free and the hope that they would succeed, which 
had gotten everyone excited, because the libres offered to help them, telling 
them that it was necessary that they work for their liberty, that otherwise they 
would see that the whites would not do anything other than make sugar 
plantations and make them slaves, that they, the libres, even though they were 
of that class, sympathized with the slaves and for that reason were working to 
give them their freedom.96 
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Even if Dulzaides had tortured Pablo into uttering the words the secretary had thus recorded, his 
actual sentiments may not have been so removed from the answers Dulzaides had been hoping to 
find. 
If the record of Luís Dulzaides’s interrogations are ambiguous about his use of torture 
during his first investigation, accounts of other investigations are less so. With the investigatory 
process splitting off into a growing number of directions, the Escalera process had already begun 
to assume the character for which it would later become notorious. The lieutenant governor of 
the jurisdiction of Cárdenas, for instance, also coordinated his own set of investigations. Acting 
on his orders, soldiers interrogated seven slaves on the plantation of an Englishman named 
Theodore Phinney, leading to their deaths. In describing the interrogation process, Phinney later 
recalled the scene: 
Stripped naked & lashed to a ladder on the ground with a rope around each wrist 
so tight that the blood could scarcely circulate, and the whole arm drawn above 
the head till the shoulder joints fairly cracked, while the ropes were secured to 
the top of the ladder, the feet and legs stretched in the same manner, and fastened 
to the lower part with a double run around the loins and back, binding the whole 
trunk of the body immoveably to the rounds of the ladder, in this position, the 
poor negro was thought to be ready to commence his declaration!97 
Over the next few days, Luís Dulzaides conducted several more interrogations of slaves 
before turning his attention to a group of nine free people of color that Francisco Hernández 
Morejón had recently apprehended and made available to the fiscal for questioning, including 
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Meliton Sotolongo and Juana Carabalí.98 It does not appear that he tortured these prisoners 
during their interrogations. Meliton Sotolongo, for instance, denied having any knowledge of the 
plan to rebel. He even denied knowing all but a few of the people Dulzaides asked him about. Of 
the slaves from La Sabanilla, Sotolongo claimed that he only knew Pablo Gangá because he had 
purchased two pigs from the slave.99 Juana Carabalí’s testimony was similarly uncooperative. 
She denied having any knowledge of the plan to rebel and claimed that if she had known, she 
would have said something in order to protect herself and her children. She too claimed that she 
did not know any of the people Dulzaides asked her about, with the exception of Meliton 
Sotolongo, confirming that he had purchased two pigs from her husband for twenty-seven 
pesos.100 At the end of these interrogations, the nine prisoners were transferred from the 
plantation San Francisco de Paula to the prison in the city of Matanzas.101 
As the investigatory process initiated by Francisco Hernández Morejón developed, 
Captain General O’Donnell was beginning to question its efficacy. On February 22, 1844, he 
wrote to interim governor of Matanzas Fulgencio Salas welcoming reports that the countryside 
was calm and secure. He thought it noteworthy, though, that the growing number of 
investigations had yet to produce any insights into the origins of the planned insurrection. 
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Pointing to the records of some interrogations Apolinar de la Gala had conducted with free 
people of color, O’Donnell expressed doubt that the prisoners were being fully forthcoming. 
O’Donnell thus informed Salas that “when dealing with the security of the land and a crime 
against the state, any method is legal and permitted if there exists beforehand a moral conviction 
that it will produce the result that the wellbeing of all desires and demands.”102 Recognizing that 
the captain general was effectively authorizing fiscales to begin torturing free people of color, 
Salas forwarded the communication to Apolinar de la Gala the very next day.103 
Revelations of torture and pain seldom made it into the official documented record of 
interrogations against slaves and free people of color. Making note of their vestiges, however, 
was a procedural requirement. On March 12, for instance, interim Governor Salas transferred 
Agustín Jiménez back to the plantation La Andrea, where Captain Apolinar de la Gala, now 
authorized to use torture, waited to resume interrogations.104 For ten days, Jiménez remained 
absent from the documentary record, but on March 22 a soldier informed De la Gala that 
Jiménez had attempted to hang himself in his cell.105 When asked to explain his actions, Jiménez 
was recorded as saying that he was being punished because people had lied about him, and that 
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he preferred to die.106 Four days later, De la Gala’s secretary inserted a bizarre note in the case 
file, claiming that he and the fiscal had gone to Jiménez’s cell “with the objective to see if 
something had occurred to him to declare,” only to find Jiménez with his head propped up in an 
unnatural position, claiming that it bothered him to lie down.107 In the case file’s next entry, the 
same soldier who had thwarted Jiménez’s first suicide attempt reported that the prisoner was 
dead.108 No new information extracted from Jiménez appeared in the case file.  
By mid-March, two months after Captain General O’Donnell had authorized Francisco 
Hernández Morejón to use torture while conducting his extrajudicial investigation, and a month 
since he had extended that authorization to include interrogations of free people of color, the 
investigatory process now involved at least sixteen separate inquiries. Hernández Morejón had 
initiated some of these by ordering subordinates in the militia to begin investigations, as he had 
done with the investigation led by Luís Dulzaides. Others had been initiated by regional officials 
like Governor Oña and the lieutenant governor of Cárdenas.109 The impetus behind this legal 
experiment in investigating slave resistance in Matanzas had been the Military Commission’s 
failure to prevent the succession of slave rebellions that had consumed the Matanzas countryside 
in 1843. This failure had in retrospect been blamed on the tribunal’s inability to uncover what 
officials presumed to be the role played by white people and free people of color in instigating 
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those rebellions. Now that the current investigations were producing increasing evidence of their 
participation, O’Donnell informed his superiors in Madrid that it was time to gather the myriad 
investigations under the institutional umbrella of the Military Commission so that the tribunal 
could oversee the prosecution of cases dealing with what he now referred to as “the conspiracy 
of the people of color.”110 On March 20, 1844, O’Donnell decreed the establishment of a new 
section of the Military Commission in Matanzas.111 
 
The Institutional Phase of the Escalera Process 
Captain General O’Donnell’s decision to place a new section of the Military Commission in 
charge of the multiple investigations into the thwarted insurrection was due in part to his belief 
that it was time to transform them into prosecutions against what he now referred to as the 
“conspiracy of the people of color.” He was also concerned that the process itself had become 
untenable. O’Donnell’s authorization of the use of torture against free and enslaved people of 
color had enabled two distinct yet mutually reinforcing impulses. As fiscales such as Francisco 
Hernández Morejón, Apolinar de la Gala, and Luís Dulzaides tortured prisoners to obtain 
information that might propel their respective investigations, they were also aware of the 
potential for self-enrichment presented by an investigatory process that recognized their claims 
to the embargoed property of its defendants once the investigations were brought before courts to 
be judged. Francisco Ximeno, the son of a wealthy Matanzas family and college student during 
1844, recalled decades later that “bribery and the unseemly idea of obtaining the large 
honorariums that they charged, was the motive that drove those beasts [the fiscales], who 
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ruthlessly pursued their depraved intentions.”112 
Indeed, the issue of embargoed property had emerged as a pressing concern as the many 
investigations began to stress the state’s ability to sustain them financially. By March 20, the 
prisons in Matanzas were already filled with over three hundred alleged conspirators, and the 
widespread use of torture meant that many detainees needed hospitalization, engendering 
expenses that could not be ignored.113 By institutionalizing the investigatory process under the 
purview of the Military Commission, Captain General O’Donnell thus made use of the tribunal’s 
existing financial relationship with the Intendancy, one that had been negotiated over time so as 
to maintain the Intendancy’s independence from the captaincy general even as the two 
institutions cooperated to bolster the state’s promotion of insular security. This relationship had 
emerged as an imperfect solution to a problem that had never been fully resolved: with legal 
proceedings generally financed by embargoing the property of defendants, how was the state to 
enact a repressive form of justice against a population of free and enslaved people of color when 
so many of them owned little, or were property themselves? 
After Captain General Francisco Dionisio Vives had established the Military Commission 
in 1825, it had taken several years for the captaincy general, the Military Commission, and the 
Intendancy to settle on a financial accommodation that would sustain the tribunal’s operations. 
Through a combination of expense accounts and increasing the salary of the tribunal’s president, 
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the Intendancy would cover the tribunal’s operating expenses in exchange for rights to the 
embargoed property of the tribunal’s defendants.114 Though O’Donnell had initially chosen to 
bypass the Military Commission in order to unshackle the investigations from the tribunal’s 
formal adherence to law, institutionalizing the ongoing investigations under the auspices of the 
Matanzas Section of the Military Commission now inserted them into an institutional framework 
with a functioning, if imperfect, system of finance. After decreeing the establishment of the 
Matanzas Section, O’Donnell named interim governor of Matanzas Fulgencio Salas to serve as 
the section’s president and then ordered him to begin embargoing the property of defendants.115 
 The existence of an established system of finance allowed for the new tribunal’s quick 
deployment. On April 3, 1844, O’Donnell ordered the Intendancy to pay the rent for the 
Matanzas Section’s headquarters at a rate of no more than twenty-six pesos per month. Unlike 
the contentious debate that had ensued years earlier when the Military Commission and the 
captaincy general tried to get the Intendancy to pay for the tribunal’s rent, the Intendancy’s 
superintendent now promptly and unquestioningly approved the outlay.116 
 Even as these pre-existing accommodations facilitated the Matanzas Section’s quick 
deployment, they also provided a framework for dealing with unforeseen circumstances. A new 
expense, for instance, was incurred when the group of new fiscales, including Luís Dulzaides, 
had been incorporated as members of the Matanzas Section. Unlike the Military Commission’s 
fiscales, who received salaries as commissioned officers in the regular army, many of these new 
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fiscales were either retired regular officers or officers in the Matanzas militia.117 Part of 
institutionalizing the Escalera process, then, meant establishing new salaries for them. 
Furthermore, the large workload prompted O’Donnell to assign the Matanzas Section’s asesor a 
salary, a development for which the Military Commission’s original asesor had unsuccessfully 
lobbied for many years.118 As with all other expenses, the Intendancy covered these salaries and 
looked towards the embargoed property of the Matanzas Section’s defendants to recoup its 
financial outlays. 
The existing framework also allowed Captain General O’Donnell to conceive of the 
expenses generated by the investigatory process broadly. Not only would the Matanzas Section 
use the embargoed property of prisoners to reimburse the Intendancy for its operational 
expenses, but those revenues would also be used to cover the ancillary expenses incurred by the 
government because of the investigatory process, such as the cost of maintaining defendants in 
prisons and hospitals, and the anticipated rewards to be given to cooperating slaves according to 
article 38 of the Bando de buen gobierno.119 
The Intendancy was thus quite literally invested in the Escalera process. On May 10, 
1844, Claudio Martínez de Pinillos announced that the Intendancy would cover the costs of 
imprisoning and maintaining defendants of the Escalera process, citing the threat to public 
security that the conspiracy posed. This was a far greater pecuniary commitment than the 
Intendancy had ever made to Havana’s Military Commission, but as had been settled years 
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before, Martínez de Pinillos announced that the Intendancy would recoup its financial outlay 
through the embargoed property of defendants.120 
The rebellions of 1843 and the revelations of the investigatory phase of the Escalera 
process pointing to a vast conspiracy linking anti-slavery and anti-imperial forces in common 
cause forged new levels of cooperation between the leading institutions of colonial governance. 
Because Captain General O’Donnell was taking an assertive role marshalling the resources of the 
state to confront this threat, and because the region most likely to be affected by a general slave 
uprising was also the center of Cuba’s sugar economy, the Intendancy had an interest in helping 
O’Donnell’s efforts to restore security and tranquility. Its cooperation was made easier by 
O’Donnell’s decision to deploy the Military Commission for this task, since the tribunal already 
had a financial relationship with the Intendancy. Though the Matanzas Section of the Military 
Commission would have to expand its operations, given the scale of the investigatory process, 
the Intendancy anticipated that the property of prisoners caught up in the process would yield the 
necessary revenues and reimbursements. 
But following the law and paying for the law, as it turned out, were two quite different 
things. With so many cases and defendants to deal with, any delays in prosecutions meant that 
defendants had to be maintained in prisons and hospitals for extended periods of time, thus 
incurring further expenses. Recognizing the importance of prosecutorial expediency, then, 
Captain General O’Donnell had asked auditor de guerra Antonio Armero on March 17 how to 
expedite the prosecution of these investigations.121 Armero had replied with six 
recommendations, the first one of which had been to institutionalize the process by establishing 
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the Matanzas Section.122 The other five recommendations had attended to legal procedures and 
were meant to streamline prosecutions to shorten the time it took to bring them before the 
Matanzas Section’s Consejo de Guerra for final judgement. The tribunal would decide on a 
system of classifications for crimes and punishments to quickly determine appropriate sentences. 
Only the bare minimum of witness testimony would be obtained. The practice of interrogating 
prisoners in groups would be kept at a minimum. Defense counsels, who were selected from lists 
of officers in the militia and regular army, would only be given twenty-four hours to review case 
files and would be allowed to submit their defenses orally before the consejo. And finally, each 
prosecution would be judged independently.123 On March 20, O’Donnell had given his approval 
to Armero’s recommendations as he decreed the establishment of the Matanzas Section.124 
On March 31, President Salas wrote to Captain General O’Donnell with his own 
recommendation for streamlining prosecutions. He noted that according to proper interrogation 
procedures, fiscales issued formal charges against defendants during their final interrogation 
session, known as the confession. Considering the number of defendants the Matanzas Section 
would be prosecuting, Salas identified this practice as a procedural bottleneck. He thus suggested 
that prosecutions could be further streamlined by omitting the issuing of formal charges 
altogether, as the crimes each defendant would be accused of would have already emerged 
during previous interrogations.125 In response, auditor de guerra Armero argued that omitting 
formal charges was too much of a deviation from the procedural requirements mandated by law. 
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He suggested, though, that they could accomplish the same ends by authorizing fiscales to issue 
formal charges when they first questioned prisoners.126 This method for streamlining 
prosecutions turned out to be of limited efficacy, as so many prisoners had already been 
questioned according to the unaltered procedure, meaning that they still needed to be formally 
charged.127 When presented with this dilemma, O’Donnell could only reply that fiscales should 
nonetheless make every effort to conclude these cases as quickly as possible.128 
 Over a month later, after the Matanzas Section’s Consejo de Guerra had already passed 
judgement on eight prosecutions, Salas informed the captain general of another bottleneck 
slowing down the conclusion of prosecutions.129 In military proceedings, all defendants had a 
right to defense counsel, and it was up to the owners of enslaved defendants to select a defense 
counsel for their slaves from a pre-determined list. The Matanzas Section was having trouble, 
however, tracking down many slaveholders, thus preventing fiscales from referring cases up to 
the tribunal’s consejo in a timely manner.130 Advising O’Donnell, Armero recommended that in 
these cases the síndicos procuradores of the jurisdictions of Matanzas and Cárdenas, appointed 
officials responsible for representing slaves in some legal matters, could be asked to select 
defense counsels for enslaved defendants.131 
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  Captain General O’Donnell was even willing to incur additional expenses if necessary to 
speed up the process. By May 5, after fiscales had already brought three cases before the 
tribunal’s Consejo de Guerra, President Salas identified yet another problem. After the consejo 
passed sentences for a given prosecution, the captain general was required to give his approval 
on an individual basis for defendants destined for imprisonment on the island. The required 
paperwork for each individual sentence included a copy of the prisoner’s sentencing report. Each 
sentencing report, however, attended to a collective prosecution, and thus included a list of all 
the prisoners, often numbering in the dozens, all the charges levied against them, and then all of 
the sentences. These documents often took up several, if not dozens, of handwritten pages. Salas 
pointed out that the tribunal did not employ enough secretaries to make copies of the sentences 
for each individual prisoner. Since delays in doing so meant that sentences could not be executed 
in a timely manner, meaning that the prisons would continue to be congested, Salas suggested 
that the tribunal commission the production of printed copies of each sentencing report. The cost 
of this, he continued, would be added to the court costs of each prosecution, which would be 
recovered from the embargoed property of defendants.132 On May 6, 1844, auditor de guerra 
Martínez advised the captain general that the circumstances required this added expense, and two 
days later O’Donnell gave his consent.133 
 From the Military Commission’s founding in 1825, the adherence to legal procedure had 
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undercut the expectation that the tribunal would be a purveyor of swift justice.134 Even during 
this moment of apparent emergency, when the existential stakes posed by the conspiracy tested 
the state’s ability to contend with the threat, the law maintained its irresistible ability to slow 
things down. During the investigatory phase of the Escalera process, when the hidden knowledge 
of free and enslaved people of color was viewed as the key to the process, fiscales had been 
authorized to use torture to uncover evidence of the conspiracy. During the institutional phase of 
the process, however, it appears that legal scripts could be tinkered with, but not fully or visibly 
abrogated. 
 
Judicial Violence, Racial Plunder, and the Consolidation of Sovereign Authority 
Despite being brought into line with the Military Commission’s administrative and legal 
practices, the Escalera process maintained its extra-legal sanction of the use of torture against 
free and enslaved people of color into its institutional phase. Fiscal Juan Costa, an officer in the 
regular army whom Francisco Hernández Morejón had charged with investigating reports of a 
planned insurrection in the rural district of Lagunillas just before the establishment of the 
Matanzas Section, for instance, was said to have killed forty-two free people of color and fifty-
four slaves during his interrogations.135 The imprisonment and torture of free and enslaved 
people of color also became regular parts of urban life in cities like Matanzas and Cárdenas. A 
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man named George Bell, who was in Cárdenas at the time, wrote to British consul to Cuba 
Joseph Crawford about hearing whippings every night.136 Writing decades later, Dolores María 
de Ximeno y Cruz, niece of Francisco Ximeno, recalled her grandmother’s descriptions of 
processions of prisoners marking the streets with their blood.137 
Though conspicuous and rampant, this sort of violence was also deployed with a certain 
selectivity. On April 12, Luís Dulzaides visited Juana Carabalí in a Matanzas prison to take her 
confession. As she had done during her preliminary declaration, Juana denied having any 
knowledge of the planned rebellion. Despite charging her with participation in the plan to rebel 
and repeatedly challenging her denials, Dulzaides could not get Juana to confess. For her part, 
Juana claimed that all accusations against her and her husband Pablo Gangá were lies. She added 
that she would never have allowed the meetings she was accused of attending to take place in her 
hut, on account of her children and because she feared the consequences.138  
 Dulzaides continued taking confessions from defendants until Meliton Sotolongo and 
Pablo Gangá were among his last remaining prisoners. On April 23, he traveled to the hospital in 
Matanzas, where the two men were being held. According to the record, Sotolongo denied 
having anything to do with the rebellion and asserted, once again, that his only interaction with 
Pablo Gangá had been related to the sale of two pigs.139 Pablo also denied having anything to do 
with the rebellion. He claimed that he had only admitted to having been the leader of the planned 
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insurrection on La Sabanilla during his preliminary declaration because at the time he had 
already been denounced by others. Pablo then proceeded to answer all of Dulzaides’ follow-up 
questions with denials. He denied travelling between plantations organizing the rebellion, 
hosting clandestine meetings in his hut with Juana Carabalí, collecting money, distributing 
weapons, and a host of other allegations made against him. There was one question, however, 
that Pablo answered in the affirmative. When asked if he knew what the penalty was for 
participating in the plan to rebel, Pablo perhaps recalled the fate suffered by his fellow rebels 
during the Military Commission’s prosecution of the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825, stating that 
he was aware that the penalty was imprisonment or death.140 
 Subsequent accounts of the Escalera process often recalled the ways fiscales tortured 
defendants until their confessions conformed with the fiscal’s expectations. According to the 
college student Francisco Ximeno, “no one is ignorant of the means employed and the horrors 
committed in their substantiation, using the most cruel torments to extract declarations, which for 
the most part were reduced to a yes or a no, in response to the tricky questions of the fiscal.”141 It 
is noteworthy, then, that Luís Dulzaides could not obtain admissions of guilt from Juana 
Carabalí, Meliton Sotolongo, and Pablo Gangá. In the case of Juana, it is likely that Dulzaides 
discounted her significance because of her gender. In his final report, which included his 
sentencing recommendations, Dulzaides found Juana guilty in the third degree. While he 
recommended that other defendants assigned the same degree of culpability be deported from the 
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island, he did not recommend a punishment for Juana.142 And when the tribunal’s Consejo de 
Guerra passed final judgement on the case, they absolved Juana of all guilt, citing her three 
young children.143 
 If Luís Dulzaides had been inclined to spare Juana Carabalí the use of torture because she 
was a woman, that was not an indication that he was less inclined to torture prisoners than were 
the other fiscales. Richard Kimball, a lawyer from New York who was visiting Matanzas at the 
time, recounted how Dulzaides was said to have “had a free negro placed in the jail in what is 
called ‘campaign-stocks,’ which is a most distressing position of the body, the arms being 
arranged so as to hold the legs; and thus placed, ordered him to be whipped unmercifully, until 
he should confess.”144 His failure to extract confessions from Pablo Gangá and Meliton 
Sotolongo, then, might be explained by his inability to impose further pain upon them. At the 
time of their confessions, Pablo and Sotolongo were being hospitalized, possibly due to injuries 
they had incurred under torture. Their bodies already ravaged, Dulzaides may not have had the 
option to coerce the desired confessions without killing them. In that little space, too broken to 
be broken any further, they resisted their captors one last time. 
 Luís Dulzaides submitted his final report on July 15. He found Pablo Gangá and Meliton 
Sotolongo guilty in the first degree of culpability and recommended that they be executed.145 On 
July 22, the Matanzas Section’s Consejo de Guerra voted to follow Dulzaides’ recommendations. 
Meliton Sotolongo never made it to his execution, as he died in the hospital on September 4. 
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Authorities executed Pablo Gangá on September 10 in front of slaves from La Sabanilla and 
surrounding plantations. They then made a slave from La Sabanilla cut off Pablo’s head so it 
could be displayed in front of the plantation. The witnessing slaves were then made to proceed 
past Pablo’s decapitated body as they were led back into the Matanzas countryside.146  
 With the Matanzas Section’s assumption of control, the investigation into the poet 
Gabriel de la Concepción Valdés also went into high gear. Between March 28 and June 23, he 
was interrogated twelve times as part of an investigatory process that would eventually envelop 
forty-eight defendants, most of them free people of color, and which would claim to have 
produced definitive proof that former British consul to Cuba David Turnbull had been the 
mastermind behind a vast conspiracy of free and enslaved people of color aiming to abolish 
slavery and overthrow Spain’s dominion over the island.147 Though the record of these 
interrogations say nothing conclusive about the use of torture, Valdés’s inability to continue 
answering questions owing to his physical state was alluded to on a few occassions.148 The 
experience of one of his associates who was also detained by the Matanzas Section, however, 
became the subject of rumor and gossip. According to Richard Kimball, “Don Mariano F___ 
brought on himself the execration and odium of the whole city of Matanzas for his barbarous 
treatment of Andrew Dodge, a colored man, born free, who was generally beloved and esteemed, 
and was the owner of a considerable property. He was tied to the ladder and flogged on three 
different occasions, but never avowed what he was accused of; and finally he was executed, in 
defiance even of those sanguinary laws of old, which instituted the ordeal of torture in ages 
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 Indeed, it was in the apprehension, torture, and eventual execution of free people of color 
like Andrew Dodge that the originary logic of the Escalera process, in which colonial officials 
used a state of emergency to justify an exceptional mode of repressive justice in the adjudication 
of free and enslaved people of color, converged with the administrative requirements of colonial 
governance, in which any escalation in the state’s ability to contend with threats to Cuban 
slavery and Spanish empire had to be paid for.150 In the final analysis, the exercise of sovereign 
authority was contingent on institutional cooperation and financial solvency. A dentist, Andrew 
Dodge owned considerable property at the time of his apprehension, including several plots of 
land in and around the city of Matanzas and four slaves.151 His holdings, however, paled in 
comparison with those of his brother-in-law Santiago Pimienta, who was also arrested as one of 
the associates of Gabriel de la Concepción Valdés. Pimienta owned a ranch occupying almost 
twenty caballerías of land and seventeen slaves. Following his execution along with Valdés, 
Andrew Dodge, and eight others on June 28, 1844, Pimienta’s total holdings were valued at 
33,977 pesos.152 
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 Free people of color such as Gabriel de la Concepción Valdés, Andrew Dodge, and 
Santiago Pimienta were the objects of scrutiny, but also the inquiry’s core source of revenue, 
with claims to their property emerging as the lynchpin unifying the motivations and actions of 
the captaincy general and the Intendancy.153 This dynamic came to the fore on June 21, when the 
Matanzas Section placed an announcement in the local newspaper that it would be auctioning 
twenty-one slaves of both sexes and of various ages. This news alarmed the Intendancy’s 
representatives in Matanzas, as they had not been informed of the auction and had yet to receive 
any reimbursements from the Matanzas Section for the considerable expenses they had already 
incurred.154 
Deliberations within the Intendancy determined that the Matanzas Section was obligated 
to turn over to them the proceeds from the auction. When presented with the claim, President 
Salas consulted with the Matanzas Section’s asesor, who replied on August 27 with a long 
opinion that boiled down to one key point. As he saw it, the Matanzas Section was a different 
institution than the Havana-based Military Commission and was thus not bound to its 
arrangement with the Intendancy, developed decades earlier, for financing its operations.155 
This dispute between the Intendancy and the Matanzas Section developed until Claudio 
Martínez de Pinillos elevated the matter to Captain General O’Donnell on September 25. In 
proffering his opinion, auditor de guerra Armero framed his response historically, recounting the 
                                                 
153 For more on the economic position held by some prominent free people of color in cities like 
Havana and Matanzas, see Deschamps Chapeaux, El negro en la economía habanera del siglo 
XIX. 
154 José García to Antonio García, Matanzas, 30 July 1844, no folio, exp. 14, leg. 42, AP, ANC. 
155 Armero to O’Donnell, Havana, 12 October 1844, no folio, exp. 14, leg. 42, AP, ANC. The 




series of royal orders and decrees defining the Military Commission’s financial relationship with 
the Intendancy, a chain of events that had culminated with the tribunal’s original asesor, José 
Ildefonso Suárez, leading tribunal officials in renouncing their rights to the embargoed property 
of their defendants in favor of the treasury. Since this accommodation between the Military 
Commission and the Intendancy had made possible O’Donnell’s rapid deployment of the 
Matanzas Section and was the only foreseeable way to sustain the colonial government’s ability 
to facilitate its numerous prosecutions, Armero argued the government had to be adaptable in its 
implementation even as the accommodation had not specifically taken into consideration the 
creation of an independent section of the tribunal. He concluded that “the section of the Military 
Commission established ad-hoc in Matanzas should govern itself by the same rules as its 
headquarters, according to which its president, [members of the Consejo de Guerra], its asesor, 
fiscales, and other functionaries must act!”156 He thus recommended that the governor of 
Matanzas be placed in charge of auctioning property embargoed during the Escalera process and 
that those revenues should be deposited in the royal treasury. O’Donnell approved of Armero’s 
recommendation and then informed all pertinent parties.157 What had once been a financial 
accommodation that the Intendancy had been forced to accept and which had proven to be 
disappointing for asesor José Ildefonso Suárez and other Military Commission officials in 1831, 
was now the most important administrative component structuring the colonial government’s 
ability to contend with the massive challenge posed by the Conspiracy of La Escalera.  
                                                 
156 Armero to O’Donnell, Havana, 12 October 1844, no folio, exp. 14, leg. 42, AP, ANC. “la 
sección de la Comision militar establecide ad-hoc en Matanzas, deber regirse por las mismas 
reglas que su matriz en punto á que su Presidente, vocales, asesor, fiscales y demás ministros 
generales actúan!” 




During the Military Commission’s first decades in operation, it had occasionally 
prosecuted high-profile cases of slave rebellion and political dissent. For the most part, however, 
it had contended with a steady stream of prosecutions dealing with everyday forms of crime. 
Because the tribunal was perceived as promoting social, economic, and political stability, the 
Intendancy thus learned to accommodate the modest financial burden posed by the tribunal.158 
As the Escalera process grew in scale, however, officials with the Intendancy found themselves 
fiercely defending a financial relationship with the tribunal that only decades before they had 
grudgingly accepted. Because the Matanzas Section of the Military Commission clearly fell 
within the purview of the captaincy general, the Intendancy could only turn to the executive to 
make its case. And because the state’s ability to sustain the Escalera process depended on the 
Intendancy’s ability to cover its expenses, it was in Captain General O’Donnell’s interests to 
compel the Matanzas Section to turn over the revenues it generated from auctioning off the 
embargoed property of its defendants. In doing so, however, the Intendancy diminished some of 
its autonomy and independence from the captaincy general and a precedent was being set. 
 
*** 
The Matanzas Section of the Military Commission continued prosecuting cases until January 22, 
1845, when its Consejo de Guerra issued its last judgment.159 According to one tabulation from 
March 1, 1845, which was based on the published sentencing reports produced by the Matanzas 
Section, the tribunal issued judgements on 3,361 individuals across seventy-one prosecutions, 
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including 72 white people, 2,364 free people of color, and 925 slaves.160 According to another 
tabulation lacking a clear indication of its source material, the tribunal issued judgments on just 
11 women of color. It is unclear whether these women were free or enslaved.161 
Of the 3,361 individuals who were judged by the Consejo de Guerra of the Matanzas 
Section of the Military Commission, 1,583, or almost half, were acquitted, including 59 white 
people, 1,248 free people of color, and 276 slaves. For a legal process that had focused on 
questioning and prosecuting free and enslaved people of color, it is understandable why the 
tribunal would eventually acquit most white people caught up in the process. Indeed, the tribunal 
only sentenced 3 white people to death, 7 white people to imprisonment either in Cuba or in 
Africa, and another 3 to exile. Considering the value of slaves to their owners, it also makes 
sense that the tribunal would have refrained from sentencing all but those deemed to be the 
principle leaders of the conspiracy to imprisonment and execution. In addition to the 276 slaves 
who were acquitted, the tribunal sentenced 19 slaves to corporal punishment and 356 slaves to 
“imprisonment” on their plantations, meaning that of the 925 slaves judged by the tribunal, 651, 
or 70 percent, were returned to their owners. And even though the process eventually turned to 
the property of free people of color to pay for its inflating costs, it is notable that almost 53 
percent of free people of color judged by the tribunal were acquitted.162  For all the ways the 
Escalera process came to articulate the violence of plantation slavery in a legal process aimed at 
defending Cuban slavery and Spanish empire, it was not entirely overwhelmed by it, leaving 
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room for pragmatic and procedural considerations to affect the outcome of prosecutions.  
For its victims, however, the Escalera process was certainly overwhelming. The tribunal 
sentenced 37 free people of color and 46 slaves to death, while 636 free people of color were 
sentenced to imprisonment either in Cuba or in Spanish prisons in North Africa, and 567 slaves 
were sentenced to imprisonment in Cuba, Africa, or on their plantations. Furthermore, the 
tribunal sentenced 443 free people of color and 17 slaves to exile.163 
Still, the tabulated outcomes of the Escalera process only reveal a small portion of the 
drama that had unfolded. For victims like Pabló Gangá and the poet Gabriel de la Concepción 
Valdés, the tribunal’s accumulated sentences gave context to their involvement in a judicial 
process that not only consumed their lives, but also put an end to years and decades of escalation 
in the struggle and organization against Cuban slavery by Africans and the African-descended.164 
For other victims like Agustín Jiménez and the countless dead who did not even survive to be 
judged, these numbers masked the true extent of the horrors inflicted in 1844. For Captain 
General O’Donnell, however, the tabulated outcomes of the Escalera process substantiated a 
prefigured truth, that foreign abolitionists had been working in concert with free people of color 
to incite the enslaved to rise up against Cuban slavery and Spanish empire. During the Matanzas 
Section’s prosecution of Gabriel de la Concepción Valdés and his associates, the tribunal’s fiscal 
had concluded:  
There is no doubt that Mr. David Turnbull, the representative of Great Britain 
on this island, as consul of that nation, a friend and ally of ours, abusing highly 
and mightily the confidence which she placed in him, either on his own, or united 
with others of his colleagues, was, if not the one who conceived of the 
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destructive idea, at least the initial motive and source from which the present 
plan of conspiracy emanated.165  
Aside from some diplomatic back and forth between Spain and England, it does not appear that 
much resulted from this conclusion.166 
 Even if David Turnbull remained beyond Captain General O’Donnell’s grasp, the process 
itself engendered other rewards that may not have afforded the drama of La Escalera a similar 
sense of closure, but which had far more significant consequences in decades to come. Two 
events are emblematic. Ever since the Spanish Empire had committed to the growth and 
development of Cuban slavery, metropolitan and colonial officials had wanted to institute slave 
regulations to mitigate against the risks of importing increasing numbers of enslaved Africans. 
Indeed, as the metropolitan government began liberalizing the slave trade to Cuba in 1789, it also 
prepared a set of slave regulations known as the Real Cédula Instrucción circular sobre la 
educación, trato y ocupaciones de los esclavos en todos sus dominios de Indias e islas Filipinas 
with the intention of promoting security and stability on plantations. Through regulations that, 
among other things, limited the type of corrective punishments slaves could receive, the Real 
Cédula Instrucción aimed in part to ameliorate the conditions of enslavement so that slaves were 
less inclined to resist. With the anticipated revenues of Cuban slavery assuming increasing 
importance in the financial designs of the Spanish Empire, and with Cuban planters claiming that 
any restrictions on their ability to physically punish their slaves would undermine the coercive 
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foundations of the entire institution, the metropolitan government suspended the Real Cédula 
Instrucción in 1794.167 
 In 1842, when Captain General Gerónimo Valdés had attempted to institute similar slave 
regulations, Cuban planters had again voiced opposition to any attempts to limit their ability to 
physically punish their slaves. Because of the Spanish Empire’s continued reliance on Cuban 
revenues, Valdés had no choice but to let the regulations go unenforced.168 
With the events of 1844, the issue of plantation security carried with it a renewed 
urgency. As others had attempted before, Captain General O’Donnell issued his own set of slave 
regulations. Unlike his predecessor, O’Donnell issued his regulations from a position of elevated 
prestige and authority, as he was being credited with saving Cuba from catastrophe. Rather than 
use that prestige to force Cuban planters to accept the type of slave regulations they had rejected 
in the past, however, O’Donnell instead reconfigured the regulations themselves so they now 
authorized slaveholders to use “the full extent of their domestic authority, conceded to them by 
law,” to punish slaves in the maintenance of plantation discipline.169 In doing so, he brought to 
the administration of colonial governance, albeit in a very specific context, the innovation at the 
heart of the Escalera process, which authorized fiscales to use the corrective measures of 
plantation slavery when interrogating free and enslaved people of color in formal legal processes.   
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 The more lasting consequence of the Escalera process on the administration of colonial 
governance was revealed in the way O’Donnell’s growing personal prestige augmented the 
captaincy general’s sovereign authority within a division of governing powers that had 
historically afforded institutions like the Intendancy high degrees of autonomy and influence. On 
November 2, 1849, a royal order from Spain stipulated that owing to budgetary concerns the 
Military Commission’s president was no longer to receive the supplementary funds to cover the 
tribunal’s rent and other expenses that his office had been assigned in 1829.170 The royal order 
also stated that the Intendancy would no longer cover the tribunal’s expenses and that the 
tribunal would have to make due with whatever revenues it raised from the embargoed property 
of its defendants. This royal order effectively undid the financial relationship between the 
Intendancy and the Military Commission that Captain General Vives had forged during the 
1820s and that the Intendancy had argued to defend in 1844. On February 6, 1850, the 
Intendancy’s superintendent informed the captain general that the Intendancy saw no reason not 
to comply with the order. Three weeks later the captain general replied that he was using the 
“extraordinary powers” that had been given to captains generals in 1825 to disregard the royal 
order. 171 If in previous years the Intendancy might have raised objections, in the post-Escalera 
era, relations of power had been reconfigured such that captains general could increasingly 
govern with impunity. 
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Isle of Tranquility: The Consolidation of Sovereign Authority, 1848-1856 
 
 
In early July 1848, Pedro Gabriel Sánchez, a wealthy planter and resident of the city of Trinidad, 
learned that his son had become involved in a conspiracy to gain independence from Spain 
through an armed insurrection. Though it is unclear how he felt about his son’s cause at the time, 
he certainly feared for his son’s life. This was not an unfounded concern that “something” might 
happen, but a certitude that this insurrectionary movement did not stand a chance against the 
combined force of the colonial state and the Spanish army. On July 4, Sánchez thus denounced 
the conspiracy to local authorities.1 
Four years after the events of 1844, the island’s residents were now well aware of the 
colonial state’s capacity to act in the interest of insular security in a conspicuous, decisive, and 
overwhelming manner. For free and enslaved people of color, the Escalera process had brought 
an end to a decades-long cycle of organization and struggle against Cuban slavery.2 And though 
Leopoldo O’Donnell’s supporters and indeed the captain general himself could write to Spain 
about the subsequent state of “tranquility” on the island, others looked at the peace that followed 
Escalera and saw a “tranquility of terror,” the type of terror that could provoke a father to 
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denounce his son.3 
The conditions that had made it possible for the colonial state to exert itself during the 
Escalera process also evidenced its near-failure to shield the island from the threats and ruptures 
accompanying the growth in Cuban slavery. During the Military Commission’s adjudication of 
the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825, the tribunal’s asesor, José Ildefonso Suárez, and Captain 
General Vives’s auditor de guerra, Felipe Martínez, had denounced allegations of the discovery 
of new conspiracies independent of the rebellion. They argued that such rumors could take on a 
life of their own and undermine public confidence in the government’s ability to maintain order.4 
Following the Escalera process of 1844, during which the apparent threat posed by the 
conspiracy had been matched by the ferocity of the state’s response, supporters of Cuban slavery 
began to doubt the state’s ability to maintain the institution, critics of slavery increasingly feared 
a future that continued to rely on the importation of enslaved Africans, and a growing number of 
the island’s white residents questioned whether the control offered by Spanish dominion was 
worth its many costs. 
 One group of men channeled their doubts and frustrations through an association they 
called El Club de la Habana. Though El Club’s members were ambivalent on the issue of 
slavery, they were unified in their desire to see Cuba annexed by the United States. Meeting in 
the Havana residence of the prominent planter Domingo de Aldama, the association’s members 
included disaffected planters, merchants, professionals, and intellectuals. Miguel de Aldama, son 
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of Domingo de Aldama, had himself witnessed the early moments of the Escalera process in late 
1843.5 His friend and club member Cirilo Villaverde had been an active participant in the literary 
gatherings hosted by Miguel de Aladama’s brother-in-law Domingo del Monte, had penned the 
1839 anti-slavery novel Cecilia Valdés, and had been an acquaintance of the poet Gabriel de la 
Concepción Valdés.6  
By June 1848, the members of El Club had taken their plan to effect Cuba’s annexation 
to the United States to a fairly advanced stage. They had tasked their associate John O’Sullivan, 
the North American journalist and coiner of the phrase “manifest destiny,” with presenting US 
President Polk with a proposition whereby Cubans would reimburse the US up to $100 million if 
the president offered to purchase Cuba from Spain.7 Another representative worked to promote 
the idea of Cuban annexation in the US press, while yet another had been sent to offer William J. 
Worth, a US general who had just served in the Mexican-American War, $3 million to recruit an 
army and invade Cuba.8 
Another center of discontent emerged in the city of Cienfuegos. It was there that former 
president of the Military Commission General Narciso López had settled after Leopoldo 
O’Donnell’s arrival in Cuba had prompted his resignation. By 1846, López had assembled a 
circle of confidants around the idea of realizing Cuba’s separation from Spain through an armed 
insurrection, including José María Sánchez Iznaga, whose father, Pedro Gabriel Sánchez, would 
                                                 
5 See Chapter 4.  
6 Herminio Portell Vilá, Narciso López y su época (Havana: Cutural, S.A., 1930), 1:243; Tom 
Chaffin, Fatal Glory: Narciso López and the First Clandestine U.S. War Against Cuba 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996), 13. 
7 Chaffin, Fatal Glory, 14-15. 




eventually denounce the conspiracy. At first in coordination with El Club de la Habana and then 
on his own, López would carry the annexationist logic to its military conclusion, leading two 
filibustering expeditions to Cuba in 1850 and 1851. Though these invasions were abysmal 
failures, with the latter costing the lives of López and many of his men, their success had been 
premised on white residents of the “ever-faithful isle” fighting for a separation from Spain, and 
thus represented a seemingly more insidious threat to Spanish sovereignty over Cuba than the 
Conspiracy of La Escalera had ever posed.  
Well aware of the example set by the Haitian Revolution, and in particular the 1804 
massacre of many of Haiti’s white residents ordered by Jean-Jacques Dessalines, agents of 
Spanish sovereignty dispersed throughout the political, economic, and social institutions of 
Cuban slave society had long been unified in their developing sense of the threat posed by the 
island’s growing population of free and enslaved people of color.9 Acts of black resistance to 
Cuban slavery and Spanish empire such as the Aponte rebellion of 1812, the Guamacaro 
rebellion of 1825, the Conspiracy of La Escalera of the early 1840s, and all the less notable acts 
of resistance in between, could thus be seen as threats, not only to the political order of the 
Spanish Empire, but to the lives of all of Cuba’s white residents. In the most basic formulation, 
free and enslaved people of color were thus “natural enemies of society,” to invoke the phrase of 
Montesquieu, who, as often appeared in the testimonial record of the Escalera process, sought 
nothing more than “to kill all the whites and take over the land.”10 
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Narciso López, by contrast, had commanded troops in the Spanish army and had 
governed citizens of Spain. While most of the men he convinced to participate in his expeditions 
were foreign to Cuba, the masses who would have constituted his imagined revolutionary force 
in 1850 and 1851 were white property owners. In responding to the threats posed by López’s 
filibustering expeditions, then, the colonial government had a much more complicated task than 
merely combating an insurrectionary force through military means. Rather than defending 
Spanish sovereignty from the “natural enemies of society,” the Spanish Empire had to defend 
Spanish sovereignty from its citizens and its subjects.11 
In this vital endeavor, the Military Commission proved to be essential, not necessarily for 
what it did, but for what it enabled. Since its inception in 1825, the tribunal had served as the 
captaincy general’s primary juridical tool for contending with threats to Spanish sovereignty. 
Though its inclusion within the institutional makeup of the colonial government had proven to be 
disruptive, the tribunal had expanded to adjudicate free and enslaved people of color, everyday 
forms a crime, and acts of political dissent. Even though the tribunal’s formal adherence to legal 
process often hindered its ability to enact the type of swift, decisive, and repressive justice its 
functionaries may have preferred, it had emerged as the only juridical institution capable of 
acting on those interests in a financially viable way.12 When the investigatory phase of the 
Escalera process grew to encompass an unsustainable number of investigations, then, it was the 
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Military Commission that assumed its stewardship. While this had the effect of turning an ad hoc 
process responding to a perceived crisis into an administrative matter, it also channeled the 
leeway and discretion enjoyed by the Escalera process in a time of emergency into a mode of 
governance that afforded increasing levels of formal and informal deference to the captaincy 
general.13 
When Narciso López invaded Cuba for a second time in 1851, then, Captain General José 
de la Concha’s military reaction was accompanied by a juridical response that was so swift and 
decisive that it was over before anyone could really take stock. Though the Military Commission 
lacked a formal role, De la Concha relied on tribunal officials to carry out his orders. In this 
moment, the Military Commission finally achieved its greatest potential, not just as a juridical 
instrument of executive authority, but as executive authority itself. 
In 1852, De la Concha was recalled to Spain after he had expressed some criticisms of 
the metropolitan government.14 The former captain general took the opportunity to author a 
sweeping review of the history and present state of colonial governance.15 By his determination, 
the populace’s unwillingness to accept the opportunity Narciso López had offered them and their 
assistance in the response to López’s second expedition in particular signaled that the time was 
opportune to enact key reforms throughout the colonial government whose impact would 
certainly be disruptive, but which Cuba’s populace would now be willing to accept. A principal 
component of his proposed reforms focused on the administration of justice in Cuba, with special 
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attention directed towards the form and function of the lower courts in the ordinary jurisdiction. 
In the ways they outlined a system of lower courts staffed by professional jurists who enjoyed 
salaries and were appointed by the central government, these reforms were in line with proposed 
reforms to the administration of justice put forward by liberals and absolutists, governing 
officials and civilians, stretching back to the times of the short-lived trienio liberal and the 1812 
Constitution of Cádiz. 
 José de la Concha returned to the captaincy general of Cuba in 1854 over concerns that 
his predecessor Juan de la Pezuela was not sufficiently attentive to the continued importance of 
slavery in Cuba.16 The next year he enacted a sweeping set of reforms to the administration of 
justice in Cuba as outlined in a royal decree approved by the Ministry of State on January 30, 
1855.17 After enacting the reforms outlined in the royal decree, Cuba possessed the type of 
professional judiciary that reformers, including De la Concha, had long sought. Though these 
reforms were meant to relieve the ordinary jurisdiction of the abuses and corruption that had long 
been sources of concern, De la Concha acknowledged far more fundamental implications when 
he concluded their enactment by abolishing the Military Commission, as he no longer deemed 
the tribunal necessary for the promotion of insular security. In doing so, De la Concha signaled 
that the legal intervention into colonial governance begun in 1825 by granting captains general 
the exceptional powers afforded to governors of cities under siege and the establishment of the 
Military Commission had finally come to fruition. 
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Narciso López and the “Tranquility of Terror” 
In February 1848, a popular uprising in France responding to rampant unemployment, food 
scarcity, restricted government, and a limited franchise forced the abdication of King Louis 
Philippe and resulted in the founding of the Second Republic. Though some of the reforms of 
France’s second republican period, such as a new constitution and an expanded franchise, were 
short-lived, other reforms endured. On April 27, 1848, slavery was finally abolished in French 
colonies.18 
Cubans whose interests were aligned with maintaining slavery feared that the revolution 
in France would spread to Spain along with its abolitionist impulse. In a meeting in Havana 
responding to the news from Europe, leading figures met to discuss and make plans. Newspaper 
accounts reported that superintendent of the Intendancy Claudio Martínez de Pinillos had been 
present at the meeting and had advised that they accept a potential republican government in 
Spain, while Captain General Federico Roncali was purported to have proclaimed his loyalty to 
the monarchy and his intention to disregard any orders coming from a future republican 
government. Another man present at the meeting was Narciso López.19 
López had been born into a wealthy merchant family in Caracas in 1798. At the onset of 
the wars for independence, he had initially sided with the patriots before joining the Spanish 
army in 1814. Over the next nine years, he served with distinction, attaining the rank of colonel 
before withdrawing to Cuba after the defeat of Spanish forces in 1823. Four years later, after the 
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metropolitan government had abandoned plans to reconquer the American mainland, López 
traveled to Spain. For years he maintained a low profile, until conservative discontent over the 
ascension of Isabela II to the throne following Fernando VII’s death in 1833 led to the first 
Carlist War. With a new war to fight, López joined the side of Queen Isabela II and Queen 
Regent María Cristina. He served under General Geronimo Valdés, another veteran of the wars 
on the American continent. It is said that he defeated Carlist cavalry officer Carlos O’Donnell, 
Leopoldo O’Donnell’s brother, in hand to hand combat. During the conflict, he attained the rank 
of general.20 
As the war concluded, López aligned himself with the group of progressive liberals who 
had propelled Baldomero Espartero to power and for a time he served as the military governor of 
Madrid. When Espartero named Geronimo Valdés as captain general of Cuba, López followed 
his long-time commanding officer back to the island. He served briefly as lieutenant governor of 
Matanzas before taking up the position of commandant general of the island’s central 
department. López then returned to Havana to assume the presidency of the Military 
Commission on October 27, 1842, overseeing among other cases the tribunal’s prosecution of 
the Bemba rebellion of 1843. With the change in Spanish government occasioned by the defeat 
of Espartero and the ascension of moderate liberals to power in 1843, Leopoldo O’Donnell 
assumed the captaincy general of Cuba. Finding himself on the wrong side of the political 
contestations that had resulted in the change in colonial governance, López was relieved of the 
Military Commission’s presidency and retreated from public life. After starting a bakery 
business that failed, López tried his hand at sugar cultivation near Cienfuegos and coffee 
cultivation in the region of Pinar del Río before returning to Cienfuegos to enter the mining 
                                                 





Though it remains unclear when and for what reasons Narciso López began to consider 
the possibility of leading an armed insurrection against Spanish control over Cuba, it does appear 
that by 1846 he was well on his way to drawing together a group of supporters and confidants 
around the idea, including a young man named José María Sánchez Iznaga. Whether the goal of 
the planned insurrection was the establishment of an independent Cuban republic, immediate 
annexation to the United States as a slave state, or the former as a path towards the latter, also 
remains unclear. What seems to be without dispute, however, was that his vision of Cuba’s 
separation from Spain would not entail an end to Cuban slavery, but would be done in its name. 
During the 1848 meeting in Havana regarding the founding of the Second Republic in France, 
López was purported to have supported the idea that if Spain became a republic and abolished 
slavery, Cubans should seek annexation to the United States to avoid a race war. It was also 
during this time that López became acquainted with the members and project of El Club de la 
Habana. After a subsequent meeting, López agreed to put off his planned uprising until word got 
back regarding the club’s offer of $3 million to General William J. Worth to assemble a force of 
soldiers and lead an invasion of Cuba with the hope that the United States would then annex the 
island.22 
 On July 4, however, everything fell apart. When Pedro Gabriel Sánchez, a planter from 
the city of Trinidad, learned from his son José María Sánchez Iznaga of Narciso López’s 
intentions, he denounced the planned rebellion to the commandant general of Cuba’s central 
department. The commandant general immediately sent word to authorities in Cienfuegos, the 
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cite of López’s planned insurrection. On July 5, authorities in Cienfuegos arrested José María 
Sánchez Iznaga and an associate named José Gregorio Díaz de Villegas. Hoping to lure López 
into their hands, authorities then sent a letter to López’s residence asking him to see the governor 
of Cienfuegos to discuss a matter. Though López responded that he would do so shortly, he 
instead absconded, first to Cárdenas and then to Matanzas, where on the night of July 8 he 
boarded a ship for the United States.23 
 The incident prompted a swift response from the colonial government. On July 10, 
Captain General Federico de Roncali directly ordered Military Commission fiscal Colonel 
Cristoval Zurutia to investigate Lopéz’s planned insurrection and his dramatic escape, bypassing 
the tribunal’s president.24 It is unclear when captains general began bypassing the Military 
Commission’s president when directing the actions of tribunal officials. It was certainly a 
departure from the way things had been done in the past, however, and spoke of the captain 
general’s ability to wield the tribunal as he saw fit when circumstances warranted. 
 As prompt as Roncali’s response had been, fiscal Zurutia’s investigation dragged on for 
months. After his superiors preemptively acquitted ten individuals caught up in his investigation, 
Zurutia recommended that they bring the prosecution to a conclusion.25 In his final report to the 
tribunal’s Consejo de Guerra, Zurutia downplayed the seriousness of the threat López had posed 
and recommended acquitting six of the remaining eight defendants of all guilt. The only 
sentences Zurutia recommended were against José María Sánchez Iznaga, who he said should be 
placed in exile for a period of eight years, and López himself, who should be stripped of all his 
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commissions and distinctions and be banished from all Spanish domains in perpetuity.26 With a 
plurality of votes, the Consejo de Guerra followed Zurutia’s recommendations when they passed 
judgement on the two on March 3, 1849.27 
 In reviewing the consejo’s judgement, Captain General Roncali’s auditor de guerra, 
Antonio Armero, continued to downplay the significance of the threat López had posed, claiming 
that the conspiracy only existed in López’s “manifest desire to create it.” He believed, however, 
that the Military Commission had been too lenient and advised Roncali to convene a consejo de 
revisión in conjuncture with members of the Real Audiencia to review the sentences against 
López and Sánchez Iznaga.28 The consejo de revisión submitted its findings on April 23, 
reducing Sánchez Iznaga’s sentence from eight years of exile to six years with a prohibition from 
returning to Cuba, and increasing López’s sentence from perpetual exile to death.29  
However serious Narciso López’s insurrectionary plans had been prior to his escape, and 
however committed they were to the goal of Cuban annexation to its northern neighbor, once in 
the US he encountered a public that was receptive to the idea as a solution to developmental 
pressures stemming from the politics and economics of slavery.30 With the help of various 
intermediaries, López threw himself into the task of organizing an armed expedition to Cuba. 
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One of his closest allies was John O’Sullivan, the proponent of American expansionism.31 
O’Sullivan’s brother-in-law was the wealthy Cuban planter Cristóbal Madan, who had 
introduced O’Sullivan to El Club de la Habana and their annexationist plans when O’Sullivan 
visited Cuba in 1847.32 With O’Sullivan’s help, López sought support for his expedition in New 
York, Washington, and New Orleans through meetings with such figures as President Polk, 
Senators John C. Calhoun, Stephen Douglass, Jefferson Davis, and Major Robert E. Lee, 
distinguished veteran of the recent war in Mexico. Encountering some interest, little support, and 
in certain instances outright resistance, López set off on his own.33 
On the early morning of May 19, 1850, López arrived in the port city of Cárdenas aboard 
a steamer named the Creole with a force of approximately 500 men. Though the force succeeded 
in capturing the city’s lieutenant governor and garrison, they encountered none of the support 
from disaffected Cubans they had anticipated. Because of their clumsy approach, they had also 
lost the element of surprise. When López learned of the approach of a sizable force of Spanish 
soldiers, he ordered his men to board the Creole and retreated to the United States.34 
The Military Commission’s 1848 prosecution of Narciso López had downplayed the 
significance of the threat he had posed. Captain General Roncali’s response to López’s 1850 
invasion, by contrast, took little for granted. Upon learning of López’s landing at Cárdenas, 
Roncali proclaimed the island to be under a state of siege, declaring that captured members of 
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López’s expedition were to be immediately executed and that any of the island’s inhabitants 
found to have supported López or who in any way tried to undermine the public peace by 
attempting to recruit plantation slaves or through political dissent would be subjected to the same 
fate.35 
As he and his predecessors had done in the past when contending with threats to insular 
security, Captain General Roncali turned to the Military Commission. Though his proclamation 
was clear and unambiguous, the tribunal acted on its imperatives in uneven ways. Six members 
of López’s expedition had been left behind after the general’s hasty retreat. Authorities captured 
five of them. Rather than being immediately executed, as per Roncali’s proclamation, the five 
prisoners were all brought before the Military Commission. The tribunal prosecuted them 
expeditiously, sentencing them all to death. On May 25, authorities executed four of the 
prisoners. Britain’s consul to Cuba intervened on behalf of the fifth prisoner, who was an 
Englishman, securing a reduction in his sentence to ten years of imprisonment in Africa.36 
The sixth member of López’s expedition, a North American named William Wilcox, 
experienced a longer trial. He had been a member of the Creole’s crew and claimed that he had 
learned of the expedition’s purpose only after they had embarked from New Orleans, and that he 
had initially refused to participate in the invasion. When the Creole arrived in Cárdenas, 
however, López’s soldiers tried to enlist him forcibly. Rather than participate, Wilcox jumped 
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overboard and swam to shore, where he hid out during the actual invasion.37 After the Americans 
apparently had departed, he surrendered to the first Cuban he saw.38 
Luckily for Wilcox, he had been taken into custody by the Navy, thus sparing him from 
the expedited trial and execution suffered by the other prisoners. On June 3, however, Captain 
General Roncali ordered that Wilcox’s case be transferred to the Military Commission.39 Despite 
Wilcox’s denial of being an actual member of the expeditionary force, fiscal Francisco Javier 
Mendoza recommended that Wilcox be executed.40 The tribunal’s Consejo de Guerra instead 
sentenced him to ten years of imprisonment in Africa.41 By the end of the year, Wilcox was in 
the Spanish port city of Algeciras, awaiting transfer to a prison in Ceuta.42 
For Cubans who had been in Cárdenas during the invasion and whose activities on that 
day aroused the suspicions of authorities, the Military Commission was less vigorous in 
attending to Captain General Roncali’s proclamation promising immediate executions. One 
person who was soon arrested for assisting the invaders was Joaquín Malléa. A twenty-seven-
year-old free pardo, Malléa was originally from Villa Clara. In 1835 he had moved to Havana, 
where he obtained a seven-year contract to work as the barber for the military. He eventually 
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moved to Cárdenas, where he entered into a business partnership with the brother of a public 
notary and opened up a barber shop of his own.43  
On the day of López’s invasion, numerous witnesses saw Malléa riding a horse while 
wielding a sword and meeting with the invaders. Following López’s retreat, authorities 
apprehended Malléa after he had attempted to leave Cárdenas. The Military Commission 
eventually assumed jurisdiction over the case and after a legal process that lasted ten months, 
fiscal Francisco Javier Mendoza recommended that Malléa be sentenced to imprisonment for ten 
years overseas, with a prohibition from returning to Cuba or Puerto Rico.44 The tribunal’s 
Consejo de Guerra reduced Malléa’s sentence to just six years of imprisonment overseas.45 
Another focus of the Military Commission’s prosecutorial ire had been a source of 
concern for regional officials prior to López’s invasion. In 1849, Governor García Oña of 
Matanzas had denounced a planter named Victoriano Arrieta for being an active sympathizer of 
Cuban independence and had named among Arrieta’s associates a neighboring planter named 
Basilio Tosca.46 In early June 1850, as he directed his resources towards rooting out suspected 
supporters of López, Captain General Roncali ordered Cárdenas authorities to arrest Tosca.47 
At the time of his arrest, Basilio Tosca was twenty-seven years old. When he was a child, 
his parents Juan Bautista Tosca and María de la Luz had survived the Guamacaro rebellion of 
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1825, which had been organized and led by their slave Pablo Gangá.48 Nineteen years later, 
Basilio Tosca witnessed firsthand the Escalera process play out, as authorities again identified 
Pablo as a leading conspirator and eventually executed him.49 Now the head of his household, 
Basilio Tosca administered the plantation on behalf of his widowed mother.50 
While under interrogation by Cárdenas-based officials, Tosca claimed that he had headed 
to the city on the day of the invasion simply out of curiosity. Learning that López’s soldiers were 
not preventing residents from moving about, he entered the city, he claimed, to collect eighteen 
ounces of gold in case he had to flee with his family. As he moved about the city, he ran into an 
acquaintance named Felipe Gaunaurd. While passing the city’s jail, some Cubans who were part 
of López’s expedition beckoned Tosca and Gaunaurd to enter the jail to converse. Soon after, 
Tosca and Gaunaurd left the city. When asked if the Americans had invited him to join them, he 
said not directly. When asked if he had recognized anyone else, Tosca claimed that he had seen 
Narciso López and had recognized the general from his time as the president of the Military 
Commission. At the end of the interrogation, authorities asked Tosca if he knew anything about 
Gaunaurd having boarded López’s ship. Tosca replied that he did not.51 Unbeknownst to Tosca, 
authorities had already interrogated Gaunaurd, who had confessed that after the meeting at the 
jail, he and Tosca had boarded the filibuster’s ship and had even had lunch with some of the 
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filibusters later in the day.52 
 By the beginning of July, the Military Commission had assumed jurisdiction over 
Tosca’s case and he had been transferred to the royal prison in Havana.53 On July 15, fiscal 
Pedro Pablo Cruces took Tosca’s confession. Tosca denied all the charges levied against him, 
claiming, according to the record, “that he is convinced of the trouble and ruinous harm that 
would be caused to the country by the project of which he is accused, and that he has valuable 
interests to lose and he is the head of his large family, circumstances that make him desire peace 
and tranquility.”54 
In his final report to the tribunal’s Consejo de Guerra, Cruces recommended that Basilio 
Tosca and Felipe Gaunaurd be exiled to Puerto Rico for a period of time to be determined by the 
captain general.55 With a plurality of votes, the consejo instead sentenced Tosca and Gaunaurd 
with time served and court fees.56 
Captain General Roncali relied on the Military Commission to prosecute several other 
suspected supporters of López and the project of annexationism.57 In this endeavor, the tribunal’s 
actions reflected a range of approaches, including the captain general’s direct command of 
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tribunal officials, the expedited prosecution and execution of some of López’s men, and the more 
drawn out prosecutions that had typified the tribunal’s workflow in the past. Despite this 
versatility, in cases when tribunal officials followed established procedures and practices, 
adherence to process could still slow things down and often lead to reduced sentences. 
Despite Roncali’s efforts to crack down on supporters of the annexationist project 
following López’s taking of the city of Cárdenas, his superiors in Spain nonetheless held him 
responsible for what they deemed to be an unacceptable breach of Spanish sovereignty. On 
November 10, 1850, José de la Concha arrived in Cuba to relieve Roncali of the captaincy 
general of Cuba, with a mandate to prevent the island from succumbing to the forces of 
annexationism.58 
Narciso López returned to the US after his failed filibustering expedition to popular 
acclaim and legal troubles. Federal officials indicted López and some of his supporters for 
violating the Neutrality Act of 1794. After the prosecution ended in a mistrial, López and his 
supporters immediately began organizing a second expedition.59 In the early hours of August 12, 
1851, López and his second force of 400 filibusters landed in the small town of El Morrillo, west 
of Havana. López then split his men into two groups, with a smaller force led by William L. 
Crittenden remaining near El Morrillo with the bulk of their supplies, while López led a larger 
force inland in search of sympathizers willing to join his cause. Through a well-organized 
intelligence apparatus in the United States, Captain General José de la Concha had anticipated 
López’s arrival and had positioned Spanish soldiers in strategic locations. On August 13, Spanish 
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soldiers attacked the divided force of filibusters. The next day, Crittenden and his remaining men 
escaped to sea on four small boats, but were captured two days later and taken to Havana. López 
eluded capture for almost two weeks. Through a series of small skirmishes, insects, oppressive 
heat, and declining morale, his force had been reduced in number and resolve. On August 26, De 
la Concha announced safe quarter for all filibusters who surrendered. On August 28, López and 
his remaining men finally surrendered.60 
As with the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825 and the Bemba and Triunvirato rebellions of 
1843, the military and legal responses to López’s second expedition were intimately related. 
Unlike those prosecutions, which had been complicated by the competing imperatives of 
interrogation and repression, the legal response to López’s second expedition brought swift, 
repressive, and exemplary punishments. 
On the early morning of August 16, Captain General José de la Concha ordered Military 
Commission fiscal Pedro Pablo Cruces to conduct a “brief and summary examination” of 
William Crittenden and his men, who were currently being detained on a vessel named the 
Esperanza. With the aid of a secretary and a translator, Cruces questioned thirty-four prisoners in 
quick succession, including Crittenden. Crittenden’s interrogation appears to have followed 
standard, if expedited, form. Upon being prompted by Cruces to recount the circumstances of his 
arrest, Crittenden described having been led to believe by López that the island was in a “state of 
revolution” and that he and his men had come to “assist in the cause.” The remaining 
interrogations played out in a similar manner, with the record of each successive interrogation 
diminishing in length.61 
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After receiving the records of Cruces’s interrogations later that morning, De la Concha 
ordered another fiscal with the Military Commission, Captain Luís de la Guardia, to finish 
interrogating the remaining sixteen prisoners. Though De la Concha deployed tribunal officials 
to take depositions in a legalistic way, there was no pretense that Crittenden’s men would be 
subject to the type of fully articulated prosecution the Military Commission typically conducted. 
Upon receiving records of the second round of interrogations, De la Concha cited his 
predecessor’s proclamation of April 20, 1850, issued the day after López’s first invasion, 
mandating the immediate execution of all filibusters, and announced that all fifty prisoners 
would be immediately executed. There would be no ratification of testimonies, no defense, no 
deliberation, and no vote by the Military Commission’s Consejo de Guerra, just executions on 
the order of the captain general. De la Concha then had the prisoners placed into the custody of 
Brigadier General Francisco de Velasco, who had served as President of the Military 
Commission from 1835 to 1842, prior to being replaced as president by Narciso López himself. 
He now once again presided over the tribunal and oversaw the executions. At 11:30AM, outside 
the Castle Atares, Velasco had the prisoners executed in four groups of twelve and thirteen, 
promptly had their bodies taken to a cemetery to be buried, and then returned to the Palace of the 
Captains General to hand the signed and certified case file to De la Concha.62 
Narciso López’s execution was conducted in a manner that was similarly hasty, though 
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perhaps a bit more attentive to formal legal process. After López’s flight from Cuba in 1848, the 
Military Commission had tried him in absentia, and after a legal process that had included the 
intervention of then Captain General Roncali, had sentenced him to death. On the morning of 
September 1, 1851, with his fate thus already sealed, López was brought to a plaza overlooking 
the port of Havana. With López presented before the surviving members of his expedition, 2,000 
cavalrymen, and 3,000 infantrymen, it may have appeared as though his execution was being 
conducted in the sort of exemplary manner that had characterized the executions of insurgent 
slave leaders during the Guamacaro rebellion of 1825, the Bemba and Triunvirato rebellions of 
1843, and the Escalera process of 1844. Those executions had been performed in front of slaves 
and had been meant to terrorize them into refraining from future slave resistance. In this 
instance, however, the executions were not meant to warn the assemblage of surviving filibusters 
against future attempts to wrest the island away from Spanish dominion. More likely, the 
intended recipients of this warning were the 20,000 residents of Havana who had assembled to 
witness the execution and who were now being reminded of the might and resolve of the Spanish 
Empire’s claims to sovereignty over the island.63 
In the twenty-six years the Military Commission had been in operation, its formal 
adherence to legal process had consistently undercut its ability to mete out swift and exemplary 
justice, even when its defendants and victims were free and enslaved people of color. At first, 
tribunal officials were not perturbed by the dilatory effects of the law, as their command of the 
law, even at a slow pace, expressed the sovereign authority of the captaincy general they 
served.64 Over the years, however, their experiences prosecuting free people of color whose 
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alleged crimes were often exaggerated, if not fabricated, exacerbated financial pressures 
experienced by the tribunal, which had to finance much of its operations through successful 
prosecutions, engendering a developing sense that free people of color could be adjudicated with 
a less rigorous attention to law in certain instances.65 During the tribunal’s involvement in the 
Escalera process of 1844, the exceptional position free and enslaved people of color occupied 
within the tribunal’s legal framework continued to develop, as the process came to sanction their 
torture.66 With Narciso López’s second filibustering expedition, then, Captain General De la 
Concha extended the legal exception the tribunal had learned to assign to free and enslaved 
people of color in certain instances to López and his men, as tribunal officials acting under the 
direct command of the captain general bypassed all but the most superficial trappings of formal 
legal process in order to subject the prisoners to the swiftest and most severe punishment.  
 
Reforming the Administration of Justice 
In the aftermath of Narciso López’s second filibustering expedition, Captain General De la 
Concha headed a colonial government that had in the last seven years withstood dramatic 
challenges to Cuban slavery and Spanish empire from the likes of slaves, free people of color, 
foreign abolitionists, and now a former Spanish general. In matters of insular security, the 
colonial government had proven itself more than capable of addressing threats to Spanish 
sovereignty over Cuba through military and legal means. In the years to come, De la Concha led 
an effort to consolidate the captaincy general’s sovereign authority to maintain insular security 
and promote social order by reforming the administration of justice in ways that diffused 
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throughout the island’s legal system his office’s capacity to repress and dominate. Though these 
reforms were promulgated by a metropolitan government committed to excluding Cuba from the 
rights and benefits of liberal governance and were enacted by a captain general who had proven 
his willingness to govern with an iron fist, they articulated a set of principles for the 
administration of justice regarding salaries for jurists and the centralization of judicial 
appointments that had been supported by liberals since the days of the 1812 Constitution of 
Cádiz. Not incidentally, these principles also characterized much of what made the Military 
Commission such a useful instrument of executive authority. 
Captain General José de la Concha returned to Spain on April 15, 1852, after some of his 
criticisms of the metropolitan government had caused him to fall from favor. He was replaced by 
Juan de la Pezuela.67 Recalling his role in overseeing the colonial state’s response to Narciso 
López’s second invasion, De la Concha summed up his overall impression: 
The great spectacle that [Cuba] has offered, during the events that have just 
ended, with the justice given to the expeditionary leader, could only be one more 
reason to force me to work hard in everything that could contribute to their 
greater well-being and prosperity, especially when we saw the growth of the 
prestige of Her Majesty's government, as clearly revealed by the enthusiasm 
with which the civil population had come to aid the troops in the pursuit of the 
pirates, and to render to the former all the aid which may have been necessary.68 
Whether these perceived feelings of popular enthusiasm were wrought of fear, genuine loyalty, 
or something in the middle, De la Concha saw them as a sign of support by the island’s populace 
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for its government. The time was right, then, to pursue a series of reforms to colonial governance 
that in the past might have been too disruptive.69 
Indeed, while his appointment to the captaincy general of Cuba had been occasioned by 
perceptions that Federico Roncali had not acted firmly enough to prevent Narciso López’s first 
invasion, De la Concha claimed that he had approached the administration of the island 
comprehensively. In the months prior to his departure for Cuba, he had done extensive research 
into the topic of colonial governance and had interviewed many people who had spent time in 
Cuba. At the time, he had signaled his sense of the origins of the troubles plaguing colonial 
governance when he conditioned his acceptance of Cuba’s captaincy general upon receipt of a 
raise.70 
As De la Concha later recounted regarding his income, captains general received 
relatively small salaries, as dictated by the relevant legislation and established practices. In a 
formal sense, they supplemented their incomes with the fees they accrued on a per-signature-
basis during the normal course of overseeing and approving the work of civil and military 
governance, and the administration of justice.71 Considering the various avenues captains general 
of Cuba normally pursued towards self-enrichment, including collecting a per-head fee on the 
activities of the contraband slave trade, De la Concha’s concern over his salary should not be 
seen as an actual concern over his material wellbeing.72 Rather, as he repeatedly pointed out, the 
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structure of remunerations for captains general meant that they had to expend tremendous time 
participating in the actual work of colonial governance. Freed from these time-consuming 
practices, De la Concha claimed that he had thus been able to dedicate the appropriate time and 
resources towards a review of colonial governance and possible reforms.73 
Though contending with Narciso López’s second invasion and its aftermath had occupied 
much of his time, De la Concha’s return to Spain in 1852 was an opportunity to set his thoughts 
and observations to paper. Much as Francisco Dionisio Vives had done by filling out the 
Ministry of War’s questionnaire upon his return to Cuba in 1832, De la Concha contributed to 
the administrative memory of Spain’s imperial project by publishing his own account of his time 
in Cuba. De la Concha’s Memoria took the practice to a whole new level, as it laid out a 
comprehensive assessment of the problems ailing colonial governance, his actions taken to 
alleviate some of these problems, and his recommendations for future administrations. While his 
review of colonial governance covered a vast territory, including public education, sanitation, 
relations with the church, and the role of the Intendancy, he directed a great deal of attention 
towards the administration of justice. 
In this facet of colonial governance, De la Concha revisited the interrelated issues of 
antiquated funding structures and salaries. Much like his argument that Captains General needed 
adequate salaries in order to attend to their responsibilities, De la Concha focused on the negative 
consequences of a legal system that relied on the labor of unsalaried officials to help sustain 
social stability. In highlighting the problems brought by a system of justice that was not 
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financially administered by the state, he was the latest contributor to a growing chorus calling for 
reforms to the administration of justice. Though these calls for reform originated in different 
political contexts by officials and jurists working in different relations to the state, they shared a 
common sense of what had to be done. 
The 1812 Constitution of Cádiz had decades earlier set the stage for major reforms to 
Spain’s legal system when it mandated that Spanish provinces be divided into judicial districts 
headed by jueces de letras (judges trained in law) who were to be appointed by the government 
and receive salaries.74 Fernando VII regained the throne as absolute monarch and abolished the 
1812 constitution before these reforms could be implemented.75 During the years of the trienio 
liberal in Cuba, however, Captain General Cagigal began restructuring the colonial legal system 
in accordance with the 1812 constitution, a process that saw the young jurist José Ildefonso 
Suárez named juez de letras for the district of San Antonio Abad.76 
Even if Captain General Francisco Dionisio Vives could find merit in the actions of 
individual jurists within this system of legal districts and jueces de letras, as he had done with 
the role José Ildefonso Suárez’s had played in the prosecution of the Soles y Rayos de Bolívar, 
his inability to easily replace judges and the decentralizing tendencies of appellate processes 
beyond his control motivated him to ask his superiors in Spain to grant him the extraordinary 
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powers enjoyed by governors of cities under siege.77 With the renewed push to secure Cuba’s 
position within the Spanish Empire that followed the end of the trienio liberal, Fernando VII’s 
government afforded Vives these extraordinary powers as well as the Military Commission with 
which to prosecute enemies of the state, for which Vives named José Ildefonso Suárez to serve 
as asesor.78 
Under both liberal and absolutist regimes, then, captains general voiced concerns about 
the present state of the island’s legal system by working towards the establishment of a 
professional judiciary and by seeking to increase the system’s responsiveness to the executive 
authority of the central government. Within the Military Commission itself, asesor José 
Ildefonso Suárez promoted these imperatives towards authoritarian ends in his related struggles 
to secure a salary for himself and to carve out administrative space for the tribunal within the 
institutional makeup of the colonial government.79 
Jurists working within Cuba’s legal system but not necessarily in alignment with the 
interests of the captaincy general also made similar calls for reform. One such voice was the 
noted jurist and liberal proponent Francisco de Armas. Born in 1804 in Puerto Príncipe to a 
Cuban mother and a father from the Canary Islands, De Armas had completed his legal studies at 
the age of sixteen and was authorized to practice law by the Real Audiencia two years later. In 
1836, he was one of three Cuban deputies who had been denied participation in the constituent 
assembly that drafted the constitution of 1837. Though Cuba remained outside of Spain’s 
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political order to be governed in principle by a set of “special laws” that in practice were never 
enacted, De Armas continued promoting the cause of Cuban representation in the Spanish 
Empire until his unexpected death in 1844.80 
In 1835, as a member of Havana’s municipal council, Francisco de Armas authored a 
report on the state of the administration of justice in Cuba that he then sent to the Ministry of 
State in Spain. Perhaps channeling the ascendant liberal fervor accompanying the death of 
Fernando VII in 1833, De Armas’s report spoke of the experience of regular folks caught up in 
the legal system. Though he characterized the island’s legal system as notorious for its high 
levels of official corruption, the prevalence of frivolous lawsuits, and endemic fraudulent 
practices, De Armas argued that these maladies were not merely the result of unscrupulous 
people acting in bad faith within an otherwise well-formed legal system. Rather, they were 
derived from a set of independent yet interconnected administrative structures that encouraged 
practices and behaviors that taken together worked to compromise the system as a whole.81   
 According to De Armas’s analysis, the issue of remunerations was central. Functionaries 
within Cuba’s legal system earned incomes based on their level of participation in lawsuits and 
prosecutions, where participation was measured according to the number of documents they 
signed or the number of pages they authored. Legal functionaries such as local judges hearing 
cases in municipal courts thus had a financial incentive to see lawsuits and prosecutions drag on. 
The problems of this system of remuneration were further exacerbated by the system’s 
dependence on lay judges. As lay judges were not trained in law, they depended on the legal 
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counsel of trained asesores. Since asesores also earned incomes based on fees measured against 
their participation in a given case, they too had a financial incentive to prolong legal processes.82 
 De Armas also criticized fueros, a system of special legal rights and specialized 
jurisdictions that, in his view, led to predatory practices and abuses of the legal system. 
Individuals who enjoyed the active fuero, because they were in the military or were members of 
other fuero-bearing entities, could initiate lawsuits that would be heard in the specialized court 
that corresponded to their fuero. Since active fuero-bearing litigants could expect lawsuits they 
initiated to be heard before friendly courts, De Armas argued that they had an incentive to 
initiate lawsuits that ranged from frivolous to fraudulent in the hope that their victims would 
instead choose to settle out of court. De Armas also argued that even the passive fuero, which 
afforded their bearers the right to defend themselves against legal actions in the specialized court 
that corresponded to their fuero, had detrimental effects, as friendly fuero courts might try to 
shield fuero-bearing defendants through prolonged hearings and lengthy appellate processes.83  
 Francisco de Armas thus proposed two reforms. The first involved greatly reducing the 
number of fuero courts of first and second instance, abolishing the active fuero, and placing 
restrictions on who could enjoy the passive fuero. The second was to staff the legal system with 
government appointed jueces letrados who earned salaries, thus eliminating the influence of lay 
judges who were not necessarily interested in the proper administration of justice and removing 
financial interests from complicating legal processes. The added expense that came with paying 
legal functionaries salaries would be covered, De Armas claimed, by channeling the fees and 
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fines normally destined for the pockets of legal functionaries into the treasury.84 
Francisco de Armas’s proposal for reforming the administration of justice spoke of the 
political aspirations resonating in Cuba during the early years of Captain General Tacón’s 
administration, when many Cubans hoped that the island might experience some of the political 
transformation taking place in Spain. But they were not particular to that moment. In the midst of 
the prosecutorial phase of the Escalera process in 1844, the Ministry of Justice in Madrid ordered 
the Real Audiencia Pretorial in Havana to respond to alleged abuses within the high court itself. 
In compiling its response, the high court’s presiding officials commissioned the high court’s 
fiscal José Antonio de Olañeta to outline the problems plaguing the administration of justice. In a 
framing that alluded to the ongoing Escalera process, Olañeta began his report by summarizing 
Cuban demographics, crediting the commanding presence of “the colored race, free and 
enslaved,” for the prevalence of immorality in Cuban society. He also pointed to productive and 
commercial practices attached to slavery and the slave trade as sources of immorality. In short, 
he blamed social heterogeneity deriving from slavery and the slave trade for the problems 
plaguing the legal system as a whole.85  
Without drawing any connections between Cuba’s population of free and enslaved people 
of color and the particular problems plaguing the administration of justice, the fiscal then 
enumerated maladies reminiscent of Francisco de Armas’s report from a decade earlier. Atop his 
list was the complicating impact of fueros and their attendant courts, and the prevalence of lay 
judges and asesores who had financial stakes in the legal processes they presided over. Not only 
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did Olañeta echo De Armas’s critique, he also offered the same solutions, arguing that the state 
had to populate the legal system with salary-earning jueces letrados.86 
Indeed, in 1845, of the more than seventy lower courts throughout the island, only six 
were headed by trained jurists. After collecting a range of opinions, including the one proffered 
by fiscal Olañeta, the metropolitan government approved a series of legal reforms, some of 
which applied to Cuba’s lower courts. Jueces letrados serving in the capacity of alcaldes 
mayores would be assigned to major cities such as Havana, Matanzas, and Trinidad to hear cases 
in the ordinary jurisdiction. Regional governors and lieutenant governors would then be 
responsible for appointing asesores to advise lay judges in smaller municipalities. These new 
jueces letrados would enjoy salaries, with their rights to fees, fines, and confiscated property 
being ceded to the royal treasury. The asesores appointed to advise local lay judges, however, 
would still maintain their rights to charge fees.87 
In practice, however, these reforms were costly. Alcaldes mayores who now enjoyed 
salaries heard increasing numbers of processes orally, for which they could still charge fees. 
Additionally, they continued to rely on the assistance of ancillary legal officials like asesores and 
scribes, who themselves possessed the right to charge fees, thus undermining the amount per 
legal process being deposited in the treasury.88 
A royal decree from January 29, 1851, issued by the Ministry of Justice further refined 
the reforms of 1845 by expanding the number of alcaldes mayores throughout the island and 
prohibiting heads of municipalities without alcaldes mayores from acting as lay judges. These 
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reforms also apportioned greater appointing and oversight responsibilities to the captain general 
and the Ministry of Justice.89 
José de la Concha returned to the captaincy general of Cuba on September 21, 1854, in 
response to concerns from those with a continued stake in the maintenance of Cuban slavery that 
his predecessor, Juan de la Pezuela, had not been a sufficiently ardent defender of the 
institution.90 De la Concha was sent by a metropolitan government already committed to the task 
of institutionalizing Spanish sovereignty within the executive powers of the captaincy general. In 
1853, the metropolitan government had already issued a royal order assigning all the 
competencies of the Intendancy’s superintendent to the island’s superior government, atop of 
which sat the captain general, thus unceremoniously putting an end to the hopes and aspirations 
Cuban planters had placed in their control of the institution.91 1853 was also the year that the 
metropolitan government finally abolished the Real Audiencia in Puerto Príncipe, leaving the 
Real Audiencia Pretorial as the island’s only high court, and keeping it under the close watch of 
the captain general in Havana.92 
On January 30, 1855, the metropolitan government promulgated a royal decree 
mandating and outlining a comprehensive reformation of the administration of justice in Cuba. 
The decree addressed the powers and responsibilities of local ley judges, the form and function 
of the island’s system of lower courts, the organization and powers of the Real Audiencia 
Pretorial, the supreme tribunal of justice in Spain, fueros and their attendant courts, the relation 
                                                 
89 Real cédula, Madrid, 29 January 1851, exp. 223, leg. 155, ROC, ANC. 
90 Fradera, Colonias para después de un imperio, 314. 
91 Fradera, Colonias para después de un imperio, 316-317. 




between fuero courts and the administration of the government, the work of ancillary legal 
figures such as notaries, the establishment and organization of a ministry of fiscales, and more.93 
The 1855 decree nonetheless addressed a set of core concerns that had been raised 
repeatedly by the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz, by Captain General Vives when he pointed to the 
limitations of the constitutionally mandated legal system when asking for extraordinary powers, 
by Francisco de Armas’s recommendations for reforming the legal system, and by the initial set 
of legal reforms made in 1845. The 1855 decree finally stripped lay judges, locally elected 
municipal officials, and jueces pedáneos such as comisarios de barrios and capitanes de partidos 
of all legal powers within the ordinary jurisdiction. Though they could still make oral 
judgements on minor matters and could act as justices of the peace, their formal roles as legal 
figures was now to channel criminals and complaints into the lower courts.94 
The 1855 decree also relieved more important governing officials at the rank of governor 
and lieutenant governor of having to hear cases in the ordinary jurisdiction. This had been made 
possible with the appointment of jueces letrados in the form of alcaldes mayores in 
municipalities and jueces de partido in less populated areas. In addition to making more stark the 
division between civil governance and the administration of justice, the 1855 decree assigned 
salaries to legal officials working in the ordinary jurisdiction, relieving them of the need to 
charge fees against recovered court costs. While this had been extended to alcaldes mayores with 
the 1845 reforms, the 1855 decree now also provided salaries for asesores, who would thus cede 
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their right to charge fees to the royal treasury.95 Finally, the 1855 decree streamlined the 
appellate process, channeling all appeals in the ordinary jurisdiction and most other appeals in 
other jurisdictions to be heard by the Real Audiencia Pretorial in Havana.96 
Though the Ministries of War and the Navy registered complaints regarding the manner 
in which the reforms had been drafted, their diminution of the fuero, and the appellate process 
they outlined for cases involving the specialized tribunals of the army and navy, by late April De 
la Concha’s government was ready to begin implementing the reforms and began sending to 
Spain lists of candidates to fill the new positions required by the reforms for approval.97 The 
island would now be divided into twenty-five judicial districts, presided over by thirty-two 
alcaldes mayores acting as judges. Along with the prosecutors, secretaries, and ancillary staff 
working for each alcalde mayor, the entire system of lower courts was now staffed with 160 
officials, each earning a salary. Prior to the reforms, the annual cost of all the salaried positions 
working within the lower courts of the ordinary jurisdiction amounted to 72,604 pesos. With the 
reforms, that annual cost more than doubled, to 171,700. Indeed, when the increased costs of the 
reforms to the entire ordinary jurisdiction were taken into account, the escalation in the 
government’s financial responsibilities for the administration of justice became even more 
pronounced. Prior to the reforms, the annual cost of maintaining the ordinary jurisdiction, 
including the lower courts and the reales audiencias, was 151,604 pesos. After the reforms, that 
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annual cost increased to 270,700 pesos.98 
This massive escalation in the government’s financial responsibilities would nonetheless 
be offset by new revenues. De la Concha estimated that prior to the reforms, the ordinary 
jurisdictions had recovered 87,000 pesos from court costs and an additional 170,000 pesos from 
the sale of sealed paper, for total annual revenues of 257,000 pesos. With 100 percent of these 
revenues now being channeled into the royal treasury, the difference between estimated revenues 
and the increased costs of affording 160 judicial officials with salaries was only 13,700 pesos, a 
much more palatable expense.99  
The 1855 decree outlined an ideal model for the administration of justice staffed by 
professional jurists acting as judges, prosecutors, and advisers, all of whom were chosen by the 
captain general and approved by the Ministry of Justice in Spain. The added expense of paying 
so many legal functionaries would be offset by channeling fines, embargoed property, and court 
costs directly into the colonial treasury controlled by the Intendancy, which was now controlled 
by the captain general. And all appeal cases would be channeled to the Real Audiencia Pretorial, 
whose president was the captain general. In short, the 1855 decree was a final step in a decades-
long push, with origins in the 1812 Constitution of Cádiz, to centralize the administration of 
justice, and indeed, the administration of colonial governance.   
 
Abolition of the Military Commission 
With the judicial reforms outlined in the royal decree of January 30, 1855, enacted, Captain 
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General José de la Concha stood atop a governing apparatus that expressed a united Spanish 
sovereignty.100 From this position of uncontested authority, he considered the totality of colonial 
governance and decided what to do next. 
 On June 8, 1855, De la Concha presented Ignacio Gonzalez Olivares, the regent of the 
Real Audiencia Pretorial and president of the Real Acuerdo, the main consultative body for the 
civil administration of the island, with a proposal to consider the feasibility of abolishing the 
Military Commission. His reason for questioning the tribunal’s continued utility were cast in 
historical terms and focused on the conditions in Spain and in Cuba that had made the tribunal 
necessary in the first place. “The Military Commission was established on this island on March 
5, 1825,” he wrote, “during a period of reaction and insecurity on the Peninsula, and of great 
danger for Cuba, owing to the moral and […] influence exerted over her by the victorious 
insurrection of the remaining Spanish possessions in America.” But it had been the colonial 
government’s lack of institutional means to promote law and order that had made the tribunal 
necessary. “Preventative and repressive policing did not exist at the time,” he continued, “either 
in the cities or in the countryside, and the administration of justice was performed in near totality 
by lay judges directed by volunteer asesores. The necessary consequence of such a state of 
affairs would be, and indeed was, that robberies, homicides, and every class of crime increased 
to alarming proportions.” At the time, he claimed, “the establishment of a tribunal, brief in its 
forms and severe in its sentences, was a measure that was not only beneficial, but necessary.”101 
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 In the ensuing three decades, however, much had changed. Not only had crime 
diminished, he claimed, “but in the field of civil and judicial administration, immense progress 
has been made.”102 Furthermore, the violent threats to insular security posed by slave resistance 
and political dissent attempting to foment revolution had been supplanted by another sort of 
threat in which perceptions of Cuba in the public and political spheres of the United States were 
being used to argue for the annexation of Cuba. Because Spain’s enemies were pointing to the 
Military Commission as evidence that Spain could only maintain control over the island through 
“terror and force,” and since the distribution of lower courts throughout the island had been 
recently reformed, De la Concha asked Gonzalez Olivares and the other members of the Real 
Acuerdo if the time had not arrived “to abolish the Military Commission?”103 
 After internal deliberations, the members of the Real Acuerdo were split on what to do. 
Some believed that the Military Commission still had utility, but that its jurisdiction could be 
reduced. As the justification for the tribunal resided upon a legal framework affording 
exceptional powers to governors of cities under siege, the dissenters believed that since Cuba 
was not in a state of siege, the tribunal should be abolished. Cases once handled by the tribunal 
could be handled by the ordinary courts, thus preserving the rights of all inhabitants of Cuba. 
Splitting the difference, the Real Acuerdo recommended that the Military Commission be 
abolished with the understanding that captains general could resurrect the tribunal whenever 
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 Approving of the Real Acuerdo’s decision, De la Concha wrote to his superiors in Spain, 
asking that the Military Commission be abolished, but that he be given the power to reinstate the 
tribunal whenever he deemed it appropriate.105 In the meantime, he issued a circular on August 
16, 1855, informing the inhabitants of Cuba that since the royal decree of January 30, 1855, had 
extended professional and capable courts throughout the island, the Military Commission was no 
longer necessary in the way that it once had been. For the time being, he then announced, the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction would be reduced to cases of political dissent and slave rebellions. All 
other cases that would have been tried by the tribunal would now revert to the ordinary 
jurisdiction, to be handled by the newly reformed system of lower courts.106 On January 5, 1856, 
the Ministry of State issued a royal order abolishing Cuba’s Military Commission and 
authorizing captains general to reinstate the tribunal whenever circumstances required.107 On 
May 8, 1856, President Juan Aquiles Rameau of the Military Commission informed Captain 
General De la Concha that he had completed the transfer of the tribunal’s material possessions, 
including its archive, and its remaining cases to the Real Audiencia Pretorial.108 
 
*** 
From 1825 to 1856, the Military Commission had served to amplify the legal powers of the 
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captaincy general to contend with threats to Cuban slavery and Spanish empire. Though the 
tribunal did not play a formal role, Captain General De la Concha’s use of tribunal officials in 
the summary adjudication and execution of Narciso López and his men was the starkest example 
of the type of swift and decisive executive action metropolitan and colonial officials had hoped 
the tribunal would enable. Furthermore, through the exemplary executions of López and his men, 
De la Concha presented this expression of his sovereign authority for all of Cuba to consider and 
contemplate. 
 With the office of the captaincy general thus empowered, the metropolitan government 
sought to consolidate these gains through reforms to the administration of colonial governance. 
In addition to abolishing the Real Audiencia in Puerto Príncipe and subsuming the Intendancy 
within the administrative purview of the captaincy general, the metropolitan government further 
consolidated the powers of the captaincy general through the 1855 reforms to the administration 
of justice in Cuba, effectively centralizing the staffing and territorial organization of the island’s 
legal system. 
 On paper, the Military Commission did not figure in these centralizing reforms. In the 
ways the tribunal was predominantly staffed by salaried functionaries and its operating expenses 
came to be covered by the Intendancy in exchange for rights to the embargoed property of its 
defendants, however, the tribunal did serve as a model for some of the administrative reforms De 
la Concha advanced in his Memoria of 1853. And in the way it amplified the legal powers of 
captains general to contend with threats to insular security, the tribunal also modeled the type of 
administrative authority the captaincy general would enjoy over the administration of justice that 
the 1855 reforms enabled. De la Concha acknowledged the important role the tribunal had 




in particular in the amplification of the legal powers of the office, when he then abolished the 
tribunal in 1856, as all that had been exceptional about the Military Commission had now been 












The political scientist Hugh Heclo once wrote that states must “puzzle before they power.”1 
From the moment Captain General Vives established Cuba’s Military Commission in 1825, 
officials dispersed throughout the institutions of colonial governance puzzled over this peculiar 
court. Through debates and contestations over the tribunal’s jurisdiction, its finances, and the 
strategies, tactics, and practices it employed in its prosecutions, these officials expressed 
differing opinions about the tribunal’s purpose and utility that often articulated the particular 
roles they played as agents of Spain’s sovereign authority over the island. Governing officials in 
the jurisdiction of Matanzas saw in the tribunal a way of suppressing slave resistance and 
repressing slaves, while officials with the Real Audiencia saw in the tribunal an unnecessary 
rival. For the jurist José Ildefonso Suárez, working as the tribunal’s asesor had the potential of 
opening up professional and material opportunities, while the Intendancy’s superintendent 
Claudio Martínez de Pinillos at times saw the tribunal as a burdensome expense. The different 
ways the tribunal left the colonial state puzzled, then, reflected the ways Spanish sovereignty in 
Cuba was dispersed throughout the institutions of colonial governance. 
Though the Military Commission’s institutional presence was sometimes a source of 
discord and contention, its utility in matters of insular security was seldom questioned. This was 
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particularly the case when the tribunal addressed the actual and perceived threats posed by the 
island’s population of free and enslaved people of color. Successive captains general thus saw in 
the tribunal a useful and at times indispensable tool for amplifying their legal powers to contend 
with threats to Cuban slavery and Spanish empire. Even in this regard, however, the law itself 
served to confuse the captaincy general’s reliance on the tribunal, as formal adherence to legal 
process had dilatory effects on prosecutions and tended to lessen the severity of sentences, when 
the exigencies of insular security were deemed to necessitate prosecutorial expediency and 
severity in judgments. 
Captain General O’Donnell came close to solving the puzzle introduced by the Military 
Commission during the multi-phased response to the Conspiracy of La Escalera. First by 
authorizing investigating officials to torture slaves during the initial moments of the investigatory 
phase of the Escalera process, then by extending that authorization to encompass free people of 
color, O’Donnell brought the sanctioned violence of plantation slavery into a formal legal 
process. Though this infused the investigations with the desired repressive edge, their continued 
adherence to legal form inflated the Escalera process to unsustainable proportions. By assigning 
the Matanzas Section of the Military Commission to assume jurisdiction over the growing 
number of investigations, O’Donnell thus situated the Escalera process within the administrative 
structures developed over the previous two decades by the captaincy general, the Intendancy, and 
the Military Commission for financing the tribunal’s operations. While the dramatic threat posed 
by the alleged conspiracy brought the different institutions of colonial governance together in 
unified intent, by channeling the colonial state’s response through the Military Commission, 
O’Donnell also organized the process around the sovereign authority of the captaincy general. 




during his response to Narciso López’s second filibustering expedition. By employing tribunal 
officials to summarily question and execute López and his men, De la Concha channeled all that 
had been enabled legally and administratively by the Military Commission’s adjudication of free 
and enslaved people of color over the preceding two and a half decades towards a show of force 
that bypassed formal legal process and was legitimized by his own claims to sovereign authority. 
With the concentration of sovereign authority within the office of the captaincy general 
on full display, it was now time to power. The 1855 reforms to the administration of justice in 
Cuba outlined the institutional expression in legal matters of a unified mode of colonial 
governance organized in hierarchical relation to the captaincy general. Within this newly 
reconfigured institutional context, the Military Commission was now redundant, as all that had 
once made it exceptional now informed the normative practice of colonial governance. 
In the period following the dissolution of the Military Commission, the decline in 
instances of large-scale slave resistance that followed the Escalera process of 1844 continued, 
even as this period saw the last great surge in slave imports. And though some still held out hope 
for the United States to annex Cuba, there were no more filibustering expeditions.2 On a few 
occasions, captains general established ad hoc military commissions to try specific cases, but it 
appears that Captain General De la Concha’s designs for the colony’s system of lower courts to 
handle cases of social and political dissent were holding fast.3  
Despite the colonial government’s increased capacity to promote insular security, 
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instability in global markets for Cuban cash crops, the concentration of economic growth and 
development in western and central Cuba, and political developments in the United States and 
Spain, among other factors, stressed the island’s economy and destabilized social relations such 
that regional discontent in eastern Cuba turned into open insurrection in 1868.4 Combining the 
struggles against Cuban slavery and Spanish empire, the conflict took on revolutionary 
proportions as “a powerful multiracial army waged anticolonial war.”5 But victory would have to 
wait. As summed up by Louis Pérez, Jr., “for ten years Cubans waged war, mostly in desultory 
fashion, mostly in the east, mostly without effect.”6 
The measure of the colonial state’s capacity to power, then, might not be adequately 
reflected in its inability to avoid the outbreak of the Ten Years’ War, but rather by its ability to 
withstand the challenge that the war represented. Though the war provoked the eventual demise 
of Cuban slavery, Spanish forces and the colonial state were able to shield the centers of Cuba’s 
agricultural economy from major disruptions, while the metropolitan government was able to 
maintain degrees of control over the process of slave emancipation, delaying final abolition until 
1886.7 And though the insurgent army posed a major challenge to Spanish dominion over Cuba, 
most of the island’s inhabitants did not take up arms and Spain managed to maintain its 
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sovereign claims over the island for another three decades.8  
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